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Summary 
There is a striking difference between the large number of theoretical 
papers on firm organization and the lack of quantitative empirical 
evidence. If on the one side economists are increasingly concerned 
with organization of firms, on the other side organization still remains 
an ambiguous concept, hardly analyzed empirically. 
In this thesis I develop a new empirical methodology based upon 
business history (see Chapter 1) and previous theoretical work which 
allows me to describe (some aspects of) the organization of firms in 
quantitative terms. This approach is instrumental to analyzing the 
hierarchical structure and the allocation of decision-making activities 
in a sample composed of 438 Italian metalworking plants. I also 
study the dynamics of firm organization in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
results of Chapter 2 show that the (static) choice of the organizational 
form crucially relies upon the "loss of control phenomenon". They 
also illustrate that the dynamics of hierarchical structure follows an 
inertial process, characterized by incremental adjustments. Lastly, 
both the organization and, more interestingly, its evolution differ from 
one category of plant to another depending crucially on plant size. 
Moreover, I test (some of) the predictions of economic theory on the 
size of the management hierarchy (Chapter 3), the allocation of real 
and formal authority (Chapter 4), and structural inertia (Chapter 6) 
through the estimates of econometric models (i. e., multinomial logit, 
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ordered logit, and survival). The findings of Chapter 3 show that the 
plant size, the characteristics (i. e., vintage and extent of use) of the 
production and communication technology in use, the plant's 
ownership status (i. e., State versus private ownership, and 
differences in the nationality of firms to which plants belong) are key 
in explaining the complexity of a plant's management hierarchy. 
In addition, in accordance with theoretical work, the findings of 
Chapter 4 show that the size of a plant's organization, the 
characteristics of the production and communication technologies in 
use, the urgency of decisions, and the presence of monetary incentive 
schemes aligning plant manager's objectives with those of the firm as 
a whole figure prominently in explaining whether authority is 
delegated to the plant manager or not. The structural and 
organizational characteristics of a plant's parent firm do also play a 
role, with the likelihood of decentralization of decision-making 
increasing with parent firm's size and decreasing with the adoption 
by the parent firm of a M-form type of organization. Lastly, the nature 
of the decision turns out to affect the allocation of formal authority, 
with decisions concerning the labor force being more frequently 
delegated to plant managers than those related to investments in 
capital equipment. On the contrary, it does not influence the 
allocation of real authority when the formal right to decide remains 
with the corporate superior. 
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Finally in Chapter 61 find that both influence activities and 
technology adoptions are key in explaining the evolution of business 
organizations. Influence activities tend to inhibit organizational 
change causing structural inertia, whilst the technology adoptions 
increase the likelihood of changing the structure of the management 
hierarchy. 
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Introduction: The Empirical Methodology 
The present research aims at finding robust evidence on some key 
characteristics of the organization of firms such as the allocation of 
decision-making, the span of control, the size of the management 
hierarchy, and the adoption of managerial and technological 
innovations. There are no institutional sources that provide data on 
such features of business organizations. Thus, I designed, conducted 
- with the help of senior and junior researchers of Politecnico di 
Milano and Univeristä di Pavia - and coordinated a questionnaire 
analysis directed at collecting information on the organization of 
Italian manufacturing plants. The present section provides details of 
the methodology of the empirical survey. In addition, each chapter, 
save the first, contains further information of the organizational, 
technological and plant-specific variables that comprise the data set. 
The Sample 
The current data set derives from the FLAUTO database developed in 
1989 at Politecnico di Milano. The sample was originally composed of 
810 plants and was stratified by industry, geographical area and 
plant size so as to faithfully represent the universe of all Italian 
metalworking plants with more than 10 employees which were in 
operation in 1989 (for a detailed description of the FLAUTO database 
see Cainarca et al. 1989). For each sample plant, the 1997 updated 
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version of FLAUTO (i. e., FLAUTO97) provides information as to 
whether it was shut down during the period June 1989-June 1997. 
Plant closure is distinguished from situations where a plant has 
changed either its ownership structure as a consequence of merger 
and acquisition activity or its location. Thus, I am able to avoid 
possible measurement errors resulting from localization, ownership 
and other administrative changes (e. g., change of the name of the 
parent firm) which are quite usual in this type of exercise (for a 
discussion of such problems see Dunne et al. 1988). Out of the 810 
plants, 708 turned out to be still in operation in 1997.1 The current 
data set constitutes an update and an extension of the old database. 
In June 1997, a questionnaire was mailed to the plant managers of 
the 708 plants of the initial sample that were still in operation. The 
response rate was 62%, so that the current database includes 438 
plants. So, it is the plant managers who provided all the information 
relating to the organization of plants and its changes during the `80s 
and 190s. For each plant of the final sample, the plant manager was 
' This corresponds to a 12.6% failure rate over an eight years period. Previous 
empirical work found considerably lower survival rates among newly established 
units. For instance, Dunne et at. (1989) find that only between one quarter and one 
third of US manufacturing plants owned by single-plant firms survive 15 years. 
However, the likelihood of survival is substantially higher for large establishments 
owned by multi-plant firms. Mata et al. (1995) show that more than 20% of new 
Portuguese plants closed within two years from birth and only 30% survived seven 
years. Nonetheless, the sample includes plants in existence in 1989, which were at 
least three years old. In addition, smaller units (i. e., those which, in 1989, had less 
than 10 employees) are excluded. As hazard rates are usually found to rapidly 
decline with both age and size, the value of the average failure rate in the sample is 
not surprising. For further details see Colombo and Delmastro (1999). 
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directly contacted by phone in order to check the accurateness of 
answers (and to complete the questionnaire if needed). 
Thus, the current sample may contain some biases with respect to 
the Italian universe of metalworking plants from which was originally 
drawn in 1989. However, I have important reasons to justify the use 
of FLAUTO97. The statistical robustness of questionnaire analyses 
highly depends on firms' response rate. In particular, empirical 
investigations that build on low response rates are very likely to 
suffer from sample selection bias problems. Industrial practitioners 
know very well difficulties in reaching a high response rate. A means 
of obtaining a high level of managers' collaboration is to link the 
fieldwork with a previous survey. In my case, the very high response 
rate was due to two reasons. First, I already knew the person (the 
plant manager) to contact within each of the 708 sample plants. 
Second, managers knew the institution, Politecnico di Milano, and 
they usually remembered the previous survey as well. Indeed, I 
overall found the cooperation of most plant managers that led not 
only to a high response rate but also to clean and robust answers. 2 
Even more importantly, FLAUTO database provides information over 
a very long length of time (namely, from 1975 to 1997). Lastly, the 
very low failure rate of sample plants during the period 1989-97 (see 
2 Notice that I was able to control some answers with the information provided by 
FLAUTO89. For instance, I knew if a plant had already adopted, during the period 
1970-89, some advanced manufacturing technologies (such as FMS, LAN and 
Robots). 
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footnote 1) has caused the exclusion of a very small proportion of 
sample plants. 
As regards the conduct of the fieldwork, I started the survey in 
autumn 1996 with the definition of the questionnaire, which has 
involved the active support of statisticians, sociologists, economists 
and managers. In March 1997, I conducted 10 personal pilot 
interviews with managers of plants of very different size and industry 
(within the metalworking sector), so as to test the effectiveness of the 
questionnaire. These interviews have included managers of ABB, 
Alenia, Ansaldo, Contraves, Electrolux, FIAT Ferroviaria, 
Mannesmann, Merloni, Romana Lamiere, and Semikron. In April and 
May 1997, I personally contacted each plant manager of the 708 
sample plants of FLAUTO that were in operation, in order to inform 
them of the research. Then, in June I sent the questionnaire by mail 
with an introductory letter in which I further explained the objectives 
of the research and the links with the previous investigation. Finally, 
telephone follows-up aimed both at checking the accurateness of 
answers and at completing questionnaires when needed. 
Table 1 shows the geographical and size distribution of sample 
plants. As to the size distribution, most of plants have a number of 
employees lower than 100. This clearly reflects the overall size 
distribution of the Italian manufacturing sector, which is 
characterized by the presence of small and medium sized firms. 
Similarly, the sample plants are mainly located in the industrialized 
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northern part of Italy. Lastly, if we compare the geographical 
distribution of the initial sample composed of 708 plants to that of 
the final sample (438), it is evident that there 
localization bias. 3 
is no manifest 
Tab. 1- Size and geographical distribution of sample plants 
final sample 
n. of plants % 
small plants (n. of employees < 100) 
medium plants (n. of empl. 100 - 500) 
large plants (n. of employees > 500) 
North-west of Italy 
North-east of Italy 
Middle of Italy 
Southern Italy and islands 
Total 
initial sample 
n. of plants % 
247 56.4 
157 35.8 
34 7.8 
248 56.6 
111 25.4 
54 12.3 
25 5.7 
390 55.1 
173 24.4 
91 12.9 
54 7,6 
438 100.0 708 100.0 
In sum, FLAUTO97 is a comprehensive and reliable database that 
includes dynamic information over a large spectrum of plants' 
characteristics (see the next paragraph). It derives from a preceding 
survey conducted by Politecnico di Milano in 1989. A possible source 
of bias of the current version concerns the exclusion of closed plants. 
However, the very high response rates of both investigations 
3 Of course, I have no data concerning the number of plant employees in 1997 for 
plants that did not answer to the questionnaire. So, I can only confront the 
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counterbalances this potential problem. 4 Furthermore, FLAUTO97 
covers a period of time of almost 20 years, with detailed information 
at the plant level. 
The Industry 
The metalworking sector includes the following nine two-digit 
industries (NACE-CLIO classification): production of metals (NACE- 
CLIO 27), fabricated metals (NACE-CLIO 28), non-electrical 
machinery (NACE-CLIO 29), computers and office equipment (NACE- 
CLIO 30), electrical machinery and electronics (NACE-CLIO 31), 
communication equipment (NACE-CLIO 32), scientific, precision, 
medical and optical instruments (NACE-CLIO 33), automotive 
industry (NACE-CLIO 34), and other transportation equipment 
(NACE-CLIO 35). In 1996 such industries accounted for 45% and 
36% of total employment and number of firms of the Italian 
manufacturing sector, respectively (see Censimento Intermedio 
dell'Industria e dei Servizi, Istat). 
Generally speaking, most of metalworking industries are the ones 
that most make use of information and flexible automation 
technologies. Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s these industries were 
rapid adopters of new technologies in the spheres of production (e. g., 
NC and CNC machine tools, flexible manufacturing systems and 
geographical distribution of the two samples. 
4 In this respect, it worth noticing that in 1989 the response rate was nearly of 
100%, since the analysis was conducted with the cooperation of the association of 
Italian manufacturing firms. 
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cells), design and engineering (CAD, CAM and CAD-CAM), and 
communication (local area networks), and of innovative 
organizational techniques (just-in-time, total quality management). 
Finally, as is pointed out in the management literature (see Kenney 
and Florida 1988 and Womack et al. 1990), the "lean production" 
model has been developed and initially applied in (some of) these 
industries. So, they constitute an ideal testbed to analyze 
quantitatively the organization of plants and firms and its evolution. 
In sum, the metalworking macro-sector covers almost half of the 
Italian manufacturing sector and in particular those industries that 
are of basic importance in the study of the technological and 
organizational change. 
Tab. 2- Industry distribution of sample plants 
n. of plants 
NACE-CLIO 27 
NACE-CLIO 28 
NACE-CLIO 29 
NACE-CLIO 30 
NACE-CLIO 31 
NACE-CLIO 32 
NACE-CLIO 33 
NACE-CLIO 34 
NACE-CLIO 35 
Total 
38 8.7 
127 29.0 
153 34.9 
2 0.5 
45 10.3 
23 5.3 
15 3.4 
19 4.3 
16 3.7 
438 100.0 
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FLAUT097 
The current version of the database, FLAUTO97, contains 
technological, organizational and other plant-specific variables (see 
the Appendix for the list of all variables). 
Plant-specific variables relate to: the number of employees in 1989 
and 1997, plant's location and industry, and the ownership status. In 
particular, individual plants are assigned to the industry, which 
accounts for the largest share of production. As to ownership status, 
I know if the plant is owned by a single- or multi-plant firm. Further, 
I can distinguish between foreign and Italian business groups as well 
as between State and private ownership. I actually know the 
nationality of the group, its size (in terms of number of employees) 
and other information that I derived from institutional sources (such 
as R&B 1998, and the Hoover's Handbook of World and American 
Business 1998) and Company Reports. 
Information relating to technological change concerns the date of 
first adoption of the following technologies: local area network (LAN), 
intercompany network (EDI), machining centers, NC and CNC stand- 
alone machine tools, flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), 
programmable robots, inflexible manufacturing systems (IMS), 
Internet/ Intranet, personal computers (PC), and mainframes. 
Therefore, I can distinguish between technologies pertaining to the 
production and network spheres. Further, I may be interested (see for 
instance chapter 3) in looking at the differences between plants that 
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adopt old Tayloristic technologies (such as IMS) and those that make 
use of innovations that belong to the flexible automation paradigm 
(such as FMS). 
The data on the organization of plants represent the main novelty 
with respect to FLAUTO and, more generally, to the empirical 
literature. First, I know the first date of adoption of the following 
managerial innovations: non-traditional individual pay incentive 
plans, job rotation, quality groups, just-in-time manufacturing, and 
total quality management. For a detailed definition of all technological 
and managerial innovation variables see Table A. 1 in the Appendix of 
this chapter. 
In addition, I collected information that allows me to define 
quantitatively some key characteristics of the organization. These are 
the number of managerial levels that compound the plant's 
organization and the allocation of plant's strategic and operating 
decisions. For each sample plant I have data on the current 
organizational structure. Moreover, I know if plants have changed 
their organization during the 1980s and 1990s, meaning that they 
have changed one and/or both aforementioned aspects of the 
organization. If the answer is affirmative, I have also information on 
the "old" organization, meaning the organizational architecture that 
was in operation before the current one. I devote chapter 2 for a more 
detailed description of organizational variables and their use in order 
to test theory. 
Empirical methodology 
Appendix 
A. 1 List of the Variables of FLAUT097 
General: 
" NACE-CLIO 3 digit code 
" date of establishment 
" employees details 
" legal form of business and ownership status 
" proportion of total production as a subcontractor 
" production structure (job shop or line) 
10 
Technology: date of first adoption of 
" NC and CNC machine tools 
" machining centers 
" programmable robots 
" inflexible manufacturing systems (IMS) 
" flexible manufacturing systems (FMS) 
" intra-firm network: local area network and/or on-line connection 
with headquarter (LAN) 
" intercompany network: electronic data interchange (EDI) with 
customers, suppliers and/or subcontractors 
" mainframe 
" personal computer (PC) 
" internet/ intranet 
Managerial Innovations: date of first adoption of 
" quality circles 
" job rotation 
" non traditional individual incentive schemes 
" just in time manufacturing (JIT) 
" total quality management (TQM) 
Organization: 
" number of hierarchic levels of plant's organization 
" allocation of plant's strategic and operating decisions (see chapter 
2) 
" date of change (period: 1975-96) of the number of levels and the 
allocation of strategic and operating decision-making, and 
eventually the characteristics of the previous organization 
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A. 2 Definition of Technological and Managerial Innovation Variables 
Table Al . 
Variable Definition 
NC/CNC machine tools NC machines are controlled by numerical commands 
punched on paper or plastic mylar tape, whereas CNC 
machines are controlled through internal computer 
Machining centers Machining centers are CNC machine tools which 
integrate a series of operations,, as opposed to stand- 
alone NC (and CNC) machine tools which instead are 
able to perform just one of them 
Robots A reprogrammable, multifunctioned manipulator 
designed to move materials, parts, tools, or specialized 
devices through variable programmed motions 
FMS Flexible manufacturing systems (and cells) are 
manufacturing equipment composed of two or more 
machine tools or programmable robots connected 
through material handling devices and controlled by 
computers, which render them capable of performing a 
variety of operations in a variable sequence 
IMS Automated inflexible manufacturing systems differ 
from the previous category due to the absence of 
computerized control and programmable equipment; as 
the sequence of performed operations is fixed, they are 
specialized in the production of a pre-specified output 
LAN Use of LAN technology to exchange technical data and 
general information with other departments, 
headquarters, and between different points on the 
factory floor (within the plant) 
EDI Intercompany computer network linking the plant to 
subcontractors, suppliers, and/or customers 
Quality circles Formal work teams either on the line or for the 
purposes of problem-solving activities according to an 
established policy with at least some operators involved 
in team activities 
Job rotation When operators rotate across jobs or tasks on the line 
Incentives "Nontraditional" incentive pay plan which applies to 
individual workers and which is sensitive to quality as 
well as quantity aspects of output 
Just-in-time Just-in-time production schedule methods with 
customers and /or suppliers aimed at reducing the 
plant's stock 
Total quality management Formal practices which apply at each step of the 
production chain aimed at controlling product quality 
Part I 
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Chapter 1 
Stylized Facts on the Organization and its 
Evolution 
Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
14 
This introductory chapter is an overview of the organizational forms 
of businesses that have emerged during this last century. The focus 
is on the main characteristics of the internal structure of the firm. In 
particular, I sketch out a classification of the different organizational 
architectures that are historically relevant, based upon features such 
as the decision-making allocation, the number of corporate levels, the 
span of control, and production and administrative practices. I argue 
that these capture key aspects of the internal working of firms and 
plants. 
In the next chapters, I will often emphasize two aspects of the 
current state of the art of studies on the organization. First, there is a 
huge theoretical interest on the organization, which comprehends 
very different approaches. In spite of the richness of such stream of 
literature, it seems to me that there are still many pieces missing in 
empirical studies. In particular there are important aspects such as 
the allocation of decision-making that totally lack of empirical 
evidence, except for business history studies. I argue that business 
history should constitute a starting point of the empirical work on the 
organization and not the main source of evidence. In particular, 
large-scale quantitative data sets are needed in order to test 
econometrically predictions of economic theory. 
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This review is neither historically original nor exhaustive, but it is 
highly instrumental to introduce the overall argument of this thesis, 
which is nicely summarized by Simon (1959) "to predict the short-run 
behavior of an adaptive organism, it is not enough to know its goals. 
We must also know a great deal about its internal structure and 
particularly its mechanism of adaptation". So, the aim of the chapter 
is to provide introductory stylized facts on the organization of firms 
and its evolution, relying mainly on business history, which is the 
main source of evidence on some key aspects of organizations. 
Business history studies use aforementioned features in order to 
define taxonomies of business organizations (see for instance 
Williamson and Barghava 1972). In this thesis, I focus on these 
aspects, but I depart from qualitative taxonomies of organizations by 
defining quantitative measures of these features (see in particular 
chapter 2). This is not, of course, a criticism to business history that 
faces conditions of very constrained data, but it is a suggestion for a 
foundation of empirical studies on the organization of firms. 
Before I proceed further a consideration is in order. As I said, in 
this chapter and overall in this thesis I am concerned with some 
characteristics of plants and firms. I argue that these organizational 
variables are central in defining the actual set up of the internal 
structure of business organizations. However, there are other 
important features such as firm's wage scale and the financial and 
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ownership structures, which are not at the core of the present work. I 
will tackle these only in a limited way. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 indicates the 
reasons why modern businesses have developed hierarchically. 
Section 1.3 concerns the classification of organizational forms in 
terms of few key aspects that are analyzed throughout the present 
study. In particular, I show that different organizational forms are 
defined by different configurations of the allocation of decision- 
making, the size of the management hierarchy, the span of control, 
and production and administrative practices. Section 1.4 
concentrates on the relation between (production) routines and the 
organization. In Section 1.5 I look at the mechanism of transition of 
organizations. I emphasize three main aspects of organizational 
change: structural inertia, diffusion of knowledge and imitation, and 
the relation between (technological and market) complexity and 
changes of the internal structure. Section 1.6 is an example of 
organizational dynamics in the case of the American car industry. 
Finally, section 1.7 sums up major results of business history 
literature and introduces next chapters. 
1.2 The Rise of the Management Hierarchy 
Marglin (1974) points out that the passage from the pre-modern to 
the modern form of organization was characterized by both the rise of 
a managerial hierarchy and the specialization of workers in fixed, 
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planned and repetitive tasks. In the pre-factory organization workers 
were directly linked to the owner/ entrepreneur and they frequently 
changed their tasks and positions along the layout of production. The 
modern enterprise is based upon two opposite features "it contains 
many distinct operating units and it is managed by a hierarchy of 
salaried executives" (Chandler 1977), who control and head blue 
collars, in order to implement the centrally defined plan of 
production. 
The evolution of the factory system followed the opposite pattern of 
that of agriculture (Dahlman paradox, Leijohnuhvud 1986). The 
factory arose with a process of coordination and consolidation of 
disperse units of production within the same centralized production 
system. This was mainly due to the technological advances of the 
second industrial revolution and to an expanding market. Whereas 
Jenks (1961) claims that the modern enterprise was born in the 
second half of the last century within railroad companies, Carlos and 
Nicholas (1988) argue that chartered trading companies had already 
adopted this complex and hierarchic form of organization in the 
seventeenth century. However, from the point of view of this research, 
the main historical fact is not the exact moment when the modern 
corporation first appeared, but the reasons why enterprises evolved 
towards a complex hierarchical form of organization. From this 
respect, O'Donnel (1952) emphasizes the role of market and 
technological complexity: modern firms developed a structure that 
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gathered and processed information and took decisions faster and 
better than pre-modern firms did, given the mutated environment 
characterized by both increasing market complexity and fast 
technological change. 
Economies of scale and scope of managerial work depend crucially 
on technology. As a consequence, the advances of the second 
industrial revolution allowed an increase in the optimal size of the 
organization of firms by sharply decreasing costs of communication 
and transportation (see Chandler 1977 and chapter 3 for further 
evidence on this issue). So, even if chartered companies had already 
adopted a modem form of organization, the expansion of their 
management hierarchies was strongly constrained by the 
technological state of the art. To sum up, 
Fact 1: 
a) The rise of the modern enterprise coincided with the rise of the 
management hierarchy. This in turn was due to an increasing 
number of items of information to gather, store and process, 
decisions to take and implement, and production, marketing and 
financial activities to run and coordinate. 
b) The achievements of a new technological paradigm raised the 
extent to which it was viable to internalize production and 
administrative operations into the management hierarchy. 
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The passage from a craft (and parallel) to a hierarchical (and 
vertical) system of organization induced a profound change in the 
allocation of decision-making (Montgomery 1987). Whilst in the pre- 
factory system workers had authority over a large spectrum of 
production decisions, the development of a hierarchic structure 
shifted real and formal authority to managers and foremen. Using 
Taylor's (1967) own words "it is only through enforced 
standardization of methods, enforced adoption of the best implements 
and working conditions, and enforced cooperation that this faster 
work can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the adoption of 
standards and enforcing this cooperation rests with the management 
alone". Often business historians concentrate on the allocation of 
authority at upper hierarchical levels. Instead, it is worth noticing 
that these changes were particularly profound at the shop floor. In 
any case 
Fact 2: 
The passage to a modem hierarchic organization implied a drastic 
change of the allocation of decision-making. Authority shifted up the 
(new) management hierarchy. 
It is important to stress that the re-allocation of power within the 
firm is neither smooth nor easy to implement. Since authority is a 
fixed resource its change implies its re-allocation, which damages 
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some agent and favors some other. Hence, there is a strong inertial 
pressure that contrasts any change of the decision-making structure. 
Indeed, this was particularly evident in the passage from the craft 
system of production to the modern organization. 
1.3 Organizational Forms 
In this section I analyze very briefly some forms of business 
organizations drawing upon studies of business history. I am 
concerned only with some particular characteristics of the 
organization. The aim is to show that organizational forms are 
characterized by different: allocations of decision-making, size of the 
management hierarchy, span of control, and production and 
administrative practices. Therefore, I shall describe and display the 
evolution of organizational forms by looking at these aspects. 
1.3.1 The Multiunit Functional Form (U-Form)l 
The structure of the multi-unit functional form is depicted in Figure 
1.2 The organizational chart captures both the presence of a deep 
' This and the next paragraphs are heavily based upon Chandler 
(1962)(1977)(1990), Chandler et al. (1996) (chapters 15-17). In addition, Dyas and 
Thanheiser (1976) and Hannah (1976) provide a thorough analysis of the evolution 
of organizational forms in Germany and France and Britain, respectively. Suzuki 
(1991) draws a historical picture for Japan. Overall, these studies emphasize 
common characteristics as well as some idiosyncratic differences of business 
organizations in various countries. Differences are mainly due to domestic market 
regimes, antitrust laws, norms and conditions on the labor market. 
2 For each organizational form I shall provide its chart. For the functional and 
multidivisional organizations charts are based upon Chandler (1962)(1977)(1990). 
In the case of the Japanese form the chart is original and it is based upon many 
recent studies of managerial literature (see for instance Carrol 1994, Drucker 1988, 
Krafcik 1988, and Womack et al. 1990). The aim is to develop a simple framework 
that shows how organizational structures differ in the aforementioned 
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managerial hierarchy and the key role of vertical coordination and 
control. Decision-making is highly centralized at the pinnacle of the 
hierarchy, where corporate offices - e. g., the board of directors and 
the executive committee - operate. Managers that hold each 
functional department (e. g., sales, production, finance and R&D) are 
also members of the top management, so that real and formal 
authority is mainly centralized at upper levels. High corporate officers 
take strategic decisions and define the production plan which is 
implemented on spot. The central management defines long-run and 
short-run plans and strategies, drawing on the information coming 
from lower levels. The vertical and upward structure of the 
information flow is a key element of this organization. At the bottom 
of the hierarchy, within operating units, lower level managers and 
foremen supervise the implementation of the plan operated by blue 
collars. 
The organization depends heavily on the availability of computable 
data upon which the firm's plan is based. From this respect, the 
development of new accounting methodologies for planning and 
monitoring operations was an essential element (Johnson 1975). For 
instance, Chandler (1962) points out that the Du Pont enterprise 
developed a revolutionary accounting and data system: "among the 
characteristics. Figures are rather stylized and should be read as follows: straight 
lines denote both authority relations and information flows; circles indicate the 
existence of ranked hierarchical levels; ovals define circles with the same decision- 
making power. All figures are reported in the Appendix of the chapter. 
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notable advances made during these years in the working out of 
information so essential for central planning, coordination, and 
appraisal were the techniques that F. Donaldson Brown devised for 
calculating the rate of return of investment". 
In sum, the functional form is a complex organization composed of 
a deep hierarchy of managerial executives who are ranked vertically. 
Strategic decision-making is highly centralized and is based on a 
bottom-up information network. 
1.3.2 The Multidivisional Organization (M-Form) 
The multidivisional form developed independently in three countries 
(recall however the existence of national differences, see footnote 1). 
During the first decade of the century it arose in Germany (at 
Siemens, Kocha 1971) and Japan (at Mitsubishi, Moriwaka 1970). In 
the USA, instead, Du Pont Corporation and General Motors adopted 
this organizational form at the beginning of the 1920s (Chandler 
1962, chapters 2-3). The chart of the M-form is depicted in Figure 2. 
The multidivisional organization is an evolution of the functional 
structure in which `organizational complexity' increases and authority 
is partially re-allocated downwards. Middle management is now 
composed of divisional offices as well as functional departments. So, 
the organization is first sub-divided by divisions (product and market 
divisions) and then is functionally structured. Given the introduction 
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of new corporate levels, the size of the management hierarchy 
expands. 
Besides changes in the number and structure of hierarchic 
relations, the multidivisional structure implies relatively to the 
functional form a step towards decentralization of decision-making. 
Corporate offices still remain in charge of long-run strategies. 
However, divisions are partially autonomous, especially for short-run 
decisions, and they are managed functionally by a general manager. 
When Sloan adopted the M-form, he emphasized the autonomy of 
division managers in these terms: "The General Manager formulates 
all the policies of his particular unit subject only to the executive 
control of the President. The responsibility of the head of each unit is 
absolute and he is looked upon to exercise his full initiative and 
ability in developing his particular operation to the fullest possible 
extent and to assume the full responsibility of success or failure" 
(from `General Motors Corporation - Organizational Study' quoted in 
Chandler 1962). Thus, we might say that the President retained 
formal authority and delegates real authority to division managers. 
This (partial) transfer of authority aimed at exploiting local knowledge 
and increasing initiative and participation of middle managers. 
Johnson (1978) points out that the new type of organization 
needed new accounting procedures as well as a new information and 
communication network. Of course, information flows and authority 
links still remained vertically structured. 
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The organizational evolution of large enterprises towards this 
structure did not follow a unique pattern. Whereas many companies 
went through the multifunctional stage, other firms did not adopt 
this organizational form. In general, fast expanding firms that 
produced similar products were integrated into a single organization. 
In this way, companies exploited economies of scale through a 
centralized structure that coordinated operations and avoided 
duplications. The multifunctional structure was a response to these 
needs. When top management decided to diversify, then the 
increasing complexity of operations to coordinate and monitor 
imposed a decentralization of decision-making to division managers 
who had specific knowledge and capabilities. Conversely, in the case 
in which many autonomous companies merged, this process often led 
directly to a multidivisional organization. General Motors is an 
example of the second pattern, whilst Du Pont Corporation followed 
the first organizational evolution: "The Du Pont then was evolving 
from a centralized type of organization, common in the early days of 
American industry, while General Motors was emerging from almost 
total decentralization" (Sloan 1963). 
To sum up, the M-form is a complex organization in which 
functional structures (divisions) are subsystems of a more complex 
and integrated system of authority relations and information flows. 
Decision-making is partially delegated downwards the management 
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hierarchy in order to exploit capabilities of division managers and to 
stimulate their participation to firm's objectives. 
1.3.3 The Japanese "Lean" Organization (J form) 
In this paragraph I discuss very briefly the emergence of a new 
organizational paradigm. I shall follow the definition of J form (i. e., 
Japanese organization) provided by Aoki (1988)(1990), who 
emphasizes the rise of a new type of organization within the Japanese 
firms during the 1980s. However, it is worth noticing that other 
organization studies have called this form as the "lean type of 
organization". Since there is large managerial literature on this issue, 
a systematic review lies beyond the scope of this chapter. A fuller 
discussion of the lean type of organization will be presented in the 
next chapters (see for instance chapters 2 and 5). But the more 
general features of this new type of organization can be briefly stated 
here. 
Aoki (1986) distinguishes a hierarchic structure in which a 
"management possesses a perfect a priori knowledge of the technical 
possibilities of shops, but is incapable of perfect monitoring of 
emerging events affecting and/or having rapid corrective actions 
implemented at shop", from a horizontal structure in which 
"productions decisions are coordinated among semiautonomous 
shops that have only incomplete knowledge of the technology at the 
outset, but gradually become capable of responding to emerging 
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events more quickly by better uses of on-the-spot knowledge". Thus, 
the main difference between the multidivisional and the Japanese 
organization concerns both the decision-making allocation and the 
information network. The multidivisional form is a structure 
characterized by "(1) the hierarchic separation between planning and 
implemental operation and (2) the emphasis on the economies of 
specialization". Instead, in the case of the J-form the main features 
are "(1) the horizontal coordination among operating units based on 
(2) the sharing of ex-post on-site information" (Aoki 1990). 
Figure 3 shows the emerging archetype of organization. First, this 
structure represents a step towards a decrease of bureaucratization 
(Womack et al. 1990). Whilst in the M-form tasks were rigidly defined 
in order to exploit economies of specialization, in the new structure 
tasks are loosely defined in order to achieve flexibility and exploit 
local learning and capabilities. Moreover, "Increased use of 
technologies, such as email, voice mail and shared databases, has, 
over time, reduced the need for traditional middle management, 
whose role was to supervise others and to collect, analyze, evaluate, 
and transmit information up, down, and across the organizational 
hierarchy" (Baharami 1992). Thus, the size of the management 
hierarchy is decreasing. In addition, Krafcik (1988) notes that the 
new type of organization is characterized by a higher span of control. 
This may be due to the new information technology paradigm (see 
chapter 3 for both theoretical and empirical analysis). Finally, 
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decision-making is further decentralized (Drucker 1988, Jaikumar 
1986, and Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Flexibility and agents' 
initiative are achieved through partial or total delegation of authority. 
Using Koike's (1990) words, the white-collarization of blue collars is a 
pillar of the lean organization. Therefore, whilst the multidivisional 
organization is based upon unskilled blue collars at the shop floor, 
the emerging organization is conversely based on a skilled workforce 
(Lazonick 1990a, 1990b). 3 
To sum up, the Japanese lean type of organization is characterized 
by a drastic reduction of the number of corporate tiers, an increase in 
the span of control and a re-allocation of decision-making that favors 
lower levels. 4 The recent evolution of technological change has been a 
major force in shaping the new organizational form. The IT paradigm 
is flattening managerial hierarchies, just as the second industrial 
revolution increased their depth. 
1.4 Organization and Business Practices 
This section is a sketch of the possible links between the organization 
and firm's routines. I shall focus only on the relation between the 
organizational structure and production practices. However, it is 
3 It has been noted to the author that this picture of increasing decentralization 
might not be true. So, it worth noticing, here, that I do not want to put forward 
neither points of view. Indeed, one of the aim of the next chapters will be to 
challenge part of the managerial literature, by providing large scale quantitative 
evidence on these and other issues. 
4 "Most businesses have spent the past few decades decentralizing. Within big firms 
all around the world, bosses have been pushing authority down the management 
hierarchy" Economist, 1990, "The incredible shrinking company", pp. 65-66. 
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important to recall here that there are other important links: for 
instance, the organizational structure may be associated with new 
administrative and accounting procedures. The aim is to show that 
the internal working of firms is characterized by routines as well as 
the other organization variables, and that the two may be interlinked. 
1.4.1 Production Routines and Organizational Structure 
Until the 1870s and 1880s there was widespread craft control in 
production (Montgomery 1987, ch. 1). Roughly speaking, more skilled 
workers, whose job was of coordinators of different tasks, defined the 
organization of production. Authority was partially delegated to 
workers in order to achieve maximum flexibility and exploit their 
capabilities. 
The passage from the pre-modern organization of production to a 
hierarchic system (see section 1.2) determined both a change of the 
allocation of authority (fact 2) and the standardization of production. 
The main features of the new system of production can be 
summarized as follows: "(1) centralized planning and routing of the 
successive phases in fabrication, (2) systematic analysis of each 
distinct operation, (3) detailed instruction and supervision of each 
worker in the performance of that worker's discrete task, and (4) wage 
payments carefully designed to induce each worker to follow those 
instructions" (Montgomery 1987, ch. 7). The planning of the firm's 
operations corresponded to the idea of complete standardization of 
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production and sale operations, exploiting economies of scale of a 
growing market. 5 For instance, Ford (1926) pointed out that "An 
operation in our plant at Barcelona has to be carried out through 
exactly as in Detroit. A man on the assembly line at Detroit ought to 
be able to step into the assembly line at Oklahoma City or Sao Paolo, 
Brazil". Companies could exploit dynamic economies of scale drawing 
upon on-spot learning-by-doing of unskilled workers (Lazonick 1990a 
and 1990b)6 and on greater knowledge of the internal and external 
environments of top managers. Thus, the (multiunit) functional form 
cannot be analyzed abstracting from scientific management 
procedures in production. 
As seen in previous sections, the modern corporation was a 
revolutionary innovation in the Schumpeterian meaning. The 
structure was highly centralized: top management and operating 
units were linked by vertical information flows and authority 
relations. Firm's plan was centrally defined and then implemented at 
the shop floor. Single-purpose machine tools were adopted and 
production was subdivided in single elementary operations (Carlsson 
1984). The top management was, thus, able to appraise and define a 
precise plan of production to be implemented by blue collars who 
were monitored by foremen and lower level management. The 
5 For an excellent and lengthy comparison between pre-modern and modern 
production routines see Coriat (1979). For a direct explanation of the scientific 
management approach to production see Taylor (1967). Alternatively, see Ford 
(1923) ch. 5-7. 
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functional organization implied new routines of running the firm. In 
more general terms, business history studies emphasize that, 
Fact 3: 
Organizational structures are associated with specific business 
practices. A change in the former often implies a change in the latter. 
A second example of the relation between organization and firm's 
routines concerns the J-form. Just as the functional organization and 
the scientific management procedures were intertwined, so the lean 
type of organization would seem to based upon new production 
practices (called Toyota System or Ohnism). Kanban system, just in 
time manufacturing, total quality management, job rotation are 
important ingredients of the new structure (see for instance Coriat 
1991 and Duimering et al. 1993). Kanban system and just in time are 
means of redefining the information structure as well as the authority 
relations. They are based on horizontal coordination (Aoki 1988, 
1990). In addition, they put emphasis on urgency in decision-making, 
thus increasing the need of re-allocating authority down the 
management hierarchy. Total quality management and job rotation 
are means of exploiting local capabilities coming from production 
complementarities more than specialization (Ichniowski et al. 1997). 
6 "The rank and file men come to us unskilled; they learn their jobs within a few 
hours or a few days". (Ford 1923). 
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However, it seems to me that managerial studies often overestimate 
the effect of business practices on the organizational structure. In 
other words, "Firms change in response to a perception that making a 
change represents substantial gains. When they do change, 
moreover, they do not necessarily optimize in any exact case. They 
search some what more haphazardly for ways in which to change, 
and (especially) they tend to imitate the actions of those rivals that 
they think are doing better. (Think of all the manufacturing firms in the 
United States that have attempted to imitate Japanese manufacturing 
techniques over the past decade without a very clear understanding of 
why or how those techniques work. )" (Kreps 1990). Thus, business 
practices may diffuse because are fads. Next chapters will provide 
new evidence on this issue. 
1.5 Mechanism of Transition 
How does organization change? What drives the process of adoption 
of new organizational structures? Econometric studies on the 
diffusion process of organizational forms have reached few (robust) 
results (see chapter 6 for a lengthier discussion of such findings and 
for new econometric evidence). Teece (1980) is the first attempt to 
provide econometric evidence on the diffusion process of 
organizations. He shows that when compared to technological change 
the evolution of organizational forms (i. e., the multidivisional 
structure) is indeed characterized by structural inertia. In particular, 
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he calculates that it took 41 years before half of a sample of leading 
American firms adopted the M-form (14 years in the case of 
petroleum industry). Instead, Mansfield (1968) in his study of 
technology adoptions finds an average time of 7.8 years (ranging from 
0.9 to 15 years). Overall, the existing evidence on organizational 
change shows that, 
Fact 4: 
Organization evolution is characterized by structural inertia. 
Table 1 presents data on the diffusion process of the 
multidivisional form for six major countries from 1913 to 1980. Even 
if we consider only the largest corporations, the adoption process of 
the multidivisional structure appears to be very slow. For instance in 
Japan, Germany and France it took more than 50 years before half of 
the 100 largest national corporations had adopted the M-form. 
Tab. 1- Adoption of the M-Form (% of the top 100 companies) 
1913 1932 1950 1960 1970 1980 
USA 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
UK 
08 17 43 71 81 
108 29 55 58 
1-5 15 50 58 
136 21 54 58 
7 17 48 - 
0 13 30 72 80 
Source: Hannah (1996) 
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Thompson (1983) finds that the diffusion of the M-form follows a 
symmetric sigmoid process and early adopters are relatively more 
diversified and of greater size. Later studies (Palmer et at. 1987, 
Palmer et at. 1993) confirm the importance of both product and 
geographic diversification, hence complexity of firm's operations, but 
not of size which is only indirectly related, through complexity, to the 
adoption of a divisional structure. Moreover, they point to the role 
played by both the ownership status and imitation of firms that 
operate in the same line of business. However, the imitation 
hypothesis is still a very debated argument. Whereas Mahajan et al. 
(1988) find no evidence of any imitation process for the adoption of 
the M-form within 127 very large US companies, Venkatraman et at. 
(1994) using the same data set show that results highlight the role 
played by external influence (i. e., information outside the same line of 
business of firms) instead of internal information (i. e., number of 
firms that operate in the same line of business and have adopted the 
M-form). Finally, Kogut and Parkinson (1998) find that imitation 
emerges as a (significant) explanatory variable of the diffusion 
process only if we extend the time of observation sufficiently, that is if 
we analyze history from the start. 
In the next three paragraphs I present in greater detail evidence on 
this issue coming from business history studies. 
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1.5.1 (Market and Technology) Complexity and Organization 
At the end of the last century and the outset of the current one, 
railroad companies, Standard Oil, and Du Pont Corporation were 
operating in a growing market in which a small scale of production 
was no longer viable.? They consolidated and coordinated small 
activities in a unique structure. The increasing amount of similar 
items of information to gather and to process led to the transition to 
functional centralized structures, with specialized departments based 
upon functions (see section 1.3.1). 
In business history there is wide evidence of a relation between 
complexity of information to gather, store and process and firm's 
organization (see for instance the three stages theory of Scott 1973). 
Chandler (1962)(1977) for the US, Suzuki (1991) for Japan, Channon 
(1973) for the UK, and Dyas and Thanheiser (1976) for Germany and 
France, confirm the existence of such relation. In 1970,81% and 
91% of the 100 largest single business firms8 of France and Germany 
respectively were functionally structured, whilst 59% and 50% of 
dominant business firms had adopted a multidivisional organization 
so as 64% and 79% of related business firms. Similarly, 100% of the 
7 For the history of American railroad companies I refer to Chandler (1977). For 
Standard Oil and Du Pont see Chandler et al. (1996), ch. 15-16. 
8A single business firm is defined as a firm with 95% or more of total sales that lie 
within a single business. Dominant business firms are those firms which, in 
addition to their main product line, have diversified into other related or unrelated 
businesses to the extent of up to 30% of total sales. Finally, related business firms 
are firms which have diversified by entering into related markets or by using related 
technology, or have combined vertical integration with such diversification so that 
no one product line accounts for more than 70% of total sales. 
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largest 500 US single business firms were functionally organized, 
whilst 64% and 95% of dominant business firms and related 
business companies respectively had adopted .a multidivisional 
structure (Scott 1973). We can thus conclude that when firms 
develop a strategy of diversification they are forced to adopt a 
multidivisional organization. 
Two major forces that being related to complexity affect 
organizational change. First, the market demand, both in terms of 
extension of the market and diversification of consumer tastes, is the 
first element. Periods of dramatic change of market demand have 
been characterized by drastic changes of the organization of firms. 
Moreover, domestic market differences have been a key element in 
causing organizational idiosyncratic differences (see footnote 1). 
Second, technology affects the way in which information is 
gathered and spreads within the firm. Thus, it influences the efficient 
size and structure of the management hierarchy. As I claimed before, 
the advances of the second industrial revolution increased the 
optimal number of corporate levels of the management hierarchy (see 
section 1.2). Indeed, the achievements of a new communication and 
transportation technology made viable the development of a multi- 
unit vertical structure. In addition, there is plenty of evidence on the 
influence of the new information technology (IT) paradigm on the 
organization of firms (see Bresnahan et at. 1999). I cannot go deeper 
into this argument here. But it is worth noticing that organization 
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studies stress that the IT paradigm is changing the organization by 
increasing the efficient number of subordinates under one manager 
(i. e., the span of control) and flattening the management hierarchy 
(see chapter 3 for further evidence). 
In sum, there is a strong relation between complexity and 
organization. Since market conditions and technological change 
influence complexity, they shape the organization of firms. Thus, I 
agree with Alford (1994), who claims that there are alternative paths 
to successful capitalism depending on industry and market-specific 
characteristics. 
1.5.2 Structural Inertia 
Chandler (1962) argues that the invention of a new organization is a 
creative response to new needs and conditions. Moreover, there is 
general agreement among economists and historians that the 
invention of a new type of organization represents a radical 
innovation. At the beginning of this section I claimed that the 
organization is a particular kind of innovation, since its diffusion is 
slower than that of technological innovations. Why? In order to 
provide some evidence into this issue, I look at some well known 
cases of business history: Du Pont (Chandler et al. 1996), Mitsubishi 
(Moriwaka 1970), Siemens (Kocha 1971), and General Motors 
(Chandler 1962 ch. 2, and Sloan 1963; for this case see the next 
section). 
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These companies were all adopters of a new organizational form. In 
all of these cases, innovating firms had a period of active search that 
started usually with a drastic change of top management. In 1902, 
Alfred Du Pont replaced Eugene Du Pont as president of Du Pont 
Corporation. Shortly after, Alfred started a process of re-organization 
that lasted until 1906 and was mainly due to a lack of administrative 
coordination. The organization followed a process of centralization 
from "a loose federation of many relatively small firms into a 
consolidated, integrated, centrally managed industrial empire". In 
just the same way, Kyota Ivasaki, president of Mitsubishi, steered a 
process of centralization of decision-making from a holding company 
to a multidivisional structure. This re-organization ended after 10 
years. At Siemens the change of the organization started when 
Werner von Siemens retired. As Kocha points out "As in the case of 
many other companies the replacement of the founder facilitates the 
reforms". 
Overall these cases show that since the organization of firms 
concerns written and unwritten rules (i. e., corporate culture), 
information flows, and authority relations, its change implies both 
sunk costs and a re-allocation of power. Thus, organization changes 
only when new ideas break strong inertial forces, which are the result 
of influence activities of firm's managers. 
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1.5.3 Imitation and Diffusion 
Diffusion of information and imitation are two major determinants of 
the adoption process of organizational forms and business practices. 9 
Authority relations, information flows, business practices are only 
partially defined by formal rules. They heavily depend on corporate 
culture (Kreps 1985). From this respect the organization is a long run 
convention. Therefore, its process of change takes time and is very 
costly. 
My claim is that organization is a convention that follows a path- 
dependent process (Arthur 1985 and 1988, Sudgen 1989 and Young 
1996). In particular, Delmastro (1996) shows that the widespread 
diffusion of information on an organizational structure is crucial. 
However, since the organization differs from technology because 
cannot be (accurately) defined, during the imitation and 
implementation process the organization adapts to local needs as well 
as to idiosyncratic firm-specific interpretations. 
The historical evidence that supports this claim is ample. As I said 
before, Kreps (1990) notices that during the 1980s American 
companies have adopted Japanese organizational procedures mainly 
because these had become a well known convention. Thus, business 
practices seem to be fads. More importantly, American managerial 
routines were adopted in Japan after the Second World War when the 
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US strongly influenced Japan economic and social reforms: "Like 
European firm, American practices had an influence in the 
introduction of the multidivisional structure in Japanese firms" 
(Suzuki 1991). In Britain the process was very similar, "One of the 
reasons for the adoption of the multidivisional form in Britain in the 
postwar period was undoubtedly the American cultural and economic 
penetration of a country with whose manufacturing firms US-based 
international corporations had increasingly links" (Hannah 1976). 
Thus, the diffusion of information, imitation, and fads play an 
important role in the diffusion of both organizational forms and 
(above all) business practices. 
1.6 An Example of Organizational Evolution: the US 
Automobile Industry, 1900-1950 
The case of the US automotive industry is very illustrative for the 
study of the evolution of organizational forms and business practices. 
Indeed, American car companies were pioneers in adopting new forms 
of organization that spread throughout the world economy. There is 
an ample literature on the car industry, and this section is based 
upon it. Of course this overview is very brief and it is focused only on 
few aspects. The aim is to show that organizational change is driven 
by the aforementioned determinants: inertial forces due to 
9 The diffusion of information is a key determinant of the diffusion of technological 
innovations. Epidemic models have represented the first attempt to introduce this 
relation into economic models (see Davies 1977). 
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conservative and influence activities of members of the firm, imitation 
(but only when the organizational form and business practices 
become a sort of convention), complexity, and technological change. 
Until the turn of the century the car industry was populated by 
many small firms. These were craft shops, which were managed by 
their founders who were the pioneers of a new sector (Thomas 1977). 
As the new century unfolded, the market grew substantially and at a 
fast pace, raising the complexity of production operations. As 
stressed by Montgomery (1987, ch. 5) "During this growth period the 
automobile industry had completely abandoned the methods of 
production in which craftsmen had made the products while laborers 
fetched and carried". The organizational response was of two types. 
On the one hand, firms like Ford started to growth vertically (Langlois 
and Robertson 1989). Ford adopted a centralized structure, exploiting 
economies of scale through the definition of a functional multiunit 
form (section 1.3.1). On the other hand, General Motors developed as 
a holding company; different firms were financially integrated but 
organizationally autonomous. Indeed, Durant, GM's founder and 
president, did not manage to create a headquarters that controlled 
and coordinated the different companies of General Motors (Chandler 
1962, ch. 3). 
In 1908, with the introduction of Model T, Ford Company achieved 
the best competitive performance in a period of fast growing and 
undifferentiated demand (Abernathy and Wayne 1974 and Abernathy 
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1978). Its functional and centralized structure was highly efficient 
under those demand and technology conditions. The increasing 
number of items of information to gather and process was faced by a 
functional structure, vertically integrated that relied upon central 
planning (Montgomery 1979 ch. 5). As stressed by Ford (1926) "The 
advantages of standardization are apparent in production. The 
disadvantage is the expense incurred when changing from the 
standard". Standardization brought, therefore, static cost reductions 
but also a lack of production flexibility, mainly due to high sunk 
costs. This became dramatically evident in 1927, when plants were 
shut down for nine months in order to reset the layout of production 
for the passage from Model T to Model A. The trade-off between 
flexibility and economies of scale was perceived by Ford's rivals, 
which chose alternative strategies: "In May 1927... he (Ford) shut 
down his great River Rouge plant completely and kept it shut down 
for nearly a year to retool leaving the field to Chevrolet unopposed 
and opening it up for Mr. Chrysler's Plymouth. Mr. Ford regained 
sales leadership in 1929,1930 and 1935, but, speaking in terms of 
generalities, he had lost the lead to General Motors" (Sloan 1963). 
In 1921, GM adopted a new decentralized organization: the 
multidivisional structure. This was a creative response to the growing 
complexity of GM's operations, thought and realized by Alfred Sloan. 
Sloan was appointed in 1921, when Durant left his president 
position. This change of leadership occurred after a GM's sales crisis. 
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In that year Ford increased its sales from 463,000 to 971,000 units 
facing the recession with an aggressive price strategy, whilst GM's 
sales slumped from 393,075 to 214,799. However, the search of a 
new organizational form started since 1915 when a committee was 
appointed to analyze problems due to the lack of coordination 
between group's companies. Indeed, between 1919 and 1920 Sloan 
worked at an `Organization Study' in which he defined the core of the 
new multidivisional structure. However, the process of re- 
organization took many years. When Sloan was appointed president 
of GM he needed more than two years to implement the new 
organizational structure: since the re-organization implied a re- 
distribution of power each semiautonomous division was hostile to 
any change. 
The spread of the multidivisional structure was rather slow. The 
diffusion of information on the new organizational form and business 
practices (e. g., the new accounting system, the scientific approach to 
production) and the related imitation process were obviously two 
intertwined features of the same dynamic evolution. Followers 
studied and copied the technology and the organization of leaders 
through a direct observation of the new system of production. In the 
case of the French car industry (Cohen 1991), Renault went to the US 
in 1911 to visit Ford Corporation and to meet Henry Ford and 
Frederick Taylor. Citroen went to Detroit in 1912 and met Alfred 
Sloan in 1923. In the Italian car industry (Fauri 1996) managers of 
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FIAT went to US to meet Henry Ford after the First World War. 
However, only in 1950 FIAT was ready to adopt the multidivisional 
organization. Overall, European car companies studied the methods 
of production and organization of US leading companies and (slowly) 
implemented them at home. 
In the United States, the first company that followed GM and 
adopted a multidivisional form was Ford. This happened 35 years 
after GM's adoption. Whilst for Chrysler the delay in the adoption of 
the multidivisional form was mainly due to its smaller size, the case 
of Ford is more complex. Henry Ford built up a functional centralized 
organization, which was efficient until the complexity of production, 
marketing, and distribution operations reached a certain level. Then, 
instead of changing organization he "attempted to administer his 
empire personally. The result was disastrous" (Chandler 1990). The 
market share declined constantly thereafter (see Table 2), and Ford 
lost completely the first mover advantage gained in 1908 with the 
introduction of Model T. 
Thus, we might say that Ford's strategy was not optimal. After 
1921 the company had an alternative dominant strategy but Henry 
Ford refused to pursue it. Only when, in 1946 the board of top 
corporate officers changed and Henry Ford left, then the company 
adopted a multidivisional organization. Breech was appointed to 
define Ford's new strategy in a period of sales crises. As stressed by 
Fortune in 1947 he began "chapping the GM organizational garment 
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onto the Ford manufacturing frame. . . one of the Breech's first acts 
was to hand around copies of a semi-official GM text on 
decentralization". In the end "The Ford Motor Company copied the 
organizational structure of General Motors... It did so, as is well 
known, only after the retirement of its founder" (Chandler 1956). 
Tab. 2- US automobile industry (1910-50), market shares 
Year/ Corporation 
1910 
1915 
1921 
1925 
1929 
1932 
1940 
1948 
1950 
Ford General Motors Chrysler 
10.7 -- 
43.4 -- 
55.4 12.3 - 
41.5 20.0 - 
31.3 32.3 8.2 
23.9 41.5 17.5 
18.9 47.6 23.7 
18.8 40.6 21.5 
24.0 45.4 17.6 
Sources: Fortune (1954), Abernathy (1974), and Chandler (1990). 
The story of Chrysler is also very instructive. Since the early 1920s 
the company enjoyed a continuous growth of market share (see Table 
2). When operations grew over a certain threshold its functional 
organization was no longer viable. At the end of the 1940s Chrysler 
faced several sales crises. As a consequence its market share sharply 
declined and at the end of 1950 the top management was replaced by 
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a new one. Colbart took the lead and tried to introduce a new 
decentralized organization. It took almost three years to implement 
the new structure since "Decentralization was a world practically 
invented by General Motors and no one at Chrysler wanted any truck 
with GM gadgetry", so that Colbart had to "to coin his own word, 
divisionalization" (from Fortune 1954). 10 
To sum up, the automobile industry is an interesting example that 
presents distinctive stylized facts on the organization of firms and its 
evolution. First, two major innovations (i. e., the multi-unit functional 
form and the multidivisional form) characterized the evolution of 
business organizations within the sector. Second, the search for a 
new structure was a process that lasted for a long period of time. 
Third, followers imitated organizational forms, production structures 
and (above all) business practices of leaders only when these became 
well known. Finally, for both leaders and followers the adoption of a 
new organization was inhibited by both internal conservative 
influence activities and sunk costs that induced structural inertia. 
io This quotation reminds me the following words of Arrow (1974): "the learning of a 
code by an individual is an act of irreversible investment for him. It is therefore also 
an irreversible capital accumulation for the organization. It follows that 
organizations, once created, have distinct identities, because the costs of changing 
the code are those of unanticipated obsolescence". Thus, sunk costs seem to play a 
key role in shaping the evolution of organizations (see also chapter 6). 
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1.7 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this chapter was to provide historic evidence on the 
organization and its evolution. For this purpose, I have selected 
specific topics from business history literature in order to present 
some major facts. First, the modern organization is a hierarchic 
system of relations. Its is composed by a hierarchy of salaried 
executives that are vertically related and ranked. 
Second, in this context there are some key variables that 
characterize each of the main organizational forms that have been 
analyzed by business history studies. As to the allocation of decision- 
making, I showed that functional, multidivisional and lean 
organizations are characterized by very different allocations of 
authority. The functional structure is very centralized, whilst the 
latter two forms are more decentralized with the Japanese 
organization being the most decentralized structure. Similarly, 
organizational forms differ in terms of size and structure of the 
management hierarchy. For instance, the Japanese "lean" type of 
organization represents a step towards both a reduction in the 
number of levels and an increase in the number of subordinates 
under one manager. Finally, production, managerial and 
administrative practices are often inter-linked with the organizational 
form. 
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Therefore, a thorough study of the organization should take into 
account these variables. However, empirical studies have so far faced 
data constrains that prevent them to operationalize these aspects of 
the organization in a quantitative way. Chapter 2 provides a 
description of a new empirical methodology upon which is based the 
present research. 
Third, organizational evolution is dominated by structural inertia, 
which is mainly due to influence activities of managers and sunk 
costs of changing architecture. Moreover, diffusion of knowledge and 
imitation seem to play an important role in affecting the widespread 
adoption of an organizational form. 
Overall, the following parts of the thesis will shed new light into 
these issues. Before proceeding further with the remainder of this 
thesis, a consideration is in order. In this chapter I focused on the 
organization of firms. However, the remaining chapters will analyze 
the organization of plants and, in some cases (see chapters 3 and 4), 
its relation with the overall organizational structure of the parent 
firm. This focus is mainly due to the data which is available to me 
(see the empirical methodology chapter), so that a wider analysis on 
the overall organization of large companies lies beyond the scope of 
the present research. 
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Figure 2- The multidivisional form 
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Figure 3- The lean type of organization (J-form) 
Corporate Office: 
Top management 
Divisional office and 
Middle management 
Operating unit: 
Lower management 
50 
Part II 
Descriptive Quantitative Evidence 
Chapter 2 
Evidence on the Organization and its Evolution 
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2.1 Introduction 
The organization of firms has recently become a lively debated issue 
in the economic literature. Nonetheless, there is a striking difference 
between the large number of theoretical papers and the lack of robust 
quantitative empirical evidence. In spite of growing interest, 
organization still remains an ambiguous concept, hardly analyzed 
empirically. In this chapter I propose an empirical methodology based 
upon business history (see chapter 1) and theoretical work (see for 
instance chapters 3 and 4), which allows me to describe some crucial 
aspects of the organization of firms in quantitative terms. In other 
words, the emphasis is on developing new indices measuring in a 
standardized way some key but elusive concepts in the economics of 
firm organization that have so far defied systematic quantification. 
In particular, I consider variables that capture the extent of the 
hierarchical structure of plants, span of control, ' and the allocation 
of decision-making activities among the different hierarchical layers. 
In my opinion, this constitutes a necessary prerequisite to 
operationalize a series of concepts that are at the core of the debate 
in the theoretical literature, but on which empirical evidence is 
surprisingly weak and relegated mostly to case studies. In this way, I 
am able to provide new interesting insights into the organization of 
plants and its evolution. 
1 Span of control is defined, for each level of a firm's organization, as the number of 
subordinates under one manager. 
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The nature of the chapter is largely descriptive. I use the above 
mentioned indices to study the organization of a sample composed of 
438 Italian metalworking plants. I also analyze the dynamics of 
plants' organization in the 1980s and 1990s. As far as I know this 
study represents one of the first attempts to provide large scale 
empirical evidence on these topics. 
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows. In the 
next section I describe the empirical methodology, giving also its 
theoretical and empirical grounds, and provide details of the data set. 
Section 2.3 concentrates upon organizational architecture. First, I 
analyze the size of plant hierarchy, then I study the span of control. 
In section 2.4 I give a detailed picture of the allocation of power 
within firms, using two measures of centralization and one of 
concentration of decision-making activities. I sum up, in the 
conclusions, the main results of the analysis and outline further 
directions of applied research on the organization of firms I will 
develop in the remainder of the thesis. 
2.2 Empirical Methodology and Data 
2.2.1 Premise 
The organization of firms is a complex structure made up of a large 
number of parts that interact in a non-simple way. Furthermore, 
organization is a hierarchic system, in the sense that "it is composed 
of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, 
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hierarchic in structure until we reach some lower elementary 
subsystem" (Simon 1962). By relying on business history (chapter 1) 
and the theoretical literature (see for example Bolton and 
Dewatripont 1994, Calvo and Wellisz 1978 and 1979, Keren and 
Levhari 1979,1983 and 1989, Qian 1994, Radner 1992 and 1993, 
Sah and Stiglitz 1986 and 1988, and Williamson 1967), I develop a 
stylized description of the internal working of firms (and plants) using 
a vector of quantitative variables. This allows me to provide robust 
large scale empirical evidence on the organization of plants, thus 
shedding new light on the current debate on firm structure and its 
dynamics. 
I use three types of measures in order to define quantitatively the 
internal structure. First, hierarchy can be represented by a tree with 
the top manager at the top and the plant's employees operating 
machines or working at the assembly lines at the bottom. The total 
number of managerial levels gives the size of hierarchy. Second, the 
span of control, defining hierarchical relations among the plamt's 
layers, shapes the form of the organization. Finally, the allocation of 
decision-making, which defines who takes what decisions within the 
hierarchy, completes the definition of the organization. 
2.2.2 Data 
Since quantitative data on the organization of firms are rarely 
available, I have conducted, with the financial and human support of 
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Politecnico di Milano and Universitä di Pavia, a fieldwork on Italian 
manufacturing plants (FLAUTO97 survey). I have obtained detailed 
information on plant's organization for a sample composed of 438 
manufacturing plants (see the empirical methodology chapter at the 
beginning of this thesis). 
In particular, for each plant I know the total number of managerial 
levels. Moreover, I have detailed data on the decision-making 
structure. I have information on the level at which each hierarchy 
takes the following six strategic decisions: (i) purchase of stand-alone 
machinery, (ii) purchase of large-scale capital equipment, (iii) 
introduction of new technologies, (iv) hiring and dismissal of plants' 
employees, (v) individual and collective incentive schemes, and (vi) 
plants' employees career paths. In addition, I also know what level of 
the hierarchy is assigned responsibility for the following operating 
activities: (a) daily production plan, (b) weekly production plan, (c) 
definition of blue collars' tasks, (d) control of blue collars' operations, 
and (e) modification of production plan after sudden shocks. I have 
adopted a rather stylized, yet meaningful description of the decision- 
making structure of the firm relating to strategic and operating 
decisions (shown in Figure la and lb respectively), which is 
instrumental to obtaining data that are comparable across plants of 
different size and ownership structure. 
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Figure la - Decision-making structure: strategic decisions 
degree of 
levels: 12345 centralization 
IL PM PM + AUT PM's PROP HL 
Legend: 
IL: intermediate levels (such as blue collars and production middle managers); 
PM: plant manager autonomously; 
PM+ AUT: situations in which the plant manager needs a formal authorization 
before taking a decision; 
PM's PROP: situations in which the plant manager can only propose but not decide 
autonomously; 
HL: higher levels. 
Figure lb - Decision-making structure: operating decisions 
levels: 12 
BC Pr. M 
T' degree of 
3 centralization 
PM 
Legend: 
BC: blue collars; 
Pr. M: production middle managers (and/or other levels between blue collars and 
the plant manager); 
PM: plant manager. 
In this way, plants can be characterized by the degree of decision- 
making centralization that depends on the level at which decisions 
are taken. 2 As concerns strategic decisions, the highest degree of 
decentralization corresponds to the situation in which the levels 
2 In chapter 4I will provide a distinction between real and formal authority of 
strategic decisions. However, it is already evident that in levels 1 and 2 either the 
plant manager or some intermediate level have real and formal authority over a 
plant strategic decision. Instead, in level 3 the plant manager has only real but not 
formal authority, since he needs a formal authorization from his corporate superior 
(he can be overruled at any time). Finally, in levels 4 and 5 the plant manager's 
superior has real and formal authority. 
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under the plant manager are responsible for taking decisions (level 1). 
Going up the hierarchy we find those situations in which the plant 
manager is autonomously in charge of pant's strategic decisions (level 
2). Otherwise his power may be limited by superiors' supervision 
(level 3), or he might be only entitled to make proposals (level 4). 
Finally, the highest degree of centralization is the case in which 
hierarchical levels higher than the plant manager (for example the 
owner in a small single-plant firm, or a middle manager in a plant 
that is owned by a multinational enterprise) take strategic decisions. 
As to operating decisions, a similar distinction can be made between 
centralized units, where decision-making power is concentrated at 
the plant manager level, and decentralized ones where responsibility 
for operating decisions is delegated to lower hierarchical levels (such 
as blue collars). 
For each sample plant I have data on the 1997 organizational 
structure. Moreover, I know if plants have changed their 
organizations during the period 1975-1996 (meaning that they have 
changed one of the considered variables). If the answer is affirmative I 
have also information on the "old" organization. In the following 
sections I shall define the old organization as "previous organization". 
If a plant has not changed its structure, then the current and 
previous organizations coincide. 
Lastly, I have additional information on sample plants, including 
size (i. e., number of employees in 1997 and 1989), ownership status, 
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sector of operation, localization, and adoption of advanced 
manufacturing technologies (AMT), inflexible manufacturing systems 
(IMS), local area networks (LAN), and electronic-data-interchange 
(EDI), managerial innovations - such as just-in-time (JIT), and total- 
quality-management (TQM) - and human resources management 
procedures - such as job-rotation, formal team practice, and 
individual incentive schemes. A description of these latter and other 
variables is provided in the introduction of this thesis and in the 
following chapters, where is needed. 
2.2.3 Measures of Organizational Structure 
The first aspect of interest of an organization is its size. Since the 
seminal work of Williamson (1967) many papers have described a 
firm's organization by its number of managerial levels (see chapter 3, 
section 3.2, for a review of hierarchical models of the firm). Thus, I 
define the variable LEVEL as the number of hierarchical levels of 
plants. Of course, the minimum of LEVEL is two, corresponding to 
the situation in which plant organization comprehends only blue 
collars and the plant manager. LEVEL is a measure of organization 
complexity. On the one hand, firms may face problems of "loss of 
control" in expanding organizational size (Williamson 1967). In fact, 
the reliance of hierarchical organizations on serial reproduction for 
their functioning exposes them to serious distortions in transmission 
(Keren and Levhari 1979) as well as to the shirking of subordinates 
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(Calvo and Wellisz 1978). Hence, bounded rationality within 
organizations should impose a severe limitation to hierarchy's size. 
On the other hand, managerial hierarchy is a source of economies of 
scale in gathering and elaborating new information (Chandler 1962 
and 1977 and Radner 1993). Indeed, the purpose of the management 
hierarchy is to capture scale and scope economies within and among 
functions through planning and coordination. If statically the choice 
of the number of levels is dominated by this trade-off, dynamically I 
would expect, especially for large plants, the elimination of (some) 
intermediate levels, with the adoption of a "lean production" approach 
(see chapter 1). In addition "Increased use of technologies, such as 
email, voice mail and shared databases, has, over time, reduced the 
need for traditional middle management, whose role was to supervise 
others and to collect, analyze, evaluate, and transmit information up, 
down, and across the organizational hierarchy" (Bahrami 1992). 
The second notion of organizational structure refers to the shape of 
an organization. Whilst the number of hierarchical levels is a 
straightforward variable to define, the span of control is more tricky. 
In general, the span of control is, for each tier of a hierarchy, the 
average number of subordinates under the same superior. However, I 
do not have information about employees' distribution among levels. 
So, what I derive is an `average span of control'3 defined as the 
3 Keith Cowling suggested to estimate the span of control at each level. There are 
two main reasons why I have not proceeded in this direction. First, I am mainly 
interested in an aggregate measure of the span of control that is comparable 
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number, SPAN, that, given the number of employees n and the 
number of hierarchical levels (LEVEL), satisfies the following 
equation: 
n =1+SPAN +SPAN 2 +"""+SPANLEva-'. 
If for instance the number of employees is 85 and the management 
hierarchy comprehends 4 levels, then SPAN equals 4. This means, in 
turn, that on average managers have 4 subordinates each. 
The (static) choice of span of control depends again upon the loss 
of control phenomenon'. In a context where employees are vertically 
related, the more subordinates a superior monitors (greater span of 
control), the smaller the probability of the subordinate being checked 
(see Calvo and Wellisz 1978 and 1979, Qian 1994, and Rosen 1982). 
Hence, a greater span of control will raise the likelihood of 
subordinates' shirking. However, a lower value of the span of control, 
given the number of employees, implies a higher number of 
hierarchical levels, expanding loss of control through information 
transmission failures (Keren and Levhari 1979,1983 and 1989). 
Dynamically, at least for large firms, with the adoption of new 
between firms of different size. SPAN has such a nice property. Second, the 
estimates of the span of control might lead to very disappointing results. In fact, we 
cannot restrict the span of control to some value, so that it might come out to be 
less than one, or, worst, negative. Thus, we might well end up with results that are 
not economically meaningful. I cannot go into details but there are clear indications 
(and reasons) that this is the case. 
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computer-based technologies that enhance both managers' 
monitoring capabilities and the efficiency and speed of information 
transmission, I expect the span of control to be increased (Krafcik 
1988). 
To sum up, I claim that organizations can be viewed as complex 
hierarchical structures. Thus, a robust way to analyze them 
quantitatively is to look at the number of hierarchical tiers and the 
span of control. I expect to find static and dynamic regularities as to 
the values taken by such variables. Before doing so, I introduce other 
and maybe more original indices that measure firm decision-making 
allocation. 
2.2.4 Measures of Decision-Making Allocation 
In order to summarize data on the decision-making structure of firms 
I put forward three different measures. I claim that they give an 
exhaustive and comprehensive picture, both statically and 
dynamically, of the allocation of power within the plant (Aghion and 
Tirole 1995 and 1997, and Sah and Stiglitz 1986 and 1988). 4 
Since Marschak and Radner's (1972) seminal contribution the term 
`organizational form' has been employed to characterize the key 
elements of organizations within a decision-making framework. Even 
though we know that there is more to organizational structure than 
just centralization and decentralization, it is not disputable that 
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authority relations are a key aspect of business organizations. We 
may therefore conceive of a corporate hierarchy comprising various 
tiers of decision-making. The power to make strategic and operating 
decisions is not necessarily concentrated at the pinnacle of the 
hierarchy but may be diffused throughout the firm. In the remainder 
of this section, I describe indices relating to strategic decisions. 
Similar indices have also been calculated for operating decisions. 5 
Data on the decision-making structure are multivariate categorical 
ranked data (see section 2.2.2). Moreover, there are very clear 
indications that data relating to different strategic (and operating) 
decisions are correlated. The main objective is to present the main 
structural features of the allocation of decision-making power in 
terms of a small number of variables, possibly one, so that they may 
be better understood. In order to do this I use principal component 
analysis, a fairly standard approach in industrial economics in 
situations such as mine (see for example Levin et al. 1987). 6 In 
particular I have followed three steps. First, I have applied a linear 
scale to categorical ranked data on the decision-making structure 
(i. e., linear ranking). Second, I have conducted a principal component 
analysis on data related to both the present and previous 
Note that I always refer to the plant level. Strategic and operating decisions relate 
to the plant, so that this and not the firm is the appropriate unit of analysis. 
5 For the sake of simplicity the details of the analysis relating to operating decisions 
are not illustrated here. They follow exactly the same steps as to strategic decisions. 
6 For strategic decisions, see Table A. 2 in the Appendix, the first component 
explains more than 75% of sample variance. Since we do not loose much 
information, data reduction seems to be quite efficient (results for both strategic 
and operating decisions are presented in the Appendix, tables A. 1-A. 4). 
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organizations, in order to have the same indicator for the two series 
of observations. That is, I have run the analysis on a (438x2) x6 
matrix (where 438 is the number of sample plants, 2 refers to the 
previous and present organizations, and 6 is the number of strategic 
decisions considered), so that the first component I derive can be 
employed for the observations of both the "old" organization and the 
current one. Third, I have defined for each plant j (j =1,.., 438) a 
measure of the degree of centralization of decision-making (DC), in 
the following way: 
6 
DC(j) _ ax; (j), 
i=I 
where ali (i=1,.., 6) are the six coordinates of the first component and 
xi(j) (i=1,.., 6) are the values of the decision variables for plant j once 
linearly ranked (recall that such variables range from 1, maximum 
decentralization, to 5, maximum centralization, see Figure 1a). Thus, 
DC will be large if plant decision-making is highly centralized. The 
details of the principal component analysis are given in the Appendix 
(see Table A. 1-A. 4) . 
In addition, I have calculated, for each plant j (j =1,.., 438) the 
number, NDk(j), of strategic decisions taken by each tier k of the 
hierarchical structure. That is: 
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6 
NDk(>) = EDk(>) 
, -ý 
k1 ifx, (j)=k, with : D; (j) = to otherwise. 
Dkt(j) is a dummy variable that equals 1 when decision i is taken by 
level k (namely if xi(j)=k) and is zero if it is taken by another level, and 
5 is the total number of hierarchical levels considered. Hence for each 
plant j ND(j) is a vector of five discrete coordinates, that range 
between zero (no decision is taken at that level) and 6 (all decisions 
are taken at that level). 
Unlike the previous measure, ND captures, besides the degree of 
plant centralization, the distribution of authority within the 
hierarchy. Whereas from DC we know the plant average level of 
centralization of decision-making activity, from ND we can distinguish 
situations in which decision-making is concentrated at high, middle 
or even low hierarchical levels from cases in which it is more evenly 
distributed. 
Lastly, I have defined a measure of the degree of concentration of 
decision-making power. To do so I have followed three steps. First, 
since the five decision levels described in Figure la represent not only 
plant hierarchical levels but also ways in which a level takes a 
strategic decision (in particular levels 3 and 4), I have aggregated 
them in three groups corresponding to three actual tiers: blue collars 
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and production middle management (level 1), plant manager (level 2 
and 3), and higher levels (level 4 and 5). Second, I have used 
Euclidean distance as a measure of decision concentration. That is 
for each plant j (j =1,.., 438), 
( CONC(j) 2 Y3j)1/ 
2 
_ \Y1j +Y22j 
+2 
where yij is the number of decisions, out of six, taken by group i. 
Clearly, CONC reaches its maximum when all decision-making is 
concentrated at one level. Third, I have standardized CONC in the 
following way, 
. rTn nnhrnr A- 
CONC(j) - min(CONC) uLL- 
max(CONC) - min(CONC) 
Notice that 0 <_ STD CONC S 1, and that higher values represent 
higher concentrations of decision-making. If STD CONC = 1, then all 
decisions are concentrated at one of the following levels: blue collars, 
plant manager, or higher levels. 
2.3 The Organizational Structure 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variable LEVEL. For each 
category of plants ordered by their number of hierarchical levels, 
columns 2 and 3 describe the sample distribution and column 4 
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reports average plant size measured as the number of employees in 
1997. Columns 5-7 do the same for the previous organization (see 
section 2.2.1). 
Tab. 1- Number of hierarchical levels (LEVEL) and plant size 
LEVEL 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
total 
1997 organizationa 
obs. % average size 
29 6.6 34.4 
233 53.2 121.0# 
126 28.8 217.1$ 
40 9.1 569.4t 
10 2.3 623.4 
438 100 195.3 
previous organizationb 
obs. % average size 
44 10.0 43.9 
217 49.5 104.6# 
107 24.5 238.5* 
43 9.8 567.3* 
27 6.2 1023.5 
438 100 233.3 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
t-test: difference in average plant size between two consecutive LEVEL classes 
significant at the 99% level. 
t t-test: difference in average plant size between two consecutive LEVEL classes 
significant at the 95% level. 
The data presented in Table 1 reveal few surprises. First, the 
sample distribution is concentrated around three and four 
hierarchical levels. Taken together they account for 82% and 74% of 
the sample plants for the present and previous organizations, 
respectively. Second, there is a strong evidence of a positive relation 
between the number of hierarchical tiers and plant size. In particular, 
almost all differences of plant size averages between consecutive 
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LEVELs are statistically significant at conventional levels (see Table 
A. 5 in the Appendix). More interestingly, the sample mean of LEVEL 
for the 1997 organization does not significantly differ from that for 
the previous organization, even if a X2 test shows that the null 
hypothesis that the distributions by LEVEL classes of the 1997 and 
previous organizations do not significantly differ is rejected at 99%. 
This is the result of two processes. On the one hand, the number of 
plants that adopt a two-level hierarchy is diminishing: they are 
evolving towards more complex structures. On the other hand, very 
articulated organizations, with 5 and 6 levels, are turning to less 
complex architectures. To gain further insights into such phenomena 
we need less aggregate data. 
Tab. 2- Number of levels, distributions for categories of plants 
n. of employees < 100 n. of employees: 100 - 500 n. of employees > 500 
LEVEL 1997$ previousb 1997a previousb 1997a previousb 
obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. % obs. % 
2 28 11.3 40 15.3 1 0.6 4 3.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
3 160 64.9 163 62.2 64 40.8 49 38.0 9 26.5 5 10.6 
4 48 19.4 49 18.7 68 43.3 45 34.9 10 29.4 13 27.7 
5 10 4.0 6 2.3 18 11.5 23 17.8 12 35.3 14 29.8 
6 1 0.4 4 1.5 6 3.8 8 6.2 3 8.8 15 31.9 
total 247 100 262 100 157 100 129 100 34 100 47 100 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
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Table 2 distinguishes three categories of plants: small (number of 
employees smaller than 100), medium (between 100 and 500), and 
large plants (more than 500 employees). As seen in the table, small 
firms are becoming marginally more articulated over time, with the 
share of small plants with 2 tiers out of the total of small plants 
decreasing (from 15.3% to 11.3%) and the share of those with a 
number of tiers between 3 and 5 increasing (from 83.2% to 88.3%). 
Medium plants instead tend to adopt organizations characterized by 
three and four levels, with the share of five and six levels sharply 
decreasing (from 24% to 15.3%). Lastly, large plants are drastically 
simplifying their organizational structure. The percentage of large 
plants with 6 tiers has decreased from 31.9% to 8.8%, while the 
percentage of those with 3 levels has risen from 10.6% to 26.5%. In 
order to evaluate the statistical robustness of changes of the 
distributions of LEVEL for the three plant size categories, I compute 
x2 tests. Whereas the distribution by LEVEL classes does not change 
substantially in the period under investigation for small plants, the 
same does not hold true for medium and large sized plants. In fact, 
for the latter two categories the null hypothesis that the distributions 
by level classes of the 1997 and previous organizations do not 
significantly differ is rejected at conventional levels.? 
7 Values of the x2 tests are 5.79 (4 d. o. f. ), 11.54 (4), and 14.13 (3) for small, medium 
and large plants, respectively. 
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A thorough analysis of the determinants of such phenomena lies 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Nonetheless, some preliminary 
remarks are in order. First, it is worth emphasizing that the sample 
does not include plants set up after 1986. Hence, as far as small 
plants are concerned, the data presented in Table 2 might be 
explained by the aging of the population of small plants, that is, by 
the process of consolidation of surviving small units. The lower 
number of hierarchical levels of large plants in 1997 might be a 
consequence of the downsizing of large organizations in the 1990s: 
the average number of employees of plants with more than 500 
employees decreases between 1989 and 1997 from 1,277 to 1,143. 
However, in accordance with the qualitative evidence provided by the 
managerial literature (see, for instance, Drucker 1988) it may also 
reflects the adoption by large firms of a leaner kind of organizational 
structure, with a lower number of intermediate managerial levels (see 
chapter 6 that provides econometric evidence). 
To further study organizational dynamics, I have computed 
transition probabilities, where each state is defined by the values of 
the variable LEVEL. In other words pii is the probability that a plant 
characterized by an i-level hierarchy turns its organization to a j- 
layered structure. Results are presented in Table 3. The first robust 
result is the existence of very strong inertial pressures on 
organization (see also Baker et al. 1994). Probabilities of maintaining 
a stable organizational structure over time are in general greater than 
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those of changing it. Indeed 63% of sample plants have not changed 
the number of hierarchical levels in the period under scrutiny (that is 
from 1975 onwards). Moreover, organizational change seems to be 
characterized by a process of marginal adaptation instead of radical 
modifications. One-level changes prevail with respect to more radical 
ones. Lastly, and contrary to prior expectations (Hannan and 
Freeman 1984), more complex structures characterized by a higher 
number of layers have modified their organizational structure more 
often and more radically than simple two and three-level 
organizations. In particular, there are only two cases in which the 
likelihood of a two-level reduction is significantly greater than zero: 
starting from an organization comprised of 5 or 6 tiers this 
probability equals 0.21 and 0.26, respectively. Such data confirm a 
tendency within the Italian metalworking industry towards the 
simplification of very articulated hierarchies. 
Tab. 3- Transition probabilities (p, ), number of levels (LEVEL) 
N. of levels of the 
previous organization 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
N. of levels of the 1997 organization 
23456 
0.57 0.32 0.07 0.04 0.00 
0.01 0.79 0.17 0.03 0.00 
0.01 0.36 0.57 0.06 0.00 
0.00 0.21 0.44 0.28 0.07 
0.00 0.00 0.26 0.48 0.26 
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Tab. 4- Span of control 
SPAN (means) 1997 organizationa previous organizationb 
Total 8.72 10.23 
Small plants 7.89 9.77 
(n. of employees < 100) 
Medium plants 9.21 11.69 
(n. of employees 100-500) 
Large plants 12.51 8.74 
(n. of employees > 500) 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
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Turning now to the findings regarding span of control, Table 4 
presents means for the SPAN variable. In aggregate, the average span 
of control has decreased over time. In the old organization each 
manager had more than 10 subordinates on average. Nowadays 
plants tend to organize their internal structure by reducing the 
average number of subordinates under one manager to less than 9, 
with the difference being significant at 95%. Moreover, as to both the 
1997 and the previous organizations, small plants have a value of 
SPAN (7.89 and 9.77) lower than the average (8.72 and 10.23). The 
opposite applies to medium size plants, which have a number of 
subordinates under each manager (9.21 and 11.69 respectively) 
above the average value. Lastly, large plants have the highest value of 
SPAN in 1997 (12.5), while they have the lowest value as regards the 
previous organization (8.7). The t-tests illustrated in Appendix (Table 
A. 6) show that the difference between the span of large and small 
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sized plants in 1997 is significant at 95%, while other differences are 
not significant at conventional levels. 
Again, we observe two very different dynamics. Small and medium 
sized plants have reduced the average number of subordinates. In 
particular, if one considers plants which in 1989 had less than 100 
employees, a t-test for matched pairs shows that the reduction of 
SPAN is significant at the 99% level (see Table A. 7 in Appendix). The 
evolution of the organization of large plants has followed an opposite 
pattern. They have increased the span of control, with the difference 
of the value of SPAN between the previous and the 1997 
organizations for plants which in 1989 had more than 500 employees 
being significant at the 95% level (see again Table A. 7). These results 
provide additional evidence of the adoption by large units of a leaner 
type of organization. 
In sum, the data so far illustrate some rather interesting findings 
on plant hierarchical structure and its recent evolution. First, 
hierarchy size increases with plant size. Nonetheless, the span of 
control also increases with plant size (with the exception of the "old" 
organization of large plants). This result may be explained by the 
attempt of firms to limit the increase of hierarchical levels when the 
number of employees increases. Second, depending on their size, 
plants have followed different dynamic paths. Small Italian firms are 
adopting more articulated organizations characterized by a low span 
of control. Medium plants have changed their internal structure from 
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either very complex or very simple organizations to three and four 
level hierarchies. In addition they are also decreasing their span. 
Lastly, large plants, starting from rather bureaucratic organizations, 
have chosen leaner structures characterized by a lower number of 
managerial levels and a higher span of control. 
2.4 Allocation of Decision-Making 
2.4.1 Strategic Decisions 
Table 5 presents results for the degree of centralization of decision- 
making activities (DC, see section 2.2.4 for a definition and Appendix 
for results of principal component analysis). 
Tab. 5- Degree of centralization of strategic decision-making 
DC (means) 1997 organizationa previous organizationb 
Total -0.12 0.12 
Small plants 0.13 0.23 
(n. of employees < 100) 
Medium plants -0.45 0.04 
(n. of employees: 100-500) 
Large plants -0.31 -0.36 
(n. of employees > 500) 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
Over time plants have decentralized decision-making activities in 
the period 1975-1997. This process of downward delegation of 
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strategic decisions leads to a statistically significant (at the 99% level) 
decrease of the value of DC (see Table A. 9 in the Appendix). Again we 
can distinguish plants according to their size. Decision-making in 
small plants is more centralized than in medium and large units. 
This holds as regards both the 1997 and previous organizations, with 
most differences being statistically significant (or almost significant, 
see Table A. 8 in Appendix) at conventional levels. When ownership 
and control are not separated, as is often the case for small 
enterprises strategic decisions are mostly taken at the top tier 
(namely, by the owner). 8 Conversely, "in large organizations, only a 
small fraction of the available information will be brought to bear on 
any single decision. Combining this observation with the fact 
individual decision-makers are limited in their capacities for 
information processing, one is led to the inevitability of decentralized 
decision-making in which different decisions - or groups of decisions 
- are made by different decision-makers on the basis of different 
information" (Radner 1996). 
Moreover, organizational dynamics turns out to depend again upon 
the size of firms (see again Table 5). Besides being centralized, small 
plants have partially delegated strategic decisions down the 
managerial hierarchy. The results of t-tests for matched pairs (see 
again Table A. 9) show that for plants that had less than 100 
8 Indeed, only 3% of small plants is owned by a business group, while the same 
percentages are 41% and 76% for medium and large plants respectively. 
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employees in 1989, the difference between the values of DC for the 
1997 and the previous organizations is statistically significant at the 
95% level. A similar dynamic pattern applies to medium sized plants, 
which have significantly (at the 90% level) decentralized decision- 
making activities, starting from values of DC around the mean and 
becoming the most decentralized plant class. In contrast, as to large 
plants, the null hypothesis that the values of DC for previous and 
current organizations do not significantly differ cannot be rejected at 
conventional levels. 
In order to gain further insights into organizational dynamics, I 
have computed the probabilities of transition, where each state is 
defined according to the value of the degree of centralization. In 
particular, I have divided plants in three categories: centralized, 
average and decentralized. Then I have calculated the transition 
probabilities from one category to another. Results are summarized in 
Table 6. We can infer that the allocation of decision-making power 
tends to be pretty stable over time. Again structural inertia seems to 
dominate organizational evolution. In addition, organizational 
changes are incremental rather than being radical. Indeed, the 
probabilities of changing the decision-making structure starting from 
either a centralized or a decentralized organization and turning to an 
average architecture are higher than those of adopting either a 
decentralized or a centralized organization (0.20 versus 0.11, and 
0.16 versus 0.04, respectively). 
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Tab. 6- Transition probabilities (p. ), DC of strategic decisions 
Previous organization 
centralized 
average 
decentralized 
1997 organization 
centralized average decentralized 
0.69 0.20 0.11 
0.06 0.81 0.13 
0.04 0.16 0.80 
Moreover, in contrast to the suggestion by Hannan and Freeman 
(1984), the level of structural inertia does not increase with plant 
size. In particular, for small and large plants organizational inertia is 
much more pronounced than for medium sized plants. In fact, 63.9% 
of small plants and 64.7% of large plants have not changed any 
decision level for each of the strategic decisions considered, while the 
same percentage is 50.9% for medium sized plants. For small units, 
the unwillingness of a founder-leader to delegate responsibility is 
likely to be a main cause of organizational stability. Conversely, for 
large plants complexity of agent relations might undermine firm's 
stimulus towards changes (Schaefer 1998). Hence, organizational 
inertia appears to be a bell-shaped function of size. In any case, the 
allocation of authority is remarkably stable over time independently 
of size. 
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Tab. 7- Number of strategic decisions (ND) taken by each levela 
levels Total 
Plant class, number of employees 
<100 100-500 >500 
1997 organizationb 
1- intermediate levels 
2- plant manager 
3-pm+aut. 
4- pm's proposals 
5- higher levels 
0.12 
0.98 
1.48 
2.18 
1.24 
0.08 0.17 0.21 
1.14 0.81 0.59 
1.19 1.88 1.76 
1.83 2.57 2.94 
1.76 0.57 0.50 
previous organization 
1- intermediate levels 
2- plant manager 
3-pm+aut. 
4- pm's proposals 
5- higher levels 
0.10 
1.08 
1.18 
1.95 
1.69 
0.08 0.09 0.21 
1.26 0.77 0.91 
1.00 1.42 1.50 
1.51 2.60 2.60 
2.15 1.12 0.78 
Legend: 
a For each column, the sum equals 6, the number of strategic decisions considered. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
c Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
So far, the analysis has considered the aggregate degree of 
centralization. How is authority allocated among hierarchical levels? 
The number of decisions taken by each tier (ND) helps us analyze this 
issue. Table 7 presents results relating to the ND variable for the 
1997 and previous organizations. Intermediate levels (including blue 
collars and production middle managers) are totally excluded from 
plant strategic decision-making. There exists some minor diversity for 
plants of different size, but overall intermediate levels take almost no 
decision. The plant manager takes, either independently (real and 
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formal authority, level 2) or subject to the superior's ultimate control 
(real but not formal authority, level 3), nearly two decisions, its 
authority changing little over time. Situations in which the plant 
manager and higher levels coordinate through a sharing of 
information (level 4) are now more likely. Conversely, authority of 
higher level management is decreasing, when is implemented in a 
very autocratic way (level 5). 
Overall, decision-making has been reallocated within hierarchies. 
However such a change is not radical; instead it is characterized 
again by both inertial forces and incremental adjustments. In this 
sense, internal political constraints might have played a very 
important role. As long as authority is a fixed resource, structural 
changes involve its redistribution among firm agents. Such 
redistribution upsets the prevailing authority system, so that some 
agent or group of agents is likely to resist any proposed 
reorganization. 
Another interesting aspect regards the relation between power 
allocation and plant size. From Table 7, it is evident that in small 
firms higher levels (very often the owner) take a considerably higher 
number of strategic decisions than the same levels in medium and 
large units. 9 This result has a straightforward interpretation: in small 
firms, ownership and actual control tend to coincide (or, by following 
9 t-tests show that these differences are statistically significant at the 99% level. For 
the sake of simplicity I omit these tests. 
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Aghion and Tirole 1997, formal authority, the right to decide, and real 
authority, the effective control over decisions, are concentrated at the 
owner-principal level). 
Tab. 8- Degree of concentration of strategic decision-making 
S7D CONC (means) 1997 organizationa previous organizationb 
Total 0.89 0.91 
Small plants 0.92 0.94 
(n. of employees < 100) 
Medium plants 0.86 0.89 
(n. of employees: 100-500) 
Large plants 0.82 0.85 
(n. of employees > 500) 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
Finally, I have computed the standardized degree of concentration 
of decision-making (STD_CONC). The main objective is to investigate 
whether firms tend to diffuse authority in order to exploit specialized 
managerial capabilities (Geanakoplos and Milgrom 1991), or 
alternatively, concentrate decision-making to avoid coordination 
problems. From Table 8, we derive that strategic decisions are highly 
concentrated. Adding information on the allocation of decision- 
making, we are able to draw a comprehensive picture. Overall, 
authority is concentrated either at the plant manager level or at 
higher levels. Small firms have the highest degrees of concentration 
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and centralization of decision-making. Differences between the value 
of STD_CONC of small plants and those of both medium and large 
plants are statistically significant at 99% both for the 1997 and 
previous organizations (see Table A. 10). Medium and large firms tend 
to diffuse authority just slightly more; they also partially delegate 
decision-making downwards, as shown previously. In this respect, 
coordination seems to play a more important role than the 
exploitation of local specialized capabilities. There is no evidence of a 
radical shift towards multi-leader organizations, as predicted by some 
theory (Lindbeck and Snower 1996). However, the aggregate degree of 
concentration has significantly decreased (see Table A. 11). The same 
holds true especially for small and medium size plants, with t-tests 
for matched pairs being statistically significant at conventional levels. 
2.4.2 Operating Decisions 
The analysis of operating decisions is based on indices analogous to 
those used for strategic decisions. For the sake of simplicity, in this 
paragraph I only synthesize the main results. However, descriptive 
statistics and statistical tests are reported exactly as in the case of 
strategic decisions. Overall, they clearly support the view that in the 
period under consideration Italian metalworking firms, especially of 
medium and large size, have increasingly adopted a "leaner" pattern 
of organization. 
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Tab. 9- Degree of centralization of operating decision-making 
DC (means) 
82 
1997 organizationa previous organizationb 
Total -0.13 0.13 
Small plants 0.15 0.34 
(n. of employees < 100) 
Medium plants -0.45 -0.09 (n. of employees: 100-500) 
Large plants -0.63 -0.45 
(n. of employees > 500) 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
As is apparent in Table 9, operating decisions have been 
significantly decentralized over time for all categories of firms. The 
value of the variable DC has decreased from 0.13 to -0.13. Small 
(from 0.34 to 0.16), medium (from -0.09 to -0.46) and large plants 
(from -0.45 to -0.84) have all delegated operating decisions down the 
management hierarchy; the differences between the values of DC for 
the previous and the current organizations are significant at 
conventional levels (see Table A. 13 in the Appendix). In particular, 
production middle managers are increasingly important for the 
implementation of strategic decisions. The ND variable shows that on 
average these hierarchical levels take three operating decisions out of 
5, while the plant manager takes most of the remaining two (see 
Table 11). Authority has shifted marginally also towards blue collars, 
especially in large plants, but they do not play any significant role as 
to both the previous and the current organizations. 
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Tab. 10 - Transition probabilities (p, ), DC of operating decisions 
Previous organization 
centralized 
average 
decentralized 
1997 organization 
centralized average decentralized 
0.70 0.18 0.12 
0.10 0.79 0.11 
0.08 0.14 0.78 
Overall, the evolution of the distribution of authority of operating 
decisions shows that structural inertia again dominates 
organizational dynamic behavior (see Table 10). More than 75% of 
plants do not change class of DC, with medium sized units being the 
more inclined towards change. Thus, the allocation of operating 
decisions is quite stable over time, but when changes do occur they 
are towards a more decentralized structure. 
Plant size influences the allocation of decision-making activities 
even for operating decisions. Small firms are the most centralized, 
and the differences in the degree of centralization between this 
category and medium and large sized plants are for both the previous 
and the current organizations statistically significant (at 99%, see 
Table A. 12). Moreover, small plants tend to distribute responsibility 
between intermediate levels and the plant manager quite evenly, 
while large plants concentrate authority on intermediate levels (see 
Table 11). 
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Tab. 11 - Number of operating decisions (ND) taken by each levela 
Plant class, number of employees 
levels Total <100 100-500 >500 
1997 organizationb 
1- blue collars 
2- middle managers 
3- plant manager 
0.25 
3.07 
1.68 
0.21 0.30 0.32 
2.84 3.32 3.56 
1.95 1.38 1.12 
previous organization 
1- blue collars 
2- middle managers 
3- plant manager 
0.15 
2.98 
1.87 
0.14 0.19 0.13 
2.78 3.12 3.72 
2.08 1.69 1.15 
Legend: 
a The sum for each column equals 5, the number of operating decisions considered. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
c Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
Lastly, operating decisions are more diffused within layers of the 
hierarchy than are strategic ones; the average value of STD_CONC for 
current organizations is 0.51 significantly lower than 0.89, the 
standardized degree of concentration of strategic decisions. In 
addition, in 1997 differences between plant categories are not 
statistically significant, whereas as to the previous organization 
decision-making in small and large plants was considerably more 
concentrated than in medium sized plants, with t-tests being 
significant at conventional levels. Even more interestingly, in the 
1980s and 1990s the level of concentration has substantially 
decreased for all categories of plants save large units (see Table A. 15). 
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Tab. 12 - Degree of concentration of operating decision-making 
STD CONC (means) 1997 organizationa previous organizationb 
Total 0.51 0.59 
Small plants 0.52 0.61 
(n. of employees < 100) 
Medium plants 0.49 0.52 
(n. of employees: 100-500) 
Large plants 0.55 0.63 
(n. of employees > 500) 
Legend: 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
2.5 Conclusions 
There is a large and growing interest in economic theory on the 
internal workings of firms. However, the theoretical literature is 
based on very little data and limited stylized facts. Indeed, most 
economists have traditionally relegated the study of organizations to 
business history or to case studies. The result is a complete lack of 
large scale quantitative empirical evidence on firm organization. 
In this introductory part of the thesis, I have offered an empirical 
analysis of the internal organization of plants and its evolution over 
the 1980s and 1990s using a detailed data set of Italian 
metalworking plants. For this purpose, the metalworking sector is of 
great interest, as it is considered by the management literature as a 
pioneer in the adoption of the "lean production" model. In particular, 
I have focused attention on the hierarchical structure of plants and 
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the allocation of decision-making activities as regards both strategic 
and operating decisions. I am aware that in this way I adopt a rather 
stylized view of organization. However, providing quantitative 
measures of these key aspects allows me to highlight rather 
interesting results. 
First, the (static) choice of the organizational form can be explained 
by the `loss of control phenomenon'. Plant's hierarchy expands with 
size, but bureaucratization seems to be partially avoided by higher 
values of the span of control and a higher degree of decentralization 
of decision-making. From one side, given the number of employees, 
firms can shrink their organization by increasing the number of 
subordinates under one manager. This, in turn, may lead to a 
decrease of failures in information transmission. From the other side, 
decentralization might be both a means of exploiting local and 
specialized capabilities and a way to speed up the implementation of 
decisions. 
Second, the dynamics of plant organization turns out to depend 
crucially on size. In the 1980s and 1990s small Italian firms have 
been adopting a marginally more articulated organizational structure, 
characterized by a higher number of hierarchical levels. The average 
number of subordinates per manager has decreased quite 
substantially. In addition, they have been partially delegating 
strategic and operating decisions down the management hierarchy, 
even if they still remain very centralized in comparison to medium 
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and large sized plants. Medium sized plants have been both reducing 
the span of control and decentralizing responsibility quite drastically. 
In contrast, large plants have followed a distinct evolutionary path 
from those of their small and medium counterparts, simplifying their 
organizational structure by reducing the number of hierarchical 
layers and increasing the average number of subordinates per 
manager. In addition, operating decisions have been increasingly 
delegated downwards, mainly to intermediate levels (such as 
production middle managers). This may be a result of the downsizing 
of large firms in the 1990s, which is evinced by the decrease of 
average plant size in this category. However, findings also provide 
quite robust evidence that large firms, in accordance with the 
scenario outlined by case studies in the managerial literature, have 
taken advantage of the greater monitoring and coordination 
capabilities offered by information technologies and of innovations in 
the managerial sphere, adopting a leaner kind of organization. 
Third, the findings of the empirical analysis clearly show that 
organizational evolution is characterized by structural inertia. During 
the last twenty years most plants have not changed either 
hierarchical structure or decision-making allocation at all. In 
addition, when changes do occur, they tend to be incremental rather 
than radical, with the few exceptions being associated with the 
restructuring of more articulated units. Inertia is not related to size, 
as predicted by the population ecology theory of organizations. 
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Organizations of small and large plants are very stable over time, 
while medium plants seem to be more inclined to change. 
I think that the results presented here shed new light on the 
organization of firms and its evolution. Nonetheless, I am aware that 
these results are to be viewed as a first step and that much remains 
to be done. Thus, two directions seem to me especially fruitful for 
further development in this thesis. First, whereas this chapter has 
focused on the role of firm size in influencing the choice of the 
organizational form and its dynamics, the variables capturing firm 
and industry-specific effects are also likely to have considerable 
explanatory power. I believe that, among them, the ownership 
structure and technology adoptions figure quite prominently. Second, 
the benefits coming from the use of a quantitative approximation of 
firm organization have only partially been exploited in this chapter. In 
particular, decisions concerning different aspects of organizations 
such as the choices of the number of managerial layers of a plant and 
of the degree of delegation of authority have never been subjects of a 
robust econometric analysis. The aim of the remaining part of the 
thesis is, thus, to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to 
look at the organization of firms and its evolution in a robust and 
comprehensive way. 
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Appendix 
A. 1 Results of Principal Component Analysis 
Tab. A. 1- Coordinates of principal components of strategic decisions 
components 
decisions: 
purchase of stand-alone machinery 
purchase of large-scale equipment 
adoption of new technology 
hiring and dismissal 
career paths of plant's personnel 
definition of incentive schemes 
89 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
0.424 0.381 0.004 0.464 0.016 0.678 
0.425 0.402 0.002 0.349 -0.076 -0.728 
0.397 0.417 0.054 -0.812 -0.018 0.074 
0.401 -0.352 -0.743 -0.045 0.401 -0.027 
0.406 -0.474 0.022 -0.022 -0.779 0.046 
0.397 -0.414 0.667 0.012 0.475 -0.039 
Tab. A. 2 - Contribution to total variance of principal components, 
strategic decisions 
components: 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
standard deviation 2.12 0.88 0.53 0.48 0.36 0.24 
proportion of variance 0.75 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 
cumulative proportion 0.75 0.88 0.93 0.97 0.99 1.00 
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Tab. A. 3 - Coordinates of principal components of operating decisions 
components: 
decisions 
daily production plan 
weekly production plan 
definition of blue collars' tasks 
control of results 
modification of production plan 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 
0.483 0.345 0.304 0.135 0.732 
0.428 0.560 -0.248 -0.573 -0.337 
0.469 -0.201 0.661 0.174 -0.522 
0.377 -0.721 -0.158 -0.500 0.249 
0.470 -0.085 -0.619 0.610 -0.126 
Tab. A. 4 - Contribution to total variance of principal components, 
operating decisions 
components: 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 
standard deviation 1.54 0.96 0.81 0.74 0.70 
proportion of variance 0.48 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.09 
cumulative proportion 0.48 0.66 0.79 0.90 1.00 
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A. 2 Results of Tests 
1) Number of hierarchical levels (LEVEL) 
Tab. A. 5 - t-tests: differences between means of the number of 
employees of plants that, have a hierarchy consisting of different levels 
LEVEL 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1997 organization 
average size t 
34.41 - 
121.03 6.26$ 
217.06 3.77$ 
569.45 2.51t 
623.40 0.21 
previous organization 
average size t 
43.95 
104.63 
238.50 
567.35 
1023.52 
4.32 
4.43* 
2.94# 
1.53 
Legend: 
Ho: SIZES=SIZE, -i, 
j=3,4,5,6, with SIZES being the average number of employees of 
plants having a j-level hierarchy. 
$ Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
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2) Span of control (SPAN) 
Tab. A. 6 - t-tests: differences between means of SPAN 
test 
small - medium 
small - large 
medium - large 
1997 organizationa 
means differences t 
7.89-9.21 - 1.35 
7.89-12.51 -2.421 
9.21-12.51 -1.70 
previous organizationb 
means differences t 
92 
9.77-11.69 -0.94 
9.77-8.74 0.70 
11.69-8.74 1.32 
Legend: 
Ho: SPAN=SPANi, iej, with SPANS being the average span of control of plants having 
less than 100 employees (small), between 100 and 500 employees (medium), and 
more than 500 employees (large). 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
Tab. A. 7 - t-tests: differences of SPAN between the 1997 and previous 
organizations (matched pairs) 
plant classa SPAN(1997) SPAN(previous) t 
total 8.72 10.23 2. lOt 
small (n. of employees < 100) 7.86 9.77 3.02* 
medium (n. of employees 100 - 500) 9.33 11.69 1.18 
large (n. of employees >500) 11.20 8.74 -2.29t 
Legend: 
Ho: SPAN(1997) = SPAN(previous), with SPAN (1997) and SPAN (previous) being the 
average span of control for the present and the previous organizations respectively. 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
t Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
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3) Degree of centralization of decision-making activities (DC), 
strategic decisions 
Tab. A. 8 - t-tests: differences between means of DC 
test 
small - medium 
small - large 
medium - large 
1997 organizationa 
means differences t 
0.13 - (- 0.45) 2.82# 
0.13-(-0.31) 1.60 
-0.45-(-0.31) -0.54 
previous organizationb 
means differences t 
0.23-0.04 0.86 
0.23 - (-0.36) 2.00t 
0.04 - (-0.36) 1.34 
Legend: 
Ho: DCj=DCi, itj, with DQ being the average degree of centralization of plants having 
less than 100 employees (small), between 100 and 500 employees (medium), and 
more than 500 employees (large). 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
* Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
Tab. A. 9 - t-tests: differences of DC between the 1997 and previous 
organizations (matched pairs) 
plant classa DC(1997) DC(previous) t 
total -0.12 0.12 3.08$ 
small (n. of employees <100) 0.02 0.23 2.201 
medium (n. of employees 100-500) -0.21 0.04 1.87 
large (n. of employees >500) -0.59 -0.36 1.13 
Legend: 
Ho: DC(1997) = DC(previous), with DC (1997) and DC (previous) being the average 
degree of centralization for the present and the previous organizations respectively. 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
* Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
§ Significance level greater than 90%. 
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4) Degree of concentration of decision-making activities (STD CONC), 
strategic decisions 
Tab. A. 10 - t-tests: differences between means of STD CONC 
test 
small - medium 
small - large 
medium - large 
1997 organizationa 
means differences t 
0.92-0.86 4.88# 
0.92-0.82 4.28# 
0.86-0.82 1.57 
previous organizationb 
means differences t 
0.94-0.89 
0.94-0.85 
0.89-0.85 
3.45* 
3.93 
1.66 
Legend: 
Ho: STD CONCH=STD CONCH, i*j, with STD CONCH being the average degree of 
concentration of plants having less than 100 employees (small), between 100 and 
500 employees (medium), and more than 500 employees (large). 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
t Significance level greater than 99%. 
Tab. A. 11 - t-tests: differences of DC between the 1997 and previous 
organizations (matched pairs) 
plant classa STD_CONC(1997) STD_CONC(previous) t 
total 0.89 0.91 3.90# 
small (n. of employees <100) 0.92 0.94 3.23* 
medium (n. of employees 100-500) 0.87 0.89 2.011 
large (n. of employees 500) 0.83 0.85 1.04 
Legend: 
Ho: STD CONC(1997) = STDCONC(previous), with STD CONC (1997) and STD CONC 
(previous) being the average degree of concentration for the present and the 
previous organizations respectively. 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
# Significance level greater than 99%. 
Significance level greater than 95%. 
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5) Degree of centralization of decision-making activities (DC), 
operating decisions 
Tab. A. 12 - t-tests: differences between means of DC 
1997 organizationa 
test 
small - medium 
small - large 
medium - large 
means differences t 
0.15 - (-0.45) 4.17# 
0.15 - (-0.63) 3.37* 
-0.45 - (-0.63) 0.73 
previous organizationb 
means differences t 
0.34 - (-0.09) 
0.34 - (-0.45) 
- 0.09 - (-0.45) 
2.68* 
4.05* 
1.72§ 
Legend: 
Ho: DCC=DC, i*j, with DCC being the average degree of centralization of plants having 
less than 100 employees (small), between 100 and 500 employees (medium), and 
more than 500 employees (large). 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
* Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
§ Significance level greater than 90%. 
Tab. A. 13 - t-tests: differences of DC between the 1997 and previous 
organizations (matched pairs) 
plant classa DC(1997) DC(previous) t 
total -0.13 0.13 3.98* 
small (n. of employees <100) 0.16 0.34 2.23t 
medium (n. of employees 100-500) -0.46 -0.09 2.82* 
large (n. of employees >500) -0.84 -0.45 2.08t 
Legend: 
Ho: DC(1997) = DC(previous), with DC (1997) and DC (previous) being the average 
degree of centralization for the present and the previous organizations respectively. 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
* Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
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6) Degree of concentration of decision-making activities (STD CONC), 
operating decisions 
Tab. A. 14 - t-tests: differences between means of STD CONC 
1997 organizations 
test 
small - medium 
small - large 
medium - large 
means differences t 
0.52-0.49 1.23 
0.52-0.55 -0.4 
0.49-0.55 -0.97 
previous organizationb 
means differences t 
0.61-0.52 2.65* 
0.61-0.63 -0.43 
0.52-0.63 -2.00t 
Legend: 
Ho: STD CONCH=STD CONCH, ij, with STD CONCH being the average degree of 
concentration of plants having less than 100 employees (small), between 100 and 
500 employees (medium), and more than 500 employees (large). 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1997. 
b Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
$ Significance level greater than 99%. 
t Significance level greater than 95%. 
Tab. A. 15 - t-tests: differences of STD_CONC between the 1997 and 
previous organizations (matched pairs) 
plant classa STD_CONC(1997) STD_CONC(previous) t 
total 0.51 0.59 5.67* 
small (n. of employees < 100) 0.52 0.61 5.26* 
medium (n. of employees 100-500) 0.47 0.52 2.35t 
large (n. of employees 500) 0.60 0.63 0.94 
Legend: 
Ho: STD CONC(1997) = STD CONC(previous), with STD CONC (1997) and STD CONC 
(previous) being the average degree of concentration for the present and the 
previous organizations respectively. 
a Plant size is defined as the number of employees in 1989. 
Significance level greater than 99%. 
Significance level greater than 95%. 
Part III 
Static Models 
Chapter 3 
Analysis of the Determinants of the Management 
Hierarchy 
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3.1 Introduction 
In part II presented anecdotal evidence that showed that the modern 
organization is characterized by having a deep management 
hierarchy. In sharp contrast with the pre-factory system, in the 
modern organization authority relations are organized vertically and 
agents are ranked hierarchically. Then in part II I provided 
quantitative evidence on the management hierarchy of plants and its 
evolution. In particular, I argued that one of the leading determinants 
for explaining sizable differences among organizations was (plant) 
size. Parts III and IV will aim at testing the determinants of the 
organization and its evolution through the estimates of econometric 
models. 
Since the seminal work of Simon (1962) the firm has been defined 
by economists as a complex system, "a system made up of a large 
number of parts that interact in a non-simple way". More specifically, 
the firm is depicted as a hierarchic system, "a system that is 
composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being, in 
turn, hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of 
elementary subsystem". Williamson (1967) represents the first 
theoretical attempt to model the firm as a hierarchy. In his setting 
limitations of organizations strongly restrict the depth of the 
organization. The top manager (or peak coordinator) defines an 
optimal plan, but the implementation suffers from "organizational 
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failures" due to the vertical and serial nature of organizations. The 
loss of control phenomenon is caused by information problems. These 
issues have been analyzed by two different approaches to the study of 
the hierarchic organization of firms: the decentralization of incentives 
and the decentralization of information (Radner 1992). The incentive 
stream (see Calvo and Wellisz 1978 and 1979, Qian 1994, and Rosen 
1982) has focused on the issues that arise when information is 
asymmetric (e. g., agents' shirking). In this setting, the management 
hierarchy is analyzed as a network of multi principal-agent relations. 
The information stream (see Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, Keren and 
Levhari 1979 and 1983, Radner 1993, and van Zandt 1999) has 
studied bounded rationality within organizations due to information 
transmission failures (e. g., information overload, leaks in the 
transmission of information between firm's units). 
In spite of the theoretical interest of economists on the organization 
of firms and the key contribution provided by business history, the 
empirical evidence on these issues is generally scarce. This chapter 
aims at testing (some of) the theoretical predictions of economic 
theory on the organizational architecture by looking at the relation 
between the depth of the management hierarchy of plants and plant 
and industry-specific variables. I test this relation through the 
estimates of an ordered logit econometric model. For this purpose, I 
use FLAUTO97 data set (see the empirical methodology chapter at the 
beginning of this thesis), which allows me to test econometrically the 
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relation between the discrete choice of the depth of the organization 
and explanatory variables such as plant size, technology adoptions, 
ownership status and industry effects. It is my opinion that the 
findings extend our knowledge over the determinants of the 
organizational structure, and might be of some importance for the 
current theoretical debate. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Next section 
introduces recent theoretical literature in greater detail, identifying 
(some of the) crucial factors that influence the size of the 
management hierarchy. In section 3.3 the econometric model is 
specified. Given the (right) censored and categorical ordered nature of 
the dependent variable, I estimate an ordered logit model with 
censoring. In section 3.4 I illustrate the explanatory variables 
included into the econometric model and discuss their expected 
impact upon the likelihood of adopting hierarchies of different sizes. 
Section 3.5 describes the findings of the estimates of six ordered logit 
models. The chapter ends up with some concluding remarks in 
section 3.6. 
3.2 A Review of Hierarchical Models of the Firm 
There are mainly two kinds of models that analyze the determinants 
of the management hierarchy. The first is based upon information 
processing, the second on decentralization of incentives. In this 
section I review the contribution of these models and sketch out 
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predictions of existing theoretical literature which I will test in the 
next sections. 
Before considering hierarchical models of the firm in greater detail, 
some general definitions are in order. First, te {0,1,..., T} is the index 
of corporate levels of a hierarchy, where t=0 is the top manager level, 
and t=T is the level of operating units, hence the size of the 
management hierarchy. There is a neat difference between production 
workers (t=T) and other administrative employees (t<7). I assume that 
only blue collar workers are in charge of production activities, whilst 
the latter have administrative tasks, such as: monitoring and 
acquiring, storing, processing, and transmitting information. Second, 
xt is the number of employees at level t. Assume that there is only 
one top manager (or top team) at the pinnacle of the managerial 
hierarchy, that is xo = 1. Assume further that the number of blue 
collars is given and equals N, that is XT = N. Third, in accordance 
with theoretical models, which usually assume balanced hierarchies 
where the number of immediate subordinates under one manager is 
the same for all managers of the same level, st is the span of control 
of tier t given by sr = xr+i / x, Hence: ' 
Xt+1 - SoS1 ... St (1) 
1 In fact, so - xi/xo; and xi = so (given that xo = 1). Moreover: sl = x2/x1, hence, x2 = 
sosi. By iteration I obtain equation (1). 
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Since discrete formulations of hierarchical models of firms cannot 
be solved, at least in their more general versions, I shall employ 
continuous approximations. 2 Taking logarithm of xt and considering 
a continuous formulation yields to: 
dJCt . 
1. = xt = xt log(st). dt 
(2) 
3.2.1 The Cost Function 
Focusing only on labor, total cost is simply given by the remuneration 
of firm's personnel. Let the wage vary among corporate levels and 
assume a continuous formulation, total cost (TC) is given by, 
T 
TC = Jwtxtdt. 
0 
(3) 
where xo = 1, x,. =N and x, satisfies equation (2). T is the 
endogenous size of the management hierarchy, and wt is the wage of 
managers of layer t. 
In the information approach, models generally assume the internal 
wage scale to be exogenous. Conversely, the incentive approach 
concentrates upon asymmetric information issues, so that the wage 
scale depends upon the level of effort of agents. To see this, let us 
2 Note however that van Zandt (1995) has recently pointed out that continuous 
formulations might not be good approximations of discrete hierarchies. 
The determinants of the management hierarchy 104 
follow Qian (1994). Assume that the utility function of each agent of 
level t is given by: 
ut = wt - g(at ) 
where g(at) is the disutility from making an effort a, , with g(O)=O. 
(4) 
The probability of being checked is for each agent a (negative) 
function of the span of control of his immediate superior. Suppose 
that this probability is simply given by P=P(s)=1/s. Then if the top 
manager wants to implement an a level of effort, she will consider 
the following incentive scheme: 
pay w, if at ? ät is known, or if a, is not known; and 
pay 0 if a, < ät is known. 
In this case the incentive compatibility condition is given by: 
wt -9(ät)? [P"0+(1-P)- wtl -9(at), dat <ät (5) 
Hence, the efficiency wage is wt = g(ä) / P, and the wage function is 
given by: 
Wt =g(ä)s. (6) 
If the span of control increases then the efficient wage increases as 
well. 
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3.2.2 The Production Function 
Another key aspect that influences the internal working of the firm is 
the production technology. In particular, administrative work enters 
in the production technology as well as the other inputs (e. g., line 
operators). Let 9 be a parameter of the production technology at the 
plant level and N the number of blue collars. Assume a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, then the total output Q is given by 
Q=6NayO 
r 
(7) 
where YT is the total administrative output. Generally, hierarchical 
models of the firm assume a and 0 to be individually equal to one. 
One of the main features of the modern organization is its serial 
structure. This in turn implies that the production technology of 
administrative work is recursive (Beckman 1977). In any tier t, the 
administrative production (called "managerial effectiveness") depends 
on the efficiency of the manager of that level and of their superiors. 
That is, at every administrative layer managers use their immediate 
superiors' administrative output yt_i as an intermediate input, and 
combined with their effort at (0_<at<1) produce yt for their immediate 
subordinates. Therefore, 
yt = Ft (yt-1, at ) ý8) 
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Suppose equation (8) to be simply given by y, = y, -, a,, 
then, if I 
normalize in order to make yo equal to 1,1 obtain 
yt = a, a2... at, (9) 
The output of each fully effective blue collar (that is, at=1 at every 
tier t, hence yT =1), is given by 9. From equation (9) it is possible to 
highlight a key characteristic of management hierarchies. The 
organization might suffer from administrative bottlenecks. In fact, if 
managers of level t are not effective then overall production declines. 
This might be due both to agents' shirking and to information and 
communication failures. 
Just as in the incentive approach at represents the level of effort of 
employees of level t, so in the information stream at is the planning 
time of managers of level t. The total administrative output YT is given 
again by a recursive function yT=f(al,..., aj, but in this case 
of / aa, < 0. If the time taken by each manager to perform his task 
increases, the total administrative output decreases. A plan that is 
efficient at period t-1, will probably need a revision. at time t. Because 
the external economic environment changes very often, time matters. 
Thus, the productivity of blue collars clearly depends upon the 
efficiency of administrative workers in gathering, storing, and 
processing information. If we define efficiency in terms of speed in 
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processing information then "efficiency can be achieved by 
hierarchical networks" (Radner 1992). In other words, the 
management hierarchy emerges as an optimal device of facing 
complexity of information (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, and Radner 
1993). 
Following Keren and Levhari (1979) (1983) assume that each 
administrative employee receives from his immediate superior M 
items of information and, after having processed transmits them to 
his immediate subordinates. Further, suppose that the time to 
perform the task is a linear function of the number M of items to 
process and the number st of subordinates (i. e., the span of control). 
Then, I define a 't, the time to perform the task of managers of level t, 
as: 
Q= ý 
interaction time with the superior interaction time with subordinates calculation time 
UO+ Y1MJ 
+ LcYY2 + Y3M)St 1+U 4+ r5M + Y653 (10) 
so that, 
fixed time fixed time for complexity variable time (depends on the tier) 
Q, - UO +Y4J + 
RY1 +Y5)MJ + 
RY2 
+Y3M+Y6)StJ 
' (11) 
If I normalize the unit of time in order to make the coefficient of the 
span of control unity, I obtain the following simple equation: 
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=/3+s,. (12) 
where, 6 is the ratio of fixed to variable (time) cost. 
On the one hand, a decrease of the total time of processing the M 
items of information due, for instance, to improvements in 
information technology lowers, ceteris paribus, , 8. On the other hand, 
a decrease of the interaction time with other agents (or bureaus) due 
to improvements in network technology raises ß. 
An example might clarify this setting. Take the case of a firm with 
N blue collars, in which the management hierarchy is totally absent - 
there are only two layers: the top manager, who runs the firm, and 
blue collar workers, who implement her plan. In this case the total 
planning and implementation time is simply given by ý6 + N. If the 
owner decides to add a tier then the span of control at the first and 
second levels are given by so = x,, and s, =N/x, =N/ so 
respectively, where x, is the number of administrative workers under 
the top manager. Thus, in the case of a three-layer hierarchy, the 
total planning time is given by: 
a1 +ao = ß+s1 +ß+so =2ß+ so+N/so. 
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If the top manager chooses xl (= so) in order to minimize the total 
planning time then it is straightforward to show that so = s, = 
Hence, the total planning time of a three-layer organization is given 
by 2/3 + 2., [N-. This type of organization is more efficient than the two- 
tier structure if and only if ß8 +N>2,8 + 2,,. 
[N--, namely if: 
,6 <N-2-, 
rN--. 
So, if a firm decides to increase the number of blue collar workers, 
then an increase in the number of administrative layers is needed to 
minimize the total planning time. 3 Alternatively, if fixed time cost 
increases, or variable cost decreases, then a multi-layered 
organization becomes less efficient. That is, information technology 
that lowers fixed time of processing information increases the 
efficiency of a multi-layered organization. On the contrary, network 
technology that lowers the interaction time between different bureaus 
tends to reduce the need of adopting a deep organization. 
3 If this looks very odd business history may help understand. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that between 1890 and 1913 the total employment of Siemens 
grew from 3,000 to 57,000, whilst the ratio between non-manual to manual 
workers passed from 1: 7.1 to 1: 3.5. If I assume a constant span of control equal 
say to 7, then this expansion implies an increase in the number of hierarchic tiers 
from 4 (+ 1, manual workers) to 6 (+ 1) (elaboration from Kocha 1971). 
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3.2.3 The Determinants of the Management Hierarchy 
There are two explanations of limitations of organizations, i. e., the 
loss of control phenomenon. First, at may reflect information 
processing and communication costs. Advances in communication 
technology reduce overload costs (higher at) and allow managers to 
increase the number of immediate subordinates, i. e., the span of 
control, avoiding information bottlenecks (Keren and Levhari 1979 
and 1983). So, "a reduction of communication costs leads to a flatter 
and smaller organization" (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994). It is worth 
noticing, however, that the relation between the size of the 
management hierarchy and communication costs is still a puzzle in 
economic theory. Indeed, Lazear (1995) points out that since 
advances in network technology lower communication costs among 
firm's units, these promote both specialization of agents in specific 
tasks and reliance on large hierarchies. In his words "Technology- 
induced reductions in the cost of communication promote 
specialization and hierarchy" (p. 125). 
Second, at may reflect the effort of managers of level t. In this case 
the management hierarchy is depicted as a structure of multi 
principal-agent relations. For each agent the probability of being 
checked is a (negative) function of the span of control of his 
immediate superior, so that at is decreasing in the span. Advances in 
the monitoring technology allow the superior to increase the number 
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of immediate subordinates avoiding agents' shirking at a time, and 
thus to reduce the optimal size of the organization (Qian 1994). 
Also production technology might affect the optimal size of the 
management hierarchy. Williamson (1967) shows that if we assume 
the production function of equation (1), then, under certain 
conditions (i. e., constant span of control), an increase in the 
parameter 0 raises the number of corporate levels. Lindbeck and 
Snower (1996) distinguish between technologies of different vintages. 
Single-purpose technologies that are associated with a Tayloristic 
approach to production are based upon specialization of line 
operators and hierarchy. Multi-purpose flexible technologies that are 
linked to a "holistic" approach are based on multiskilling and a sharp 
reduction of bureaucratization. Moreover, Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990) point to the importance of complementarities in the use of 
advanced manufacturing technologies: the impact on the 
organizational structure is strong only when flexible technologies 
work in cluster rather than in isolation. 
Table 1 sums up the main theoretical predictions on the size of the 
management hierarchy. The number of corporate levels is positively 
related to the firm (plant) size. As to production technology, results 
are less robust. In Williamson, an increase in the productivity of blue 
collar workers raises the optimal size of the organization. In other 
models results depend on the features of the production technology 
(e. g., vintage and extent of use). 
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Tab. 1- Determinants of the hierarchy, theoretical predictions 
Determinants Impact on the optimal size of the hierarchy (T") 
Firm (plant) size positive 
Efficiency of production technology positive in Williamson (1967), uncertain elsewhere 
Efficiency of monitoring technology negative in Qian (1994) 
Efficiency of network technology negative in Keren and Levhari (1979) and (1983), 
and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994); 
positive in Lazear (1995) 
In the approach called decentralization of incentives the asymmetry 
of information and the related opportunistic behavior shape the form 
of the organization. In this context, the size of the management 
hierarchy is a negative function of the efficiency of the monitoring 
technology. Indeed, a better technology of monitoring allows the firm 
to increase the number of immediate subordinates under each 
manager, thus, to decrease the number of levels. As to the approach 
called decentralization of information, the focus is on the total 
planning time. In this case the size of the organization depends on 
communication costs. 
3.3 The Econometric Model 
Let us concentrate attention on the size of the plant's organization 
(i. e., the number of managerial levels). The optimal number of levels 
of plant j that operates in the industry i is given by 
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Tý *= arg max(irj) = F(Nj, xj, yj, z; ), (14) 
T 
where 9r is the profit function, Nis the number of plant's employees, x 
is a vector of production, network and monitoring technologies in 
use, y is a vector of other plant-specific characteristics such as the 
ownership status, and z is a vector of industry-specific 
characteristics such as market concentration and the industry 
technology base. 
Above mentioned theoretical models have identified factors that 
influence the size of the management hierarchy. For instance, T* 
should be a positive concave function of the number of plant 
employees. Moreover, production, network and monitoring 
technologies may affect the choice of the optimal size of the 
organization. I test these and other determinants through the 
estimates of a discrete choice model. 
T* is unobserved. What I observe is the real number of levels T that 
differs from its optimal value due, for instance, to adjustment costs. 
Schaefer (1998) has recently pointed out that influence costs may 
lead to delays in adjusting the organizational structure towards its 
efficient configuration. In any case, the relation between the optimal 
size of the organization and its actual value is 
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T=2 if T*<_, uo 
T=3 if po <T*<pi 
T=4 if ul <T*< JU2 
T=5 if , u2 <T*<_, u3 
T=6 if T*> , u3 
where pi are the thresholds that separate the different discrete 
categories of the number of corporate levels, T=2 represents the 
simplest two-layer organizational structure, and T16 is the maximum 
observed level of organizational 
, 
complexity, i. e., the data in 
FLAUTO97 allow me to know only if a plant has six or more 
managerial levels. Observations are, thus, censored on the right-end 
side of the distribution of T'*. 
Given the (right) censored and categorical ordered nature of the 
dependent variable, I proceed to estimate an ordinal-level logit model 
with censoring (see Maddala 1983). Before proceeding further with 
the definition of the explanatory variables, a further remark is in 
order. In this chapter I focus on the optimal size of the management 
hierarchy. However, it is clear that this is but one element in a set of 
decisions the firms make. In other words, there is simultaneity 
between T* and other variables. However, given the nature of the 
dependent variable the estimation of a simultaneous system lies 
beyond the scope of this research. 
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3.4 The Explanatory Variables 
Table 2 presents explanatory variables of the econometric model and 
their description. Plant size is measured by the logarithm of the 
number of employees in 1997 (i. e., Size). In accordance with the 
results of above mentioned studies, I expect a positive impact of such 
variable on the probability of adopting a multi-layered organization. 
In order to account for declining marginal effects (i. e., a concave 
relation), plant size is introduced into the econometric model in a 
logarithmic form. 
A second group of explanatory variables refers to technologies in 
use in sample plants in 1997 that pertain to the production sphere. I 
consider advanced manufacturing technologies (AMTs) and inflexible 
manufacturing systems (IMSs). DAMT is a dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if a plant is among the adopters of one or more of the 
following AMTs: numerically (or computerized numerically) controlled 
stand-alone machine tools, programmable robots, machining centers, 
and flexible manufacturing systems. Further, I define four additional 
dummy variables AMT1, AM72, AMT3 and AMT4; they equal 1 if a 
plant has adopted 1,2,3 and 4 AMTs, respectively. These allow me to 
treat the intensity of use of AMTs as a categorical variable (see Dunne 
1994). Finally, IMS is a dummy variable that is 1 when plants have 
adopted inflexible manufacturing systems. Overall, I expect 
production technology to have a significant impact on the choice of 
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the organizational structure. However, I distinguish two types of 
technology. Inflexible manufacturing systems are tightly related to 
the Tayloristic approach to production based upon the specialization 
of blue collar workers and a sharp separation of tasks in production. 
IMSs are, therefore, likely to be linked to organizations in which the 
number of hierarchic layers is very high. Conversely, AMTs are last 
generation technologies, which have been devised to exploit 
complementarities in production. These aim at increasing the degree 
of flexibility in production through a holistic and decentralized form 
of organization based upon a loose definition of tasks. So, as to AMTs 
I would expect a negative impact on the probability of adopting very 
bureaucratic organizations. 
Turning to network technology, I have considered two variables 
that capture advances in communication efficiency. Intro firm 
network is a dummy variable that equals 1 for plants that by June 
1997 had adopted local area network (LAN) and/or on-line 
connection with headquarters, whilst Inter firm network is set to 1 for 
plants that by June 1997 had introduced electronic data interchange 
(EDI) with customers, suppliers and/or subcontractors. Whereas the 
former category accounts to advances in intra-firm communication 
technology, the latter relates to improvements in inter-firm 
communication system (i. e., shared databases between different 
firms, see Johnston and Vitale 1988 and Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995). 
Network technology increases the efficiency of both intra and inter- 
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firm communication. In accordance with the above line of reasoning, 
the effect of advances in communication technology on the optimal 
number of corporate levels should be negative. Indeed, it reduces 
overload costs and thus allow the firm to increase the span of control 
and to shrink the management hierarchy. Moreover, advances in 
information technology enable managers to access to timely 
information about production (see Hubbard 1998). These increase the 
ability of managers to collect and process information on a plant's 
operations and decrease principal's costs of investigation. Therefore, 
advances in communication technology improve the efficiency of 
monitoring and lead to an increase in the span of control and to 
flatter management hierarchies. However, advances in 
communication by decreasing the costs of communication might 
induce specialization and hierarchy. As a consequence, the degree of 
bureaucratization may increase or decrease, depending on which 
effect prevails. 
A fourth group of variables concerns adoptions of managerial 
innovations. JIT and TQM are dummies that equal one for plants that 
by June 1997 had adopted just-in-time manufacturing and total 
quality management, respectively. Management literature (see for 
instance Drucker 1988, Duimering et al. 1993, and Krafcik 1988) 
associates the introduction of such innovations to the adoption of a 
"lean" type of organization, characterized by a flat organizational 
structure. 
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Tab. 2- The explanatory variables of plant organization 
Variable 
Size 
DAMT 
AMT1 
AMT2 
AMT3 
AMT4 
IMS 
Intra-firm network 
Inter firm network 
JIT 
TQM 
State owned group 
Private group 
Private Italian group 
European MNE 
NA MNE 
R&D 
Herfindahl 
Description 
Logarithm of the number of plant's employees in June 1997 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted one or more AMTsa; 0 
otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted one AMTa, 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted two AMTsa, 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted three AMTsa, 0 
otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted four AMTsa, 0 
otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted inflexible 
manufacturing systems; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted advanced intra-firm 
network technology (i. e., LAN and on-line connection with 
headquarters); 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted electronic data 
interchange with customers, suppliers and/or subcontractors; 0 
otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted just-in-time 
manufacturing; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that by June 1997 had adopted total quality 
management; 0 otherwise 
1 for State-owned plants; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to private business groups; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to private Italian business groups; 0 
otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to European multinational enterprises; 0 
otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to North American multinational 
enterprises; 0 otherwise 
Proportion of R&D employees to total sector employment (three- 
digit NACE-CLIO classification) 
Herfmdahl concentration index (three-digit NACE-CLIO 
classification) 
Legend: 
a) AMTs (advanced manufacturing technologies): machining centers, programmable 
robots, numerically (or computerized numerically) controlled stand-alone machine 
tools, and flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). 
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Economists are introducing these features into theoretical models. 
However, there is no quantitative large-scale evidence that shows 
whether the relation between the lean type of organization and the 
adoption of such innovations holds or not (see also chapter 5). If 
these considerations hold true, then I would expect these routines to 
decrease the probability of adopting bureaucratic organizations (i. e., 
organization characterized by a large number of corporate levels). 
Another group of variables relates to the plant's ownership status. I 
define the two dummy variables State-owned and Private group that 
denote whether in 1997 a plant belonged to a State-owned group or 
to a private multi-plant company, respectively. Moreover, I 
distinguish group's nationality by introducing three additional 
dummy variables Private Italian group, European MNE and NA MNE, 
indicating the Italian, European or North-American nationality of the 
private business group to which the plant eventually belonged. Above 
mentioned theoretical models do not take into account the effect of 
the ownership status on the organizational structure. However, I 
would expect organizations of plants that belong to a business group 
to be comparatively of smaller size, since administrative tasks are 
partially allocated at upper corporate levels outside the plant. On the 
contrary, in plants that belong to a single-plant firm the boundaries 
of the firm's management hierarchy coincide with those of the plant's 
organization. In addition, State-owned plants are expected to be 
comparatively more bureaucratic than private plants, since these do 
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not have to respond in full to market pressures (see Shleifer 1998). 
Finally, differences in the nationality of business groups might lead to 
differences in organizational structures when corporate culture is an 
important feature (Kreps 1985). 
Tab. 3- Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Size 1.6094 8.4118 4.4818 1.1865 
DAMT 010.8015 0.3994 
AMT1 010.2215 0.4157 
AMT2 010.3311 0.4711 
AMTS 010.1530 0.3604 
AMT4 010.0959 0.2948 
IMS 010.3219 0.4677 
Intra firm network 010.5822 0.4938 
Inter firm network 010.1849 0.3887 
JIT 010.4635 0.4992 
TQM 010.5457 0.4985 
State owned group 010.0320 0.1761 
Private group 010.1963 0.3977 
Private Italian group 010.0525 0.2233 
European MNE 010.0890 0.2851 
NA MNE 010.0548 0.2278 
R&D 0 0.2204 0.0206 0.0375 
Herfindahl 0.0001 0.2425 0.0177 0.0348 
Industry-specific effects are captured by two variables. First, R&D 
is defined as the proportion of R&D to total industry employment 
(three-digit NACE-CLIO classification). Second, Herfindahl is the 
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three-digit Herfindahl concentration index. These variables are 
introduced in order to control for industry effects. In particular, these 
give us information of the scientific base and market competition of 
industries in which plants operate. 
Table 3 illustrates descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables. In June 1997, sample plants had on average 195 
employees (Size = 4.48). As to AMTs, 80.1% of the sample 
establishments had adopted one or more AMTs by June 1997, with 
the average number of AMT types in use being 1.7.32.2% of plants 
had adopted IMS, whilst the percentage of adopters was 58.2% and 
18.5% for intra and inter-firm network technology, respectively. As 
concerned to managerial innovations, 46.3% and 54.6% of sample 
plants had adopted just-in-time manufacturing and total quality 
management. As to ownership status, 22.8% of plants were owned by 
a multi-plant organization; of these, 8.4% were owned by a national 
group, with the remaining 14.4% belonging to foreign multinational 
enterprises (either European or North-American). 
To sum up, in this paper I estimate a series of ordered logit models 
with censoring, where the dependent variable "Number of plant's 
managerial levels" takes the value n=2,3,4,5,6 if in June 1997 the 
organization of the plant was compounded by n hierarchic levels. The 
explanatory variables are intended to capture the above-illustrated 
factors, which may influence the likelihood of choosing the number of 
layers. 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
The results of three econometric models are reported in Table 4. 
Explanatory variables include plant size, adoption of production, 
network and managerial innovations, ownership by a business group, 
and industry-specific effects. 
Generally speaking, the econometric results are quite robust. First, 
the positive, highly significant, coefficient of plant size comes as no 
surprise. Size is the individual variable, which exhibits the greatest 
explanatory power in all models, showing that the number of 
hierarchic levels is a positive and concave function of the number of 
plant employees. 4 So, the number of corporate levels increases with 
plant size, but at decreasing marginal rates. Obviously, span of 
control and depth of management hierarchy are closely entwined. In 
chapter 2I showed that the span of control increases with the plant 
size. Thus, the (positive) concave relation between depth of the 
organization and plant size may be interpreted as the attempt of large 
plants to limit the expansion of the management hierarchy through 
an increase in the span of control, thus reducing the loss of control 
phenomenon. 
Second, production technology plays a key role in influencing the 
choice of the organizational form. As predicted, there is a positive 
4 It is worth noticing that I have also introduced into the econometric model the 
number of employees in a linear form. However, the coefficient of the linear form 
turns out to be insignificant. More specifically, a LR test shows that I can drop out 
the linear form. 
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significant relation between the size of the organization and the use of 
IMSs. Such finding seems to confirm that single-purpose technologies 
linked to the Tayloristic approach to production need a rigid 
separation of tasks and ranks, hence a larger number of hierarchic 
layers. 
In contrast, the use of AMTs tends to increase the probability of 
adoption of leaner forms of organization. However, the coefficient of 
DAMT is not significant. A further exploration to the extent of use of 
AMTs contributes to extend our understanding of such relation. 
Thus, in Model II, I have further distinguished the adoption of AMTs 
by introducing the categorical variables AMT1, AM72, AMT3, and 
AMT4. Results show that the negative impact on the likelihood of 
adopting deep organizations is increasing in the number of AMTs, 
with AMT4 being significant at the 95% level. This result confirms 
that the effect of the adoption of flexible technologies on the 
organizational structure is based upon complementarity effects. More 
than the use of an AMT in isolation, is the combination of different 
complementary technologies that leads to a "holistic organization", 
characterized by a loose definition of tasks, hence, by a flat 
management hierarchy. 
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Tab. 4- The determinants of the hierarchy (ordered logit model 
with censoring) 
Variables 
ao Constant 
ai Size 
a2 DAMT 
a3 AMT1 
a4 AMT2 
as AMT3 
a6 AMT4 
a7 IMS 
a8 Intra-firm network 
a9 Inter firm network 
aio JIT 
an TQM 
a12 State owned group 
ass Private group 
a14 Private Italian group 
ai5 European MNE 
a16 NA MNE 
a17 R&D 
a18 Herfindahl 
, u1 
/J2 
93 
Log-likelihood 
LR test 
N. of censored obs. 
N. of obs. 
II 
124 
III 
-0.8039 (0.4757)a -1.0666 (0.4873)b -0.9911 (0.4913) c 
0.7943 (0.1121) c 0.8510 (0.1140) c 0.8400 (0.1150) c 
-0.2447 (0.2819) - 
0.5213 (0.1946) c 
0.6548 (0.2427) c 
-0.4974 (0.2452)b 
0.2011 (0.2152) 
0.1657 (0.2151) 
1.0798 (0.4449) b 
-0.2553 (0.2420) 
-1.1465 (2.4582) 
3.4768 (2.3236) 
3.7670 (0.3047) c 
5.8158 (0.3458) c 
7.8153 (0.4425) c 
-457.0385 
118.5546(11)C 
10 
438 
-0.1892 (0.3279) 
-0.1790 (0.3014) 
-0.2881 (0.3620) 
-0.9568 (0.4152)b 
0.6178 (0.1963) c 
0.6183 (0.2442) b 
-04576 (0.2509) a 
0.2610 (0.2196) 
0.1799 (0.2198) 
1.0584 (0.4688) b 
-0.1865 (0.2457) 
-1.4780 (2.4392) 
4.1121 (2.4468) a 
3.7918 (0.3072) c 
5.8649 (0.3519) c 
7.8719 (0.4518) c 
-454.0520 
124.5275 (14) c 
10 
438 
Legend 
a) Significance level greater than 90%. 
b) Significance level greater than 95%. 
c) Significance level greater than 99%. 
Standard errors and degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
-0.2159 (0.3316) 
-0.1674 (0.3033) 
-0.2310 (0.3705) 
-0.9106 (0.4200) b 
0.6113 (0.2013) c 
0.6438 (0.2467) c 
-0.5282 (0.2636) b 
0.2782 (0.2250) 
0.1412 (0.2237) 
1.1316 (0.4697) b 
0.5017 (0.4014) 
-0.6884 (0.3131) b 
-0.0054 (0.3585) 
-1.6593 (2.6857) 
3.5251 (2.6113) 
3.7934 (0.3082) c 
5.9167 (0.3519) c 
7.9578 (0.4520) c 
-450.3609 
131.9097 (16) c 
10 
438 
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As to network technology results are rather articulated. First, the 
size of the organization is increasing in the use of intra-firm network 
technology. Since I cannot derive any robust conclusion on the 
causality link between organization and technology, I might also 
interpret this result on the other way round: plants characterized by 
a deep organizational structure are more likely to introduce network 
technology so as to improve the efficiency of intra-firm 
communication. Further, it is interesting to note that whilst advances 
in intra-firm communication increase the likelihood of choosing 
multi-layered structures, improvements in inter-firm communication 
(with customers, suppliers and/or subcontractors) decrease this 
probability. The coefficient of Inter firm network is negative and 
significant at conventional levels. In particular, this result might be 
the outcome of a process of outsourcing: the integration of suppliers 
and subcontractors within the plant's network might capture a 
process of delegation of production activities outside the plant. 
Turning then to managerial innovation variables, these overall 
display a very low explanatory power. Adoptions of just-in-time 
manufacturing and total quality management do not seem to 
influence the choice of the organizational structure of plants. It is 
interesting to note that in chapter 4I will show that the use of JIT 
presses the firm to decentralize decision-making authority down the 
management hierarchy. So, whilst JIT affects the allocation of 
authority, it does not affect the size of the organization. 
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As to the ownership status, State-owned plants tend to be 
relatively more bureaucratic than private plants, with the coefficient 
of State-owned group being significant at 95%. Whereas in Models I 
and II I control for State versus private ownership, in Model III I 
further distinguish the nationality of the private multi-plant 
corporation to which the plant eventually belongs. It turns out that 
there is a great difference between plants owned by national private 
groups and those that belong to foreign multinationals. In particular, 
being owned by a European multinational enterprise (significantly) 
decreases the probability of plants of adopting deep organizational 
structures. Corporate culture might be a major determinant of 
differences in the organizational structure among firms of different 
nationality. This result might also point to the role played by the 
distance between the plant and its headquarters. Indeed, whilst 
plants that belong to European corporations are directly controlled by 
their headquarters, thus reducing the need of (some) intermediate 
levels, North-American multinationals whose headquarters is very far 
from the production unit may prefer to delegate activities completely 
at the plant level. As to Italian private business groups, they are in 
average of smaller size: 65% of them have less than 10,000 employees 
against 33% and 25% of European and North-American 
multinationals, respectively. So, plant and firm boundaries are more 
likely to overlap for a larger proportion. 
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Finally, there is no evidence of any relation between the size of the 
organizational architecture and the industry structure, with the 
coefficients of R&D and Herfindahl being insignificant in most 
regressions. Only in Model II, Herfindahl turns out to be significant at 
the 10% level, pointing to a (weak) positive relation between the level 
of plant bureaucratization and market concentration. 
Tab. 5- Determinants of the hierarchy, empirical facts 
Determinants LR tests (on the Results Comments 
coefficients of Model 111) 
size ai =0 51.30 (1) c positive (concave) relation 
production technology aa= a4= as= a6= a7=0 12.54 (5) b significant impact; the sign j 
depends on the characteristics 
of production technology (i. e., 
vintage and extent of use/ 
complementarities in 
production) 
network technology as=a9=0 10.27 (2) c significant impact; the sign 
depends on the characteristics 
of network technology (i. e., 
intra versus inter-firm network 
technology) 
managerial innovations aio= aii=0 2.66 (2) insignificant impact 
ownership status a22= ai4= ais= a16=0 14.36 (4) c significant impact, with State- 
owned plants being more 
bureaucratic than private 
plants; existence of national 
differences 
industry effects ail= ai8=0 1.91(2) insignificant impact 
Legend 
b) Significance level greater than 95%. 
c) Significance level greater than 99%. 
Degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
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To sum up results, I have further proceeded to test the joint 
significance of different groups of explanatory variables by LR tests 
on Model III of Table 4. Table 5 presents results. Such findings may 
offer interesting indications to the theoretical literature. On the one 
hand, they confirm that the plant size and adoptions of (production 
and network) technology are key in explaining differences among 
organizational structures. On the other hand, results relating to the 
impact of the use of technological innovations upon the plant 
organization highlight the importance of the specific characteristics of 
such technologies. In particular, the magnitude and sign of these 
effects do depend on the vintage (i. e., IMS against AMT), the extent of 
use (number of AMTs in use) and the specific locus of 
(communications) innovations (intra against inter-firm network 
technology). 
Conversely, managerial innovations display no explanatory power. 
This result points to the difference between innovations embedded 
and those not embedded in capital equipment. Technologies 
embedded in capital equipment incorporate specific and codified 
manufacturing methods (for instance, the new layouts of production 
linked to FMS). Thus, technological adoptions turn out to affect the 
structure of the organization. Instead, the implementation of 
managerial innovations follows more arbitrary rules: "Since TQM can 
fail if people in the organization expect it to fail, implementation 
details (e. g., whether widespread faith is cultivated effectively) will 
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matter" (Camerer and Knez 1996). So, managerial techniques are not 
correlated with any specific form of organization. This might be due to 
differences in the implementation process among sample plants. In 
other words, business practices seem to be fads (see chapter 5 for 
further analysis). 
3.5.1 A Further Inquiry on the Boundaries of the Firm 
I have then proceeded to separate single-plant firms from plants 
owned by a multi-plant corporation. It is worth noticing that in both 
cases I have reduced the categories of the dependent variable (i. e., the 
number of managerial levels) from 5 to 4. As to single-plant firms, I 
have classified plants with 5 and 6 levels in one category, given that 
there are only three single-plant firms with 6 or more levels. As to 
plants owned by a multi-plant company, I have classified plants with 
2 and 3 levels in one category, given that there are only two plants 
owned by a business group with the number of managerial levels that 
equals 2. Table 6 presents results of these estimates. At the end of 
the table LR tests on the overall contribution of size, production and 
network technology, managerial innovations, ownership status and 
industry effects, similar to those of Table 5, are reported. 
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Tab. 6- Management hierarchy and boundaries of the firm 
Variables 
ao Constant 
a., Size 
a2 AMT1 
a3 AMT2 
a4 AMT3 
as AMT4 
a6 IMS 
a7 Intra-firm network 
as Inter firm network 
a9 JIT 
aio TQM 
Single-plant fine 
N 
-0.8941 (0.5403)a 
0.7819 (0.1332) c 
0.0119 (0.3539) 
-0.0450 (0.3280) 
0.1011 (0.4071) 
-0.2837 (0.6190) 
0.3379 (0.2491) 
0.5546 (0.2414) b 
-0.5845 (0.3188)a 
0.0500 (0.2424) 
0.3601 (0.2357) 
all State owned group 
a12 Private Italian group 
a13 European MNE 
a14 NA MNE 
a15 R&D 
a16 Herfindahl 
, 11 
f12 
Log-likelihood 
LR test 
-1.5638 (4.1634) 
3.9799 (2.5516) 
3.6953 (0.3114) c 
5.8058 (0.3628) c 
-325.6098 
68.1696 (12) c 
LR tests on groups of explanatory variables: 
a1=0 
a2= a3= a4= as= a6=0 
a7=ae=0 
av= aio=O 
a»=0 
ai2= a13= a14=0 
a, s= a16=0 
35.5822 (1) c 
2.5640 (5) 
6.9936 (2) b 
2.5682 (2) 
1.8720 (2) 
N. of censored obs. 
N. of obs. 
26 
338 
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Mu lti plant firm 
V VI 
-5.7163 (1.871) c 
0.8130 (0.3187) b 
-1.2442 (0.9851) 
-0.6161 (0.9356) 
-1.2356 (1.0407) 
-2.2005 (1.0407)b 
1.3054 (0.4497) c 
1.9844 (1.1365) a 
-0.4188 (0.5404) 
0.8849 (0.5856) 
-0.3120 (0.6235) 
1.3428 (0.6809) b 
0.5200 (3.6709) 
3.5585 (6.4154) 
2.1681 (0.3432) c 
4.1418 (0.5946) c 
-4.0630 (2.2523)a 
0.7546 (0.3288) b 
-1.3159 (1.0519) 
-0.5016 (0.9643) 
-0.9579 (1.1279) 
-2.0073 (1.0589)a 
1.3548 (0.4855) c 
2.3282 (1.3627) a 
-0.6176 (0.5866) 
0.9322 (0.6700) 
-0.5884 (0.7440) 
-0.7479 (0.8310) 
-2.1466 (0.7354)c 
-1.0353 (0.8690) 
0.9313 (4.3933) 
2.0433 (8.4590) 
2.3334 (0.3598) c 
4.3727 (0.6225) c 
-103.3449 
37.8992 (13) c 
9.4722 (1) c 
15.442 (5) c 
5.1502 (2) a 
3.6442 (2) 
5.4816 (1) b 
0.4174 (2) 
7 
100 
-99.7142 
45.1205 (15) c 
7.8780 (1) c 
15.233 (5) c 
7.1160 (2) b 
4.6760 (2) a 
12.7430 (3) c 
0.2088 (2) 
7 
100 
Legend: 
See Table 5 
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Generally speaking, results point to the difference between the 
determinants of the boundaries of the firm's organization and those 
of the plant's management hierarchy. In single-plant firms, the 
boundaries of the plant coincide with those of the firm. In this case 
administrative, financial and marketing activities are incorporated 
into the plant's organization as well as production operations. Thus, 
the impact of production technology vanishes, whereas the overall 
role of network technology remains key. Note also that the use of 
intercompany network technology is associated to flatter 
organizations only in single-plant firms, but not in plants owned by a 
business group. It is very likely that single-plant firms make use of 
such innovations to outsource part of the production to 
subcontractors, whilst the same does not apply to the other category 
of plants. 
As to plants owned by a business group, the boundaries of a 
plant's organization relate only to the production unit. In this case, 
production technology is key in shaping the management hierarchy. 
In addition, we have a confirmation that State-owned plants are very 
bureaucratic compared to all the other categories of plants, and 
plants owned by private European corporations have adopted smaller 
organizations with respect to those owned by Italian and North 
American companies. 
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter is, as far as I know, the first attempt aimed at testing 
the determinants of the size of the management hierarchy. For this 
purpose, I have examined the decision to adopt an organizational 
form, in terms of the number of corporate levels for a sample of 438 
Italian manufacturing plants. The characteristics of the plants were 
observed in 1997. Particular attention was devoted to variables 
usually considered in the theoretical literature, which I present in 
section 3.2, such as plant size and the use of production and network 
technology. In addition, I introduced into the econometric model the 
ownership status, which is traditionally considered in the theory of 
the firm, industry effects and managerial routines, upon which 
theoretical as well as empirical work starts to concentrate. 
The findings of this chapter clearly show that managerial 
innovations do not significantly affect the organizational structure 
(chapter 5 provide further insights into this issue). This might 
suggest that, since these innovations are loosely defined, plants are 
not pressed to adjust the organization accordingly. In other words, 
even if, for instance, just in time manufacturing is diffused 
widespread, this does not preclude the existence of differences in the 
implementation process. This may point to the difficulty of 
codification, hence implementation, of innovations that are not 
embedded in capital equipment. 
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Conversely, (production and network) technology plays a central 
role in shaping the organization. However, the impact crucially 
depends on its type, vintage and extent of use. First, network 
technology shows two opposite (significant) effects on the 
organizational architecture depending on the specific locus of 
advances in communication efficiency. Whilst improvements in intra- 
firm network technology increase the likelihood of adopting 
organizations characterized by deep management hierarchies, the 
opposite applies to inter-firm network innovations. As to production 
technology, I have distinguished old vintage technologies (i. e., IMS) 
from AMTs. The former are linked to the Tayloristic approach to 
production, so that these need a high specialization of workers and a 
more hierarchic production structure. As to AMTs, these are 
intertwined with the flexible automation paradigm based on flexibility 
and job rotation, so that these are linked to a leaner kind of 
organization. In addition, I have also showed that the extent of use, 
and not the use, of AMTs affects the size of the organization of plants. 
Finally, I provide evidence that the ownership status matters. 
State-owned plants adopt more bureaucratic forms of organization. 
More interestingly, my findings suggest that corporate culture might 
affect the choice of the organizational form. In particular, there are 
sizable differences according to whether a plant is owned by a private 
Italian group or by a foreign multinational enterprise, the latter being 
less hierarchic. 
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Formal and Real Authority in Organizations: 
Testing the Determinants of the Allocation of 
Decision-Making 
Chapter 4 
4.1 Introduction 
135 
"While we all have personal experience with some 
determinants of real authority, it is harder to come up with 
more systematic evidence. The key issue is, of course, the 
measurement of real authority ... organizational 
characteristics such as the span of control, the 
concentration of ownership, and the number of principals 
and supervising layers are directly relevant for measuring 
(or assessing) real authority enjoyed by subordinates within 
a firm. In addition, one may use questionnaires, look ex post 
at the nature of decisions..., count the number of times the 
agents are overruled" (Aghion and Tirole 1997). 
Economists are increasingly concerned about the internal working of 
firms and in particular about the determinants of the allocation of 
decision-making power. In spite of the fact that a reach stream of 
theoretical papers has recently addressed such issues, empirical 
studies are much less numerous and generally rely upon `personal 
experience' as well as anecdotal evidence (see for instance the most 
cited works of Chandler 1962 and 1977). Probably, the most severe 
problem that economists find in addressing empirically these issues 
is collecting data which may be suitable to testing theoretical 
hypotheses. As far as I know, this chapter represents the first 
attempt to provide systematic quantitative evidence on the allocation 
of decision-making and its determinants. The aim of the chapter is to 
test (some of) the predictions of economic theory in a comprehensive 
and robust way through the estimates of an econometric model. 
There are a number of determinants of the allocation of decision- 
making that have been analyzed in theoretical settings. I shall briefly 
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look at some of them. In general, delegation implies benefits and 
costs for the firm. Assume a firm composed of two bureaus (teams or 
agents) hierarchically ranked, a superior and a subordinate. 
Furthermore, suppose that in each period the firm selects over N 
possible projects. Team theory (Marschak and Radner 1972) ignores 
the problem of conflicting objectives among bureaus and focuses 
upon the issue of coordination of imperfectly informed agents. Agents 
are boundedly rational ä la Simon, in the sense that "the scarce 
resource is not information; it is processing capacity to attend to 
information" (Simon 1973). Thus, firm's screening over the projects is 
not perfect. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) (1988) show that since centralized 
organizations select a relatively lower number of projects than 
decentralized architectures do, then decentralization emerges as an 
efficient arrangement in situations where projects are on average of a 
good type. Keren and Levhari (1989) and Radner (1993) argue that if 
urgency is valuable for a firm, decentralization is an efficient means 
to achieve it. In other words, firms have strong incentives to 
decentralize decision-making activities when strategies must be taken 
in a short period of time and implemented shortly after. Now, 
suppose that the N projects are of m types. If we allow for increasing 
returns from task specialization (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994), then 
by delegating decision-making to the agent who has the best 
information over some type of decision, firms can fully exploit 
economies coming from local capabilities and tasks specialization 
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(Geanakoplos and Milgrom 1991). Finally, Aoki (1986) points out that 
if we extend theory of team dynamically decentralized organizations 
can exploit on-spot learning by doing and by using, whilst more 
centralized forms may show better ex ante specialized competencies. 
Turning to a principal-agent context the transfer of authority to a 
subordinate may increase both his initiative to acquire information 
and his participation in the contractual relationship (Aghion and 
Tirole 1997). Laffont and Martimort (1998) argue that 
decentralization emerges whenever limits of communication and 
collusive behavior among agents are taken together into account. 
Otherwise, it follows from the revelation principle. that centralization 
dominates decentralization. 
The cost of delegating formal authority is the principal's loss of 
control over the choice of the project. Thus, loss of control assumes 
the form of deviation from principal's objectives. This concept can be 
approached from two different points of view: the decentralization of 
incentives and the decentralization of information (for this distinction 
see chapter 3). The information stream (see for instance Keren and 
Levhari 1979 and 1983, and Radner 1993) points out that 
organizational failures might be due to information transmission 
leaks. Since agents are organized serially within firm's organization, 
information transmission suffers from leaks between the pinnacle 
and the bottom of the hierarchy. Hence, general strategies defined by 
the superior (i. e., the top management) might differ from agents' 
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implementation simply because of inefficiencies and delays in intra- 
firm communication. The incentive stream (see Calvo and Wellisz 
1978 and 1979, and Qian 1994) underlines that limitations of 
organizations may be due to agents' shirking. As is natural in a 
context of asymmetric information, agents are tempted to hide 
valuable information to the principal in order to maximize their 
objectives that are in general different from those of their superior. 
This is obviously a major source of loss of control for the principal. To 
sum up, factors that influence these costs and benefits (principal's 
loss of control on the one hand, increase of agent's initiative and 
participation on the other) make delegation of decision-making more 
or less profitable, hence more or less likely. 
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows. Next 
section introduces recent theoretical literature in greater detail, 
identifying (some of the) crucial factors that shape the allocation of 
decision power between an agent (i. e., the plant manager) and a 
principal (his corporate superior). I heavily draw upon the model of 
Aghion and Tirole (1997), which is close to the point of view of the 
present empirical research. Section 4.3 presents the design of the 
empirical analysis I have run in order to collect data on the allocation 
of authority within Italian manufacturing plants. In section 4.4 the 
econometric model is specified and the explanatory variables are 
illustrated. In section 4.5 I show the empirical results. Section 4.6 
sums up conclusions. 
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4.2 Determinants of the Allocation of Decision-Making 
In this section I illustrate some theoretical findings on the allocation 
of decision-making and their implications for the delegation of 
decision power to plant managers. Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are 
devoted to the delegation of real authority (i. e., the effective control 
over decision-making activity), with the principal conserving formal 
authority (i. e., the right to decide and thus to overrule the agent if 
needed). The analysis largely relies on Aghion and Tirole's (1997) 
(henceforth, A&T) basic model which is sketched out in section 4.2.1; 
some extensions of the model are briefly considered in section 4.2.2. 
In section 4.2.3 I turn to the determinants of the delegation of formal 
authority. 
4.2.1 Delegation of Real Authority 
Assume a hierarchy composed of a plant manager (the agent, A) and 
one superior (the principal, F). The agent is assigned the task of 
selecting and implementing one out of N projects (no project is project 
0). For each project k define bk as the agent's private benefit and Bk 
as the monetary gain for the principal (where bo=Bo=O). For each 
party there is at least one project that gives a sufficiently negative 
pay-off (i. e., k and k' such that bk«O and Bk<<O), so both parties 
have no incentive to indicate a project when uninformed. Let b and B 
be the maximum gains that a project can yield for the agent and the 
principal respectively. If the principal's preferred project is chosen, 
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the agent will have a private benefit given by 8b. Alternatively, if the 
agent's preferred project is chosen then the principal will get aB, 
where a and 8 belong to (0,11 and are said, for obvious reasons, 
congruence parameters. Finally, with probability e the agent acquires 
all information about the pay-offs of the N projects at private cost 
gA(e). Instead, with probability 1-e he does not learn anything and 
still judge all projects as identical. Similarly, the principal learns the 
pay-offs of all projects with probability E and is totally uninformed 
with probability 1-E; her disutility of being informed is given by 
gp(E). For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that principal and 
agent's disutility functions are given by gp(E)=pE2/2 and gA(e)=ae2/2 
respectively, where a and p are two positive exogenous parameters. ' 
Then, we obtain in equilibrium: 
e b(p-B) 
E B(a - ab) 
(1) 
Large values of the ratio e/E indicate that real authority is 
increasingly transferred to the agent; in other words, the less 
informed the principal the more likely that he simply rubber-stamps 
the agent's proposal. According to expression (1), the assignment of 
real authority to the agent depends negatively on the agent's disutility 
1 A&T assume that g(0)=0, gß'(0)=0, g'(1)=00, and g; g">O, where i=A, P. Of course, 
when g(") is a quadratic function we do have to introduce a discontinuity for a=E=1, 
sot that condition g'(1)=0o still holds. 
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parameter and the principal's maximum pay-off, and positively on the 
agent's maximum private gain, the principal's disutility parameter 
and the congruence of objectives between the parties. In what follows 
I am interested in the characteristics of a firm's organizational 
structure and procedures and other firm-specific variables that are 
likely to influence the relative allocation of real power between a plant 
manager and his corporate superior. 
First, I expect the complexity of plant's operations to have a 
considerable impact on the distribution of decision-making power. In 
large plants characterized by an articulated multi-layer organizational 
structure the plant manager is likely to enjoy a substantial 
information advantage over the corporate headquarters, as he is 
closer to the plant's operations. In other words, the value of p rises 
more rapidly with a plant's complexity than that of a, thus favoring 
delegation of decision-making activity to the plant manager. 
Second, use of advanced communication technologies is also likely 
to play a crucial role. By increasing the ability of the corporate 
headquarters to collect and process information on a plant's 
operations, improvements in communication technology decrease 
principal's costs of investigation, thus lowering p; ceteris paribus, 
assignment of real authority to the plant manager should be less 
frequent. Such reasoning especially applies to complex units which 
are relatively more exposed to information transmission problems. 
However, recourse to efficient communication technologies may also 
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improve the plant manager's capability to collect information, 
resulting in a lower value for parameter a; therefore, the above 
mentioned negative effect on the delegation of real authority may 
possibly be reversed. 2 
Third, if strategic decisions relating to a plant's activity involve on 
average a greater amount of resources, their expected impact on the 
principal's monetary benefits is greater. In addition, a plant competes 
with the other organizational units of its parent firm (e. g., other 
functional departments, other manufacturing units in multi-plant 
firms) for the use of fixed corporate resources; the greater the 
financial resources required to implement the plant manager's 
preferred decisions, the less likely that locally optimal decisions will 
also be optimal for the firm as a whole, as there are substantial 
externalities on other units. Consequently, when decisions tend to 
involve considerable investments, B is large and a is small, other 
things being equal: less decentralization of decision-making follows. 
The above conditions do depend on the characteristics of a plant's 
production technology and organization of production activity; for 
instance, they generally hold true for plants that are involved in mass 
production of rather standardized goods and are characterized by 
2 In addition, note that communication technologies facilitate interaction between 
plant managers and their corporate superiors. Since the capabilities of the latter to 
monitor and control decisions by the former (and to reverse them if they turn out to 
be suboptimal) are enhanced, decision-making activity may well be more 
decentralized in organizations which have adopted such technologies, as far as real 
(but not formal) authority is concerned. This effect is not captured by A&T model, 
which is not a monitoring game. 
Chapter 4 143 
large, highly indivisible investments in automated capital equipment, 
where strategic decisions relating to production factors basically are 
of discrete nature (i. e., adding or closing a production line). 
4.2.2. More on the Delegation of Real Authority 
According to the literature, there are a few additional variables which 
are among the main determinants of the relative allocation of real 
authority. 
First, urgency might have a strong impact on the delegation of real 
authority to the plant manager. Accordingly, whenever a plant's 
organization is shaped by the desire to reduce "time to market" and 
assure prompt response to external stimuli, I expect responsibility for 
decision-making to be quite decentralized. Keren and Levahry (1989) 
show that if the implementation lag is valuable for the firm, than 
decentralization of authority may be an efficient outcome. Again, A&T 
analyze the effect of urgency in an extension of their basic model; 
they conclude that "the principal is more likely to rubber-stamp, the 
more urgent the decision" (p. 26). This result is quite straightforward 
from the framework considered in the previous section if one 
assumes that decision-making is sequential rather than 
simultaneous. For any level of principal's effort, urgency in decision- 
making results in an increase of her marginal disutility: the more she 
oversees, the slower the decision-making process, the lower the 
returns from implementing the selected project. Thus, an increase in 
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urgency of decisions shifts downward the reaction curve of the 
principal, raising agent's real authority. 
Another key aspect is the presence of monetary incentives aimed at 
aligning the agent's objectives with those of the principal. A&T (pp. 
20-22) generalize the setting described in the previous section by 
allowing the agent to respond to monetary incentives. They show that 
there are two main reasons why an increase in agent's remuneration 
raises his real authority. First, for any level of effort of the principal 
agent's initiative increases with the amount of monetary incentives 
(that is, there is an upward shift of the reaction curve of the agent). 
Second, there is a reduction in the principal's incentive to monitor: 
for any level of agent's initiative the principal devotes less effort to 
investigate projects (i. e., principal's reaction curve shifts downward). 
Thus, the net effect of the introduction of monetary incentives is an 
increase of agent's real authority. 
Let us now depart from the model considered in the previous 
section by assuming that the superior has authority over m identical 
subordinates, who run different independent tasks. The situation is 
identical to the previous one, except that the principal now has to 
distribute her effort over a plurality of agents, so that 
M 
gp(E) = p(J E; )2 /2. The symmetric equilibrium (see equation 1) 
becomes 
Chapter 4 145 
e_ b(pm2 - B) 
E B(a - ab) 
(2) 
As the number m of subordinates increases, it becomes more costly 
for the superior to attend all activities; thus, the principal will 
delegate real authority downward the management hierarchy. 
Conversely, a plant manager may have multiple principals. This 
has various implications, of opposite signs upon delegation of 
decision-making so that the net effect cannot be unambiguously 
predicted ex ante. First, due to the split of returns among several 
principals, there is a free rider problem in monitoring the agent's 
behavior which favors delegation. 3 Second, there is the effect of the 
split of authority among corporate superiors with imperfectly aligned 
objectives. On the one hand, the conflict of interests among them 
may raise each principal's incentive to monitor the agent's activity. 
On the other hand, it may also allow the agent to set the multiple 
principals against each other. Hence, the degree of centralization of 
real authority may increase or decrease, depending on which effect 
prevails. 
The above mentioned variables (that is, the number of 
subordinates over which a plant manager's corporate superior has 
authority and the number of multiple principals of the plant 
3 Note however that depending on the characteristics of the principal's monitoring 
cost function, the multiplication of principals may induce more investigation in 
aggregate; in that case, the agent's initiative is reduced. See A&T (p. 23). 
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manager) are closely linked to organizational characteristics of a 
plant's parent firm such as its overall size, single-plant or multi-plant 
nature, and organizational structure (i. e., U-form or M-form, for a 
detailed description of these organizational forms see chapter 1). 
Accordingly, these factors are very likely to affect, the distribution of 
real authority between the plant manager and his superior. 
4.2.3 Delegation of Formal Authority 
As a preliminary remark, one should acknowledge that' formal 
responsibility for strategic decisions is quite rarely delegated to a 
plant manager. Superiors in the corporate hierarchy generally retain 
the formal right to overrule plant managers' choices if in their own 
view this is deemed necessary. This practice contrasts with the one 
concerning operating decisions, which are often (and increasingly) 
decentralized to plant managers and lower managerial layers (see 
chapter 2). Such evidence is in line with Geanakoplos and Milgrom 
(1991) which demonstrate that within firm's hierarchy the right to 
take a decision should be assigned to the manager who has the best 
information. That is, delegation emerges as an optimal outcome for 
exploiting local knowledge. 
A&T also analyze the allocation of formal authority. They highlight 
that both incentive and individual rationality considerations are 
relevant for understanding why a principal gives up the right to 
reverse an agent's decisions. On the one hand, when the agent is also 
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formally in charge of decision-making (that is, he has both real and 
formal authority), his initiative increases as he does not fear being 
overruled. The cost for the principal is the loss of control over agent's 
activity. On the other hand, delegating to the agent the formal right to 
decide raises his utility, thus relaxing his individual rationality 
constraint. 
As to the allocation of formal authority over strategic decisions 
between the plant manager and his superior, the incentive 
considerations do not lead to directly testable hypotheses. 4 On the 
contrary, the participation view does. In particular, A&T suggest that 
the specific nature of the strategic decision should play a key role in 
assessing which decisions are delegated to the agent and which are 
retained by the principal. Decisions that have great impact on the 
principal's economic return (i. e., B assumes a large value) and little 
impact on the agent's private benefit (i. e., b is small) should be 
centralized. Conversely, decisions that affect only marginally 
principal's returns could be delegated to the agent. Furthermore, 
decisions for which the objectives pursued by the plant manager are 
likely to diverge from those of the firm as a whole (i. e., a is low) 
should be retained with the plant manager's superior, while those for 
4 Note that according to the incentive view, formal authority should be delegated to 
the agent when i) the principal's benefits are very sensitive to the agent's initiative, 
ii) the likelihood of the principal being informed is exogenous and iii) the principal 
is quite uninformed. On the contrary, the principal should retain it if she is very 
well informed. Such reasoning helps explain why operating decisions are frequently 
decentralized, while strategic decisions are not, as was indicated earlier. 
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which the superior's choices could badly hurt the plant manager's 
activity (i. e., j8 
is low) should be relatively more decentralized. From 
the above line of reasoning I derive the following remarks. 
" Decisions concerning capital investments should be kept more 
centralized than those concerning the workforce due to the greater 
amount of financial resources involved in each individual decision 
and the larger externalities they impose upon a firm's other units 
(higher B, lower a). In addition, control over the latter decisions is 
likely to be more important to the agent than control over the 
former, because his private benefit is likely to be greater (higher b) 
and the principal's choices may be very detrimental to him (lower 
A; such considerations reinforce the above mentioned tendency. 
" As to decisions concerning investments in capital equipment, the 
larger the amount of the investments the less likely 
decentralization (higher B, lower a). 
" As to decisions concerning a plant's labor force, formal authority 
should be kept centralized if decisions may affect other units 
(lower a) and be more frequently decentralized if they have a direct 
impact on the plant manager's activity (high b, low 6). For 
instance, the former category includes decisions on the adoption 
of general schemes of payment of the labor force or, to a more 
limited extent, hiring and dismissal of plant's personnel, while to 
the latter one belong decisions on career paths within the plant. 
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4.3 Data 
So far, the greatest obstacle to the direct measurement of the 
allocation of decision-making activities and the analysis of its 
determinants has been the lack of large-scale data sets. In this thesis 
I use information on the organization of plants and their parent 
companies for a sample composed of 438 production units (see the 
empirical methodology chapter at the beginning of this thesis for 
further information). In particular, detailed data was provided by the 
questionnaire analysis on the decision-making structure of each 
sample plant. Data concern who within the firm (that is, which 
managerial level) takes strategic decisions related to plant's activity 
(see also chapter 2, and in particular section 2.2.2). I consider the 
following six plant's strategic decisions: (i) introduction of new 
technologies, (ii) purchase of large-scale capital equipment, (iii) 
purchase of stand-alone machinery, (iv) hiring and dismissal of 
plant's personnel, (v) career paths, and (vi) definition of individual 
and collective incentive schemes. 
I focus on the relationship between the plant manager (the agent) 
and his corporate superior (the principal), where the latter is either 
the firm's owner or a salaried manager. In the second case the 
principal is an intermediary of the owner(s), a situation typical of 
(even though not confined to) establishments that are owned by large 
multi-plant firms. Instead, the first case especially applies to small 
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entrepreneurial firms. Further, notice that when firms are very small 
there may be no plant manager, at least formally. In such cases the 
agent is the person responsible for supervising production. In what 
follows, for the sake of brevity and simplicity, I shall always use the 
term "plant manager". 
In order to test the theoretical hypotheses illustrated in the 
previous sections, I have distinguished three distinct modes of 
allocating plant's strategic decisions. 
1. Decisions are taken autonomously by the plant manager's 
corporate superior. In this case the plant manager can at most 
propose directives, but formal and real authority is a superior's 
matter (levels 4 and 5 of figure la in chapter 2). 
2. The plant manager is in charge of the decision, but the superior 
can overrule him, as formal authorization is needed: the plant 
manager has real authority but formal authority still remains with 
the superior (level 3). 
3. Finally, the plant manager has both formal and real authority. In 
this case decisions are taken autonomously by the plant manager 
and the superior is excluded from the decision-making activity 
(levels 1 and 2). 
Thus, for each of the six aforementioned plant strategic decisions I 
know who (the plant manager or his corporate superior) is in charge 
and how the decision is taken. In other words, I know how real and 
formal authorities are allocated between the two parties. 
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4.4 The Econometric Model 
4.4.1 The Specification of the Econometric Model 
I test theory by analyzing the impact of some explanatory variables 
which will be illustrated in sections 4.4.2, on the allocation of 
decision-making. The choice faced by the parent firm of plant j 
(j=1,...., 438) can be modeled as a discrete choice problem (see 
Maddala 1983). In particular, the firm can allocate every plant's 
strategic decision in three different ways. First, the superior retains 
formal and real authority over the strategic decision, whilst the plant 
manager can at most propose general directives (I call this situation 
integration, I). In the second case, formal authority is still a superior's 
matter, but the plant manager has real authority on the plant's 
strategic decision (delegation of real authority, DR). Finally, authority 
is completely delegated to the plant manager (delegation of formal 
authority, DF). 5 The choice of the decision mode reflects the 
maximization of the superior's utility, which is a random attribute of 
feasible choices. For each plant j and decision i the utility of choosing 
mode k (where k=I, DR, DF) is defined as 
5 Note that there exists, at least theoretically, a fourth situation, in which the plant 
manager holds formal authority whilst the superior possesses real power. In 
business organizations, where agents are ranked hierarchically, this situation is 
very unlikely. Moreover, A&T show that delegating formal authority increases the 
plant manager's initiative, so that the relative allocation of real authority to the 
plant manager under delegation (i. e., the equilibrium value 61k) is higher than 
under integration. Thus, the event in which the plant manager holds formal 
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kk Utýk =V . +sý 
where Vk is a deterministic component, which depends on a set of 
explanatory variables Xis, and s, is a random disturbance. For 
instance, the superior will find convenient to delegate formal 
authority over a strategic decision to the plant manager whenever her 
expected utility under delegation of formal authority is higher than 
the utility under both delegation of real authority and integration, 
that is UDF>UDR and UDF>Ul. Utility maximization implies that the 
likelihood '` of mode k being chosen is given by 
P, k = Pr(U,, > U,,, for all t* k). 
If disturbances s are independently and identically distributed by 
a Weibull distribution, then Pk is given by the multinomial logit 
model (McFadden 1974). To test if these assumptions hold true, the 
McFadden, Train and Tye (1981) test has been performed. 6 The 
multinomial logit specification appears to be highly accepted in this 
context (see the results of the test in the Appendix, Table A. 1). 
authority and the corporate superior possesses real authority is also theoretically 
very unlikely. In any case, in the empirical part I do not allow for this situation. 
6 Even if this test is biased toward accepting the null hypothesis, Brooks, Fry and 
Harris (1998) show that the test has very high power and recommend its use. 
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4.4.2. The Explanatory Variables 
In order to test the predictions of economic theory as to the 
determinants of the allocation of decision-making power, I have 
considered a set of explanatory variables that are presented in what 
follows (see Table 1). 
The complexity of the organization of plants is captured by two 
variables. LEVEL is the number of hierarchical levels of the plant. 
Since the superior is never included within the plant's hierarchy 
(either she is the owner or she is a salaried manager, but in no case 
is she part of plant organization), LEVEL is the number of levels 
under the superior. SIZE is the logarithm of the number of plant 
employees. As was stressed before, an increase of organizational 
complexity by increasing superior's marginal disutility, may press her 
to leave decision-making power to the plant manager who is closer to 
plant's operations and therefore enjoys an information advantage. 
Thus, I expect LEVEL and SIZE to have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of delegating decision-making down the firm's management 
hierarchy. 
I define NETWORK as a dummy variable that equals one if the 
plant has adopted advanced intra-firm communication technologies 
(i. e., Local Area Network, on-line connection with the corporate 
headquarters). Since their adoption allows firms to improve the 
performance of data transmission within their organizations, I have 
introduced this variable as a proxy of intra-firm communication 
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efficiency. We know that a better communication technology might 
allow the principal to centralize decision-making activities and reduce 
loss of control, so that NETWORK should be negatively related to the 
likelihood of delegating decision-making activities to the plant 
manager. Nonetheless, I noted earlier that with the use of 
sophisticated network technology, the cost incurred by the agent to 
collect information on plant's operations may decrease to a larger 
extent than those incurred by the principal; in that case NETWORK 
will have an opposite impact on the allocation of decision-making. 
The enhanced capabilities of the corporate headquarters to monitor 
agent's behavior may lead to the same result. 
LARGE INVESTMENT is a dummy variable that is set at one for 
plants that have introduced large-scale capital equipment, such as 
inflexible and flexible manufacturing systems (IMS and FMS). This 
variable allows me to take into account situations in which plant's 
decisions become more important to the superior and are likely to 
engender larger externalities due both to budget constraints and 
indivisibility problems, thus leading to a more centralized decision 
structure. Further, URGENCY equals one whenever the plant makes 
use of "just-in-time" (JIT) production methods; otherwise its value is 
zero. I use this variable as a proxy of urgency of decisions. Indeed, 
firms that adopt JIT are pressed to deliver fast their products and to 
adjust production schedules over time in accordance with variations 
of the demand; consequently, they heavily rely on the speed of taking 
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and implementing production decisions. From previous theoretical 
remarks, I would expect URGENCY to increase the probability of 
delegating real authority to the plant manager. 
Tab. 1- The explanatory variables of the econometric models 
Variables Description 
Level Number of hierarchic levels of plant organization 
Size Logarithm of the number of plant employees 
Network 1 for plants that have adopted advanced network technologies (i. e., 
LAN and on-line connection with headquarters); 0 otherwise 
Large investment 1 for plants that have invested in large scale capital equipment, such 
as inflexible and flexible manufacturing systems (IMS and FMS); 0 
otherwise 
Monetary incentives 1 for plants that use "non-traditional' pay incentive plans, 0 otherwise 
Urgency 1 for plants that have adopted just-in-time production methods; 0 
otherwise 
Multi plant 
Small group 
Large group 
M -form 
D-Technology 
1 for plants that belong to multi-plant parent companies or business 
groups; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to multi-plant parent companies or business 
groups with less than 100,000 employees; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to multi-plant parent companies or business 
groups with more than 100,000 employees; 0 otherwise 
1 for plants that belong to multi-plant parent companies or business 
groups with an M-form type of organizations; 0 otherwise 
1 for decisions concerning the introduction of technological 
innovations; 0 otherwise 
D-Capital equipment 1 for decisions concerning the purchase of large scale capital 
equipment; 0 otherwise 
D-Machinery 1 for decisions concerning the purchase of stand-alone machinery; 0 
otherwise 
D-Hiring & dismissal 1 for decisions concerning hiring and dismissal; 0 otherwise 
D-Career path 1 for decisions concerning plant employees' career paths; 0 otherwise 
D-Incentive schemes 1 for decisions concerning the introduction of general incentive 
schemes; 0 otherwise 
Legend 
a) M-form is equal to 1 whenever the parent company has more than 25,000 
employees and no one of its product lines accounts for more than 70% of total 
sales (e. g., it is a "related business company"). 
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MONETARY INCENTIVES is one for plants that have introduced 
"non-traditional" individual incentive schemes; otherwise it is equal 
to zero. Italian labor legislation allows firms to introduce individual 
and team monetary incentive plans. However, only a (small) 
proportion of them makes use of such payment plans. In particular, I 
focus on monetary incentives that link salaries to individual 
measures of performance. The introduction of monetary incentives 
should lead to more delegation of decision-making to the plant 
manager by both reducing superior's incentive to supervise and 
increasing the plant manager's propensity to recommend the 
superior's preferred project. 
Lastly, let us turn to variables that reflect the structure and 
organization of plants' parent firms. I define MULTI-PLANT as a 
dummy variable that is one when the plant belongs to a multi-plant 
firm or a business group, and is zero when the plant is owned by a 
single-plant firm. As was suggested before, the position of the 
superior within firm's management hierarchy might influence the 
allocation of real and formal authority. Whilst LEVEL provides 
information on the position of the superior (and the plant manager) 
starting from the bottom of firm's hierarchy, MULTI-PLANT conveys 
information on the superior's position starting from the vertex of the 
organizational pyramid. Indeed, in plants that are owned by single- 
plant firms the superior often is the firm's owner, while in plants that 
are owned by a multi-unit organization she generally is an 
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intermediate salaried executive. In this latter case, we also capture 
the effect of the size of the parent firm on the allocation of plant's 
strategic decisions by introducing two additional dummy variables. 
LARGE GROUP equals 1 for plants owned by business groups which 
have more than 100,000 employees and it is equal to 0 otherwise. 
SMALL GROUP equals 1 for plants owned by all remaining multi-plant 
organizations. In order to control for the organizational structure of 
the parent firm I have defined the variable M-FORM, which is a 
dummy variable that is one when the parent company is organized by 
a M-form type of organization. Since I do not have information 
regarding the organizational structure of all parent firms, I have 
proceeded as follows. The business history literature has highlighted 
that a M-form organization tends to be adopted especially by large- 
sized firms that have developed a diversification strategy (see chapter 
1). For instance, in 1970 in France and Germany within the top 100 
companies, 81% and 91% respectively of "single business" firms were 
functionally structured, whilst 59% and 50% of "dominant business" 
firms had a multidivisional organization; the same held true for 64% 
and 79% of "related business" firms (Dyas and Thanheiser 1976). 7 
Similarly, in the 1970s within the top 500 American companies, 
7 "Single business" firms are defined as firms with 95% or more of total sales that 
lie within a single business. "Dominant business" firms are those firms which, in 
addition to their main product line, have diversified into other related or unrelated 
businesses to the extent of up to 30% of total sales. Finally, "related business" 
firms are firms which have diversified by entering into related markets or by using 
related technology, or have combined vertical integration with such diversification 
so that no one product line accounts for more than 70% of total sales. 
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100% of "single business" firms were functionally organized, whilst 
64% and 95% of "dominant business" firms and "related business" 
firms respectively had a multidivisional structure (Scott 1973). 
Following this evidence, I have classified the organization of parent 
firms depending on their size and diversification of the product mix. 
In particular, I associate a M-form type of organization to the parent 
company whenever the latter has more than 25,000 employees and 
no one of its product lines accounts for more than 70% of total sales 
(e. g. it is a "related business" company). 8 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics. The distribution of the number 
of plant's hierarchic levels is concentrated between 3 and 4, whilst 
the average number of employees is 195 (SIZE-4.48). Technological 
variables show that 58.2% and 71.7% of sample plants have adopted 
network technology and large-scale capital equipment respectively. 
46.3% of them has introduced JIT techniques, 36.5% makes use of 
monetary incentive schemes. As to ownership status, more than 22% 
of sample plants belong to a multi-unit organization. Of them, 16% 
are owned by a firm or business group with less than 100,000 
employees, whilst the remaining 6.8% are part of a very large 
corporation (i. e., total number of employees greater than 100,000). 
Lastly, in 10.5% of the cases the parent firm of sample plants can be 
considered as a M-form type of organization. 
8 Data are derived from R&B (1998), the Hoovers's Handbook of World Business 
(1998), the Hoovers's Handbook of US Companies (1998), and Company Reports. 
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Tab. 2- Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
Level 3.473 620.838 
Size 4.482 8.412 1.609 1.185 
Network 0.582 100.494 
Large investment 0.717 100.451 
Monetary incentives 0.326 100.469 
Urgency 0.463 100.499 
Multi plant 0.228 100.420 
Small group 0.160 100.366 
Large group 0.068 100.253 
M -form 0.105 100.307 
D-Technology 0.167 100.373 
D-Capital equipment 0.167 100.373 
D-Machinery 0.167 100.373 
D-Hiring & dismissal 0.167 100.373 
D-Career path 0.167 100.373 
D-Incentive schemes 0.167 100.373 
4.5 Empirical Results 
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Results of multinomial logit estimations are presented in Table 3. The 
baseline of the estimates is the situation in which the principal 
possesses both formal and real authority (i. e., integration). Columns 
2 and 3 correspond to the estimates of the baseline against the 
delegation of real authority to the plant manager; hence I test the 
determinants of the allocation of real authority given that the 
superior holds formal authority (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). In 
columns 4 and 51 compare the situation where the plant manager 
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has real and formal authority with that where formal and real 
authority remains with the superior, so that I test the determinants 
of the allocation of formal authority (see section 4.2.3). Recall that the 
number of observations (2,628) is given by 438, the number of 
sample plants, time 6, the number of plant's strategic decisions I 
consider. 
The number of coefficients of the econometric model has been 
reduced starting from the less significant ones. Both the initial 
unrestricted model and the final restricted model are reported in 
Table 3. In order to test for joint acceptance of all restrictions, a LR x2 
test has been performed. The test is equal to 7.97 (95% critical value 
for x9 = 16.92), so that the restrictions are jointly accepted. 
In order to provide further insights into the issues at hand, a 
simulation study has also been performed. The results are illustrated 
in Table 4. First, on the basis of the estimates of the restricted model, 
I have calculated the probabilities of integration of decision-making 
activity, delegation of only real authority to the plant manager, and 
delegation of formal (and also real) authority for the "average" sample 
plant, which represents the benchmark of the simulation. This latter 
is defined following the descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables reported in Table 2. In particular, the average plant is 
owned by a single-plant functionally organized firm and has adopted 
both advanced network technology and large-scale capital equipment 
but not monetary incentive schemes and JIT production methods. 
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Moreover, plant organization is composed of 195 employees 
(SIZE=4.48) and a three-layer hierarchy. 
Second, I have computed changes of the above mentioned 
probabilities due to a variation of the value of each individual 
explanatory variable, with all remaining variables being kept 
constant. Indeed, since most explanatory variables are Boolean, this 
kind of exercise seems to offer more interesting evidence than simple 
calculation of marginal effects. Note also that as regards variations of 
continuous and discrete variables (i. e., LEVEL and SIZE), I have 
considered the lowest value of the first decile of sample plants in 
descending order (in this case the value assumed by the variable is 
defined as "large" or "high") and the highest value of the first decile in 
ascending order ("small" or "low" values), respectively. 
Generally speaking, the evidence on the allocation of real and 
formal authority is rather robust and interesting. First, as to the 
complexity of the organization of plants, the number of hierarchic 
levels under the superior, captured by LEVEL significantly affects (at 
the 99% level) the allocation of both real and formal authority. In 
particular, more complex organizational structures are characterized 
by decentralization of real (and formal) authority to the plant 
manager. The results of the simulation study highlight that the 
likelihood of decision-making power being kept with the corporate 
superior is below 50% for a 5-layered plant, against 64.7% for the 
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benchmark plant and 69.2% for a 2-layered plant. 9 Such findings 
confirm theoretical predictions relating to the alleged rapid increase 
of superior's information costs when plant organization becomes 
complex. In other words, being close to operations seems a key factor 
for optimality of decision-making activity in complex organizations. 
Similarly, a higher number of direct and indirect subordinates, 
that is a larger value for SIZE induces the superior to delegate real 
(but not formal) authority to the plant manager. However, in this 
case, I have to distinguish between plants that have adopted 
advanced network technologies and plants that have not. The 
estimates suggest that previous remark holds only for the latter 
category. Plants in which intra-firm communication is severely 
limited tend to decentralize real authority to the plant manager 
whenever the number of employees increases. Conversely, plants that 
have adopted network technologies do not seem to suffer from loss of 
control due to increasing complexity. In this case, the number of 
employees does not have any influence on the allocation of real 
authority: the value of the Wald test relating to the sum of the 
coefficients of SIZE and the interactive term SIZExNETWORK is not 
significant at conventional levels. However, quite surprisingly, it has 
a negative and significant (at the 95% level) impact upon the 
allocation of formal authority. 
9 In accordance with the criteria explained above, when LEVEL is "low" the plant is 
composed of a two-layer hierarchy, whilst a "high" value for LEVEL represents the 
case of an organization composed of five tiers. 
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Tab. 3- Results of the multinomial logit models 
Variables 
ao Constant 
al Level 
as Size 
a3 Network 
as Network * Size 
as Large investment 
a6 Monetary incentives 
a7 Urgency 
as Small group 
a9 Large group 
aio M-form 
an n D-Capital equipment 
a12 D-Machinery 
a13 D-Hiring & dismissal 
aia D-Career path 
ais D-Incentive schemes 
Log-likelihood 
LR joint test 
N. of observations 
X2 tests (unrestricted 
model): 
a2 + a4 =0 
a8= a9= aio =0 
ail= a12= a18 =a14= ais=0 
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Delegation of real authority Delegation of formal authority 
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted 
-3.61 (0.39)c 
0.251 (0.07) c 
0.40 (0.09) c 
1.71 (0.47) c 
-0.40 (0.11) c 
-0.10 (0.12) 
0.50 (0.10) c 
0.08 (0.10) 
0.30 (0.16) a 
1.27 (0.34) c 
-1.07 (0.28)c 
0.12 (0.16) 
0.20 (0.16) 
0.05 (0.17) 
0.21 (0.17) 
-0.08 (0.17) 
-3.46 (0.37) c -2.27 (0.43) c 
0.26 (0.06) c 0.29 (0.07) c 
0.36 (0.08) c 0.10 (0.10) 
1.63 (0.45) c 1.32 (0.53) b 
-0.37 (0.10) c -0.34 (0.13) c 
- -0.49 (0.12) c 
0.48 (0.10) c 0.09 (0.12) 
- 0.25(0.12)b 
0.31 (0.15) b 0.17 (0.20) 
1.27 (0.34) c 1.589 (0.47) c 
-1.05 (0.28) c -1.04 (0.41) c 
- -0.50 (0.20) b 
- -0.26 (0.19) 
- 0.29 (0.18) 
- 0.45 (0.18) c 
- 0.01 (0.18) 
-2468.60 -2472.59 
195.72 (30) c 187.74 (21) c 
2628 2628 2628 
Del real authority Del. formal authority 
0.00 (1) 
17.45 (3) c 
4.69 (5) 
6.94 (1) c 
15.57 (3) c 
34.25 (5) c 
Legend 
a) significance level greater than 90%; 
b) significance level greater than 95%; 
c) significance level greater than 99%. 
Standard errors and degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
-1.91 (0.29) c 
0.30 (0.07) c 
0.99 (0.41) b 
-0.25 (0.09) c 
-0.43 (0.11) c 
0.24 (0.11) b 
0.20 (0.20) 
1.624 (0.46) c 
-1.05 (0.40) c 
-0.54 (0.19) c 
-0.33 (0.19) a 
0.27 (0.17) 
0.39 (0.17) b 
0.03 (0.18) 
2628 
Joint model 
27.44 (6) c 
42.01 (10) c 
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Tab. 4- Simulations 
Variables Del. of real Del. of formal Integration Total 
authority authority 
Benchmark plant 21.7% 13.6% 64.7% 100.0% 
Level = low (=2) 18.6% 12.2% 69.2% 100.0% 
Level = high (=5) 28.7% 21.6% 49.7% 100.0% 
Size = small (21 employees) 20.7% 18.2% 61.1% 100.0% 
Size = large (450 employees) 22.4% 9.6% 68.0% 100.0% 
Network = 0, Size = small 14.4% 16.4% 69.2% 100.0% 
Network = 0, Size = average 21.9% 15.0% 63.1% 100.0% 
Network = 0, Size = large 33.2% 12.8% 54.0% 100.0% 
Large investment =0 20.2% 21.4% 58.4% 100.0% 
Monetary incentives =1 31.3% 13.2% 55.5% 100.0% 
Urgency =1 21.0% 18.4% 60.6% 100.0% 
Small group =1 26.7% 14.9% 58.4% 100.0% 
Small group =1, M -form =1 12.8% 7.2% 80.0% 100.0% 
Large group =1 36.5% 32.7% 30.8% 100.0% 
Large group =1, M-form =1 23.2% 20.9% 55.9% 100.0% 
D-Capital equipment =1 23.3% 9.4% 67.3% 100.0% 
D-Machinery =1 22.8% 11.3% 65.9% 100.0% 
D-Hiring & dismissal =1 20.9% 18.8% 60.3% 100.0% 
D-Career path =1 20.4% 20.7% 58.9% 100.0% 
D-Incentive schemes =1 21.8% 15.4% 62.8% 100.0% 
Legend 
Benchmark plant is defined as follows: (Large and Small) group = 0, Level =3, Size = 
4.48 (195 employees), Network = 1, Large investment = 1, Monetary incentives = 0, 
Urgency = 0. 
Small and Large plant are defined as the first and ninth deciles of the plant size 
distribution. 
Low and high level are defined as the first and ninth deciles of the distribution of 
the number of hierarchic levels. 
Note also the positive and significant (at the 99% and 95% levels 
for DR and DF, respectively) coefficients of NETWORK. Such result 
would seem to suggest that contrary to theoretical predictions, the 
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adoption of sophisticated communication technologies might favor 
delegation of authority (real and/or formal) to the plant manager. 
Nonetheless, since the effects of the number of plant employees and 
the use of efficient intra-firm communication technology are tightly 
entwined, a more careful insight is possible only through the 
simulation analysis. Indeed, the findings of the simulations (see again 
Table 4) document the two opposite effects of the adoption of network 
technologies depending on plant size. In large plants'° characterized 
by high intra-firm communication efficiency, decision-making is 
integrated at the superior level as is suggested by A&T, with the 
estimated likelihood of integration being as high as 68%. Conversely, 
when large plants do not adopt advanced intra-firm communication 
technologies such probability declines to 54%. The opposite pattern 
applies to smaller plants. Indeed, when the number of plant 
employees is low, integration at the superior level is more likely for 
plants that have not introduced sophisticated network technologies 
(69.2% versus 61.1%). In sum, delegation of decisions to the plant 
manager is positively (negatively) correlated to the number of 
employees for plants with low (high) intra-firm communication 
efficiency, with the allocation of decision-making of plants of average 
size being very similar for the two categories. 
10 As was said earlier, "small" and "large" plants are defined by the first and ninth 
deciles of the size distribution of sample plants. In particular, a "small" plant has 
21 employees, whilst a "large" plant has 450 employees. 
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In accordance with theoretical considerations, the introduction of 
monetary incentive schemes makes decentralization of real (but not 
formal) authority more likely, with the coefficient of MONETARY 
INCENTIVES being positive and significant at the 99% level for the 
delegation of real authority and insignificant for the delegation of 
formal authority. Accordingly, the likelihood of DR increases quite 
substantially when MONETARY INCENTIVES is set at 1 (from 21.7% 
up to 31.3%). As to the effect of URGENCY, its coefficient is positive 
and significant at 95% in the DF estimates but is insignificant in the 
DR estimates. In other words, plants that have adopted JIT are more 
likely to decentralize not only real but also formal authority to the 
plant manager; so, we may say that the plant manager is more likely 
to hold formal and real authority the more urgent the decision. 
LARGE INVESTMENT displays an opposite effect, with its coefficient 
being significantly (at 99%) negative for delegation of formal 
authority. Plants that do not invest in large-scale capital equipment 
are less likely to suffer from budget constraints or indivisibility 
problems, so that formal responsibility for strategic decisions is more 
likely to be decentralized at the plant manager level. Note from Table 
4 the quite large increase of the probability of DF (from 13.6% to 
21.4%) when LARGE INVESTMENT equals 0, with everything else 
being equal. 
Turning to the effects of the characteristics of the parent firm of 
sample plants a preliminary remark is in order. If I introduce a 
Chapter 4 167 
variable which controls only for plant's belonging to a multi-unit 
organization (i. e., either a multi-plant independent firm or a business 
group), than the ownership status fails to register any impact on the 
likelihood of adopting different decision-making structures. The 
coefficient of this variable is indeed positive but insignificant. " Such 
finding would seem to suggest that infra-group mechanisms play no 
role in the allocation of plant's decision-making activities. Since I 
believe that two opposite forces are at work, one relating to the size of 
the parent firm and the other to its organizational form, I have 
addressed this issue in greater detail by distinguishing plants owned 
by a multi-unit company depending on both the size and the 
characteristics of the organization of the parent firm. 
In particular, I control for the effect of the group's size by 
introducing the two dummy variables SMALL GROUP and LARGE 
GROUP, and the organizational form of the parent firm by introducing 
the dummy M-FORM. 12 In order to evaluate the joint significance of 
these variables I have computed LR x2 tests, which show that the size 
and the organizational form of the parent firm significantly (at 99%) 
affect delegation of both real and formal authority. Results for SMALL 
GROUP and LARGE GROUP confirm that the larger the group size, the 
11 For the sake of synthesis, the estimates of such model are reported in the 
Appendix of the chapter (see Table A. 2). 
12 Since LARGE GROUP and M-FORM are clearly (positively) correlated I have 
computed a LR X2 test in order to test for joint significance. The test is equal to 
26.16 (99% critical value for 
4=9.49), 
which shows that I cannot drop out the 
two variables. 
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higher the probability of delegating decision-making at the plant level. 
Conversely, when the parent firm adopts a multidivisional form 
decision-making is highly integrated at the corporate divisional level. 
Simulations are again very illustrative. On the one hand, the size of 
the business group to which the plant belongs positively affects the 
likelihood of delegation of real and formal authority. Whilst the 
probability of complete centralization at the superior corporate level is 
64.7% for an average independent plant (i. e., the benchmark case), it 
decreases to 58.4% for a plant owned by a small or medium-sized 
group and to 30.8% for one that belongs to a large corporation, with 
everything else being equal. On the other hand, with parent firm's 
size being kept constant, when the parent firm adopts a 
multidivisional form of organization instead of being functionally 
organized, the likelihood of delegation to the plant manager is sharply 
reduced. The results of the simulations highlight that the probability 
of integration is as high as 80% and 55.9% for plants owned by 
small-medium and large multidivisional corporations, respectively. 
Actually, multidivisional firms introduce an intermediate hierarchic 
level between the plant manager and the top management. From the 
point of view of high corporate officers, this process leads to 
decentralization of decision-making activities to division managers. 
Conversely, from the point of view of the plant manager, this type of 
organization decreases his authority in favor of his corporate 
superior. 
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Lastly, let us focus attention on the evidence about the effects of 
the dummy variables related to the different types of strategic 
decision. Note that the baseline is represented by the decision 
concerning the introduction of technological innovations (i. e., D- 
TECHNOLOGY=1). First, such variables overall display a significant 
impact on plants' decision-making structure. Indeed, we can reject 
the null hypothesis of joint equality to zero of their coefficients at the 
99% level by a LR Z, 2 test. However, second, whilst they significantly 
influence delegation of formal authority, the same does not hold true 
for delegation of only real power (see the values of the x2 tests at the 
bottom of Table 3). Third, there is a neat difference in the allocation 
of decisions concerning plant's capital equipment with respect to 
those concerning plant's workforce. Dummy variables relating to the 
former decisions display a negative impact on the likelihood of 
decentralization of formal authority, whilst those relating to the latter 
increase the probability of delegation. As to decisions concerning 
investment in capital equipment, the larger the amount of the 
investment (D-CAPITAL EQUIPMENT versus D-MACHINERY) the less 
likely the decentralization of decision-making to the plant manager. 
In particular, simulations show that for the benchmark plant, the 
probability of delegation of formal authority is 9.4% and 11.3% for 
decisions concerning the purchase of large capital equipment and 
individual machinery respectively, against 13.7% for the introduction 
of new technologies. As to decisions on plant's workforce, delegation 
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from the corporate superior to the plant manager is more likely 
whenever decisions do not affect other units and have a direct impact 
on the plant manager's activity so as for decisions relating to the 
career of plant employees. The likelihood of DF in this latter case is 
estimated at 20.7% against 18.8% and 15.4% for decisions as to 
hiring and dismissal of plant's personnel and the introduction of 
general incentive schemes, respectively. Overall, these results provide 
support to the view expressed by A&T that different types of 
decisions, having a different importance both to the corporate 
superior and to the plant manager, are allocated following different 
patterns. Moreover, they suggest that exploitation of plant manager's 
specific knowledge about the characteristics of plant's workforce may 
have played a key role in shaping the plant's decision structure. 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter is a first step toward an empirically robust test of 
theoretical predictions on the allocation of decision-making. Aghion 
and Tirole (1997) have identified factors that influence the allocation 
of formal and real authority between a principal and an agent. I have 
tested these and other predictions of economic theory for a sample 
composed of 438 Italian manufacturing plants in the case of the 
relation between the plant manager (the agent) and his corporate 
superior (the principal). The results are quite interesting. 
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First, the complexity of a plant's organization strongly influences 
the allocation of decision-making activities. A higher number of 
managerial levels increases organizational complexity, hence, it also 
reduces the superior's information over the internal working of the 
plant. This process raises the stimulus toward delegation of both 
formal and real authority to the plant manager, who has greater 
knowledge of plant's activity. A similar reasoning, though confined to 
real authority, applies to the effect of an increase of the number of 
plant's employees if intra-firm communication efficiency is low. 
Conversely, plants that have adopted advanced intra-firm 
communication technology do not seem to suffer from loss of control 
due to an increase of size. Note also that use of such technologies 
seems to favor centralization of decision-making in large plants, in 
accordance with the predictions of A&T, whilst it stimulates 
delegation in smaller units. Such findings raise interesting questions 
on the role of technology in shaping firms' decision structure which 
wait for further theoretical developments. 
Second, when decision is urgent the superior finds convenient to 
reallocate the right to decide downward the corporate ladder. Third, I 
find confirmation that the introduction of monetary incentives 
increases the likelihood of delegating real (but not formal) authority. 
Fourth, in accordance with the predictions of economic theory, 
authority over different types of plant's strategic decisions turns out 
to be allocated depending on a) the relative importance of them to the 
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plant manager and to his corporate superior, b) the extent of intra- 
firm externalities, and c) the desire to take advantage of plant 
manager's local knowledge and specific capabilities. In particular, 
decisions concerning capital equipment are more centralized than 
those relating to the workforce. Among the former, decisions 
regarding the purchase of large-scale capital equipment involving a 
larger amount of financial resources, are more centralized than those 
relating to individual machinery. Among the latter, decisions on 
career paths of plant's personnel are those that are most frequently 
delegated to the plant manager. 
Lastly, for plants owned by a multi-plant firm, the size and the 
organizational form of the parent firm significantly affect the 
allocation of real and formal authority over decisions relating to 
plant's operations. Everything else being equal, the larger the parent 
company, the more frequently the superior is pressed to decentralize 
decision-making power, probably due to higher span of control and 
the associated greater overload cost. Conversely, when the parent 
firm adopts a multidivisional form, an intermediate level between the 
top management and the plant level is introduced. In this case, the 
span of control of the principal is reduced, with everything else being 
equal, so as the distance between plant manager's corporate superior 
and plant's operations. Thus, the adoption of a multidivisional form 
by the parent firm leads to a significant reduction of the plant 
manager's (real and formal) authority. 
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Appendix 
Tab. A. 1 - Results of the McFadden. Train and Tye Test (IIA 
Test): Test for the unrestricted model of Table 3 
Obs. Full model Restricted model X2 tests 
Integration and delegation of real 2147 -1262.62 -1262.50 0.25 (16) 
authority 
Delegation of real authority and 1130 -730.16 -729.66 1.01 (16) 
delegation of formal authority 
Integration and delegation of 1979 -1050.23 -1050.03 0.40 (16) 
formal authority 
Legend 
Degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
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Tab. A. 2 - Results of the multinomial logst models with only the 
multi-plant ownership variable 
Delegation of real authority Delegation of formal authority 
Variables 
ao Constant 
a1 Level 
a2 Size 
as Network 
as Network * Size 
as Large investment 
a6 Monetary incentives 
a7 Urgency 
as Multi plant 
a9 D-Capital equipment 
alo D-Machinery 
all D-Hiring & dismissal 
a12 D-Career path 
a13 D-Incentive schemes 
Log-likelihood 
LR joint test 
N. of observations 
Tests 
a2 + aa =0 
a9= aio= ail= ala= als=0 
0.00(i) 
4.67 (5) 
5.87 (1) b 
34.15(5)c 
Legend 
a) Significance level greater than 90%. 
b) Significance level greater than 95%. 
c) Significance level greater than 99%. 
Standard errors and degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
Unrestricted Restricted 
-3.63 (0.39) c 
0.25 (0.07) c 
0.41 (0.09) c 
1.77 (0.46) c 
-0.41 (0.10) c 
-0.13 (0.11) 
0.49 (0.10) c 
0.05 (0.10) 
0.12 (0.14) 
0.12 (0.16) 
0.20 (0.16) 
0.05 (0.17) 
0.21 (0.17) 
-0.08 (0.17) 
Unrestricted Restricted 
-3.49 (0.36) c -2.29 (0.43) c 
0.26 (0.06) c 0.29 (0.07) c 
0.38 (0.08) c 0.11 (0.10) 
1.56 (0.43) c 1.22 (0.51) b 
-0.36 (0.10) c -0.32 (0.12) c 
- -0.50 (0.12) c 
0.47 (0.09) c 0.08 (0.12) 
- 0.22 (0.11) a 
- 0.12 (0.18) 
- -0.50 (0.20) b 
- -0.27 (0.19) 
- 0.29 (0.18) 
- 0.451 (0.17) c 
- 0.01 (0.18) 
-2481.80 -2486.43 
169.33 (26) c 160.07 (15) c 
2628 2628 2628 
Del. of real authority Del. of formal authority 
-1.90 (0.29) c 
0.31 (0.07) c 
0.73 (0.34) b 
-0.19 (0.07) c 
-0.44 (0.11) c 
0.23(0.11)b 
-0.53 (0.19) c 
-0.33 (0.19) a 
0.27 (0.17) 
0.39 (0.17) b 
0.03 (0.17) 
2628 
Joint model 
41.87(10)c 
Chapter 5 
A Note on the Measures of the Organization 
Chapter 5 
5.1 Introduction 
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The theoretical literature on the organization of firms is extensive and 
articulated, ranging from the allocation of decision-making to the 
information structure. On the contrary, empirical evidence is limited 
and confined to particular issues such as the incentive schemes of 
(top) managers, the firm's ownership status and the financial 
structure. In the last few years, however, economists have started 
collecting firm (plant)-level data, capturing some missing features of 
the organization (see for instance Bresnahan et. al 1999, and 
Ichniowski et. al 1997). Nevertheless, empirical studies still do not 
look at some key aspects of organizations. For instance, there is a 
lack of large-scale quantitative evidence on the allocation of decision- 
making (chapters 2 and 4), on the size of the management hierarchy 
(chapters 2 and 3) and on the span of control (chapter 2). Empirical 
work on the organization concentrates on the adoption of innovations 
such as human resource managerial procedures (e. g., quality circles, 
job rotation, incentive schemes) and other management routines (e. g., 
just-in-time, total quality management). These are of course very 
important features of the internal working of the firm, which might 
significantly affect firm's productivity, even though these innovations 
often relate only indirectly to the aspects over which economic theory 
has been puzzled in the last 20 years. 
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Since above mentioned features of business organizations are quite 
difficult to observe economists have started to use managerial 
innovations as proxies of these characteristics. Chapter 2 tackles the 
issue of exploring empirical methods to investigate directly the latter. 
This short note aims instead at analyzing the relations between 
managerial innovations and variables that measure the 
organizational structure, showing that economists might be wrong in 
linking the two. 
5.2 Measures of Organizational Structure 
In this paragraph I shall look very briefly at some empirical measures 
of the organizational structure developed in chapter 2. For reader's 
convenience, I re-define some of the measures described in that 
chapter which I analyze in this note. For further details see of course 
chapter 2. 
As to the allocation of decision-making, I have information on the 
corporate level that takes each of the following six plant's strategic 
decisions: (i) purchase of stand-alone machinery, (ii) purchase of 
large-scale capital equipment, (iii) introduction of new technologies, 
(iv) hiring and dismissal, (v) definition of individual and collective 
incentive schemes, and (vi) plant's employees career paths. Similarly, 
I know what level of a hierarchy is assigned responsibility for the 
following five operating activities: (a) daily production plan, (b) weekly 
production plan, (c) definition of blue collars' tasks, (d) control of blue 
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collars' operations, and (e) change of production plan after sudden 
external shocks. In particular, for operating (strategic) decision- 
making I allow for three (five) corporate levels ranging from blue 
collars, maximum degree of decentralization, to the plant manager 
(the plant manager corporate superior for strategic decisions), 
maximum degree of centralization (see figures la and lb in chapter 
2). Table 1 illustrates descriptive statistics. 
I have thus defined for each plant j (j =1,.., 438) a measure of the 
degree of centralization of decision-making (DC), in the following way: 
5 
DC(J) _ý QliX; (. 1), 
i=1 
where ali (i=1,.., 5) are the five coordinates of the first component of 
the principal component analysis and xi(j) (i=1,.., 5) are the values of 
the decision variables for plant j once linearly ranked; recall that 
such variables range from 1 (1), maximum decentralization, to 3 (5), 
maximum centralization, for operating (strategic) decisions. Thus DC 
will be large if plant decision-making is highly centralized. 
Second, I use the Euclidean distance as a measure of 
concentration of decision-making power. For each plant j (j =1,.., 438), 
222 i/ 2 CONC(j) = iy, ;+ 
ya; + ý1s; ) 
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where yid is the number of type of operating decisions, out of 5 (6 for 
strategic decisions), taken by level i. Clearly, CONC reaches its 
maximum when all decision-making is concentrated at one level. I 
have then recalculate CONC in the following way 
STD 
- 
CONC(j) - 
CONC(j) - min(CONC) 
max(CONC) - min(CONC)' 
so that 0: 5 STD CONC 5 1, and higher values represent higher 
concentrations of decision-making. If STD CONC =. 1, then all 
decisions are concentrated at one hierarchic level. 
Tab. 1- Decision-making structure 
Range Mean Std. dev. 
Strategic decisions (1 =blue collars, 5=plant manager's corporate superior) 
Introduction of new technologies 1-5 3.57 1.04 
Purchase of large scale capital equipment 1-5 3.67 . 94 
Purchase of stand-alone machinery 1-5 3.60 . 98 
Hiring and dismissal 1-5 3.53 1.12 
Career paths 1-5 3.42 1.09 
Definition of general incentive schemes 1-5 3.65 1.09 
Operating decisions (1 =blue collars, 3=plant manager) 
Weekly production plan 1-3 2.61 . 
50 
Daily production plan 1-3 2.16 . 49 
Monitoring of blue collars' operations 1-3 2.21 . 61 
Definition of blue collars' tasks 1-3 2.03 . 
39 
Change of production plan 1-3 2.41 . 
55 
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Finally, LEVEL is the number of hierarchic tiers that compound a 
plant's organizational structure. 
5.3 Relation between Measures of Plant's Organization 
Table 2 shows definitions and descriptive statistics for variables 
measuring the organizational structure and for human resource 
practices. It is worth noticing that the variable STD_CONC has been 
re-defined as ST C. ST and ST C. OP for strategic and operating 
decisions, respectively. 
I test two different but related hypotheses on the introduction of 
human resource practices: 
Hypothesis 1: human resource practices covary in cross-sectional 
data (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994). 
Hypothesis 2: such instruments are correlated to a new 
organizational form characterized by decentralization of decision- 
making, diffusion of power among hierarchical layers, and reduced 
bureaucratization. 
In order to assess correlation, I have proceeded to calculate 
Spearman rank correlations between aforementioned variables 
controlling for industry sector (through nine two-digit dummies), 
plant's size (in terms of the number of plant's employees), ownership 
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status (single versus multi-plant ownership), and production 
structure (layout of production: job shop versus line). Table 3 reports 
results. 
Tab. 2- Organization variables 
Type Variable Mean Std. dev. 
Variables measuring the organizational structure 
Degree of concentration of strategic dec. continuous ST C. ST 0.894 0.154 
Degree of concentration of operating dec. continuous ST C. OP 0.513 0.297 
Degree of centralization of strategic dec. continuous DC. ST -0.115 2.008 
Degree of centralization of operating dec. continuous DC. OP -0.128 1.500 
Number of hierarchic levels ordered LEVEL 3.473 0.838 
Human resource management practices variables 
Job rotation dummy JOB 0.605 0.489 
Quality circles dummy CIRC 0.372 0.483 
Individual pay incentive plans dummy INC 0.326 0.469 
Management innovations variables 
Just-in-time dummy JIT 0.463 0.499 
Total quality management dummy TQM 0.546 0.498 
Firm-specific controlling variables 
Number of employees discrete EMPL 195.34 373.73 
Ownership status (multi-plant=1) dummy MULTI 0.228 0.420 
Layout of production (line=1) dummy PROD 0.518 0.500 
As both theoretical and empirical work suggests, human resource 
practices covary in cross-sectional data. The significant and positive 
correlations among the various human resource management 
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variables point to the presence of a cluster of complementary 
innovations. This may be the result of the adoption by profit- 
maximizing firms of a coherent business strategy that exploits 
complementarities. Alternatively, there might be the same underlying 
cause that drives all of them. One explanation is the presence of fads 
(Bikchandani et. at 1992): "Think of all the manufacturing firms in 
the United States that have attempted to imitate Japanese 
manufacturing techniques over the past decade without a very clear 
understanding of why or how those techniques work" Kreps (1990). 
Tab. 3- Correlations between measures of plant's organization 
and new management practices 
Measure ST_C. ST ST C. OP DC. ST DC. OP LEVEL 
ST_C. ST 
ST. C. OP 
DC. ST 
DC. OP 
LEVEL 
JOB 
CIRC 
INC 
JIT 
TQM 
1 . 021 -. 
22 c . 08 -. 00 
-1 . 06 -. 03 -. 15 c 
--I . 18c -. 17c 
1 -. 17 c 
1 
JOB CIRC INC JIT TQM 
. 03 -. 06 . 07 . 05 -. 
05 
. 16 c -. 06 -. 05 -. 18 c -. O5 
-. 04 . 04 -. 07 -. 10 b . 01 
-. 02 . 02 -. 05 . 00 -. 06 
. 07 . 13 c -. 00 . 07 . 11 b 
1 . 07 . 19 c . 27 c 
1 . 13 c . 18 c 
-1 . 18 c 
--1 
Spearman partial rank order correlations controlling for industry (nine 2-digit 
industry dummies), employment (EMPL), ownership status (MULTI) and production 
structure (PROD). Number of observations = 438. 
Legend: 
a) Significance level greater than 90%. 
b) Significance level greater than 95%. 
c) Significance level greater than 99%. 
. 14 c 
. 34 c 
. 06 
. 28 c 
1 
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Turning to the focus of the chapter, i. e., testing hypothesis 2, 
results of Table 3 strongly point to the absence of any relation 
between measures of the plant's organizational structure and human 
resource management practices. Only just-in-time is correlated with 
a more diffused and decentralized form of organization. Contrary to 
common arguments, total quality management and quality circles are 
instead correlated with more bureaucratic structures. The other 
results do not show any significant correlation at all. 
Finally, I define a variable that measures how "lean" is the 
organization of sample plants: 
LEAN(j) = -S[S(DC. ST) + S(DC. OP) + S(ST _ 
CST) + S(ST - 
C. OP) + S(LEVEL)] 
where S(x) means standardization of x. 
By following existing literature, a lean type of organization is 
defined as characterized by: decentralization of (some) decision- 
making activities, diffusion of centers of power (in order to exploit 
local knowledge) and sharp reduction of bureaucratization (very low 
number of corporate levels). Thus, I would expect LEAN to be highly 
correlated with the adoption of new management practices. 
Table 4 shows that this is not the case. Again, only just-in-time is 
(weakly) correlated with the lean type of organization. There is no 
evidence, at least for Italian plants, of any relation between the 
adoption of flat and decentralized organizations and the introduction 
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of new managerial practices. In sum, such findings suggest that 
economists should be more careful in using the latter as proxies of 
the former. 
Tab. 4- Correlations between LEAN and management practices 
Measure JOB CIRC INC JIT TQM 
LEAN . 068 -. 037 . 
050 . 085 a . 022 
Spearman partial rank order correlations controlling for industry (nine 2-digit 
industry dummies), employment (EMPL), ownership status (MULTI) and production 
structure (PROD). Number of observations = 438. 
Legend: 
a) Significance level greater than 90%. 
Part IV 
Dynamic Models 
Chapter 6 
The Determinants of Structural Inertia: 
Technological and Organizational Factors 
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6.1 Some Preliminary Remarks on Structural Inertia 
There are wide anecdotal evidence and a few large-scale empirical 
studies supporting the view that business firms quite rarely change 
their organizational structure, a phenomenon usually referred to in 
the literature as "structural inertia". 
Both the economic press and studies in business history suggest 
that powerful conservative forces are at work preventing firms from 
implementing organizational changes, even if such changes would 
overtly improve performances. There are well known examples of 
companies in which internal reorganization lasted for many years, 
being obstructed by high corporate officers; in the end a drastic 
change of top management was needed for the restructuring to take 
place (see for instance the cases of Du Pont in Chandler et at. 1996, 
of General Motors in Chandler 1962, of Mitsubishi in Moriwaka 1970, 
and of Siemens in Kocha 1971 reported in chapter 1). In other 
instances, organizational changes were only implemented when a 
crisis threatened the very survival of the firm (see for instance Baker 
and Wruck 1989 and Wruck 1994, mentioned in Schaefer 1998). In 
addition, econometric works on the diffusion of the M-form highlight 
that large enterprises have been extremely slow in adopting such 
organizational innovation when compared to the adoption of 
technological innovations, thus suggesting the existence of structural 
inertia (see for instance Teece 1980). 
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Why are firms so reticent to modify their organizational structure? 
In other words, what are the determinants of structural inertia? 
Various explanations of such phenomenon have been offered by 
the economic literature. 
Behavioralist theorists of organizations (see March and Simon 
1958, Cyert and March 1963) point to the bounded rationality of 
economic agents and the costs involved by decision-making activity 
under uncertainty to have access to, store, process, and transmit 
information. As there is no guarantee that a decision to modify the 
organization be optimal, firms prefer to stay with their structure 
unless abnormally poor performances trigger change. 
The literature on population ecology contends that structural 
inertia is the outcome of an ecological-evolutionary process, as 
selection processes tend to favor stable organizations, that is 
organizations whose structure is difficult to change (see Hannan and 
Freeman 1984). Namely, in comparison with other institutions, 
business firms enjoy the advantage of a high level of reliability and 
accountability (i. e., the capacity to collectively produce a product of 
given quality repeatedly and to document the sequence of decisions 
and related outcome, see Hannan and Freeman 1984, p. 153). But in 
order to assure reliability and accountability, a firm's organizational 
structure needs to be reproducible over time. This is obtained by 
processes of institutionalization and by the creation of standardized 
routines, two factors which make firms highly resistant to change. 
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Evolutionary theories of technical change (see Nelson and Winter 
1982) help understand why organizational routines are a source of 
structural inertia. According to such stream of literature, routines are 
the repertoire of idiosyncratic collective actions that inform a firm's 
behavior; they are built through a cumulative process based on the 
experience of firm's problem solving activity and involve automatic 
coordinated responses to specified signals from the environment. ' So, 
due their very nature, they can only be modified incrementally and at 
considerable costs, with this leading to lock-in effects which extend to 
firm's entire organization. 
Two further bodies of theoretical literature are relevant for 
understanding the sources of structural inertia. The literature 
concerned with the investment behavior of firms under uncertainty in 
the framework of real option theory (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) has 
argued that when an investment decision entails sunk costs and 
future market conditions are uncertain, there is an additional 
opportunity cost of implementing the decision which stems from the 
lost option value of delaying it until new information is available. Any 
change of a firm's organization implies sunk costs, caused by the re- 
definition of authority relations, task assignment, information flows, 
and administrative procedures, and its returns are uncertain by 
' Routines are the memory of the organization, being responsible for the 
preservation of distinctive capabilities in spite of the fact that individual employees 
come and go (Winter 1988). See also the analysis by Nelson and Winter (1982). For 
a critical review of the concept of routines and its relation to firms' distinctive 
capabilities, see Cohen et al. (1996). 
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nature. So, it might be optimal for a firm to wait and postpone any 
change of the organizational structure until new information is 
collected. 
Lastly, there are political forces within organizations that hinder 
organizational change (see Milgrom 1988 and Milgrom and Roberts 
1990a). The reason is that adoption by a firm of a particular 
organizational design leads to a particular distribution of quasi-rents 
among firms' employees. Therefore, if a firm is going to change its 
organizational structure, a change which is likely to have 
considerable distributional implications, individual employees will try 
to influence the nature of the change so as to protect or augment 
their own quasi-rents. As such influence activities absorb employees' 
time and attention, which otherwise could be used in directly 
productive activities, they engender substantial costs. Their extent 
will depend among other things on the nature of decision-making 
power within the organization: the more discretionary decision- 
making, the higher influence costs, with everything else being equal. 
In order to avoid them, a firm may refrain from implementing 
organizational changes that would improve productive efficiency, 
unless failure to do so threatens survival (Schaefer 1998). 
The aim of the present chapter is to analyze empirically the 
determinants of structural inertia. As far as I know, this work 
constitutes the first attempt to directly address such issue through 
econometric estimates based on a large, longitudinal data set at plant 
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level. For this purpose, I specify and test a survival data analysis 
model of the likelihood of an individual plant changing the number of 
hierarchical tiers at time t, provided that no change has occurred up 
to t. I consider a set of plant- and industry-specific explanatory 
variables which are expected to induce or oppose organizational 
change. 
I am especially interested in three aspects. First, I adhere to the 
view that technological and managerial innovations are the main 
driver of organizational change. It has been argued by previous 
studies that have analyzed in the early 1990s the emergence of a new 
manufacturing paradigm (see for instance Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 
Holmström and Milgrom 1994) that adoption of advanced 
technologies, use of new human resource management practices and 
organizational change are characterized by strong complementarities 
and non-convexities. Therefore, if they even occur, they do so 
contextually. 2 In accordance with such argument, I devote particular 
attention to the impact upon organizational change of the adoption of 
process innovations and new management practices that are germane 
to the "flexible firm" paradigm. Second, I consider the role of sunk 
costs associated with the organization of plants' production process. 
In plants that adopt a Tayloristic organization of production, based 
2 Colombo and Mosconi (1995) analyze the diffusion of advanced manufacturing 
and design technologies among Italian metalworking plants. They provide evidence 
that consistently with the above argument, the adoption of anyone of the two 
technologies positively influences subsequent adoption of the other; in addition, 
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on rigid division of labor among plant employees and the 
specialization of tasks, there are quite substantial sunk costs, so, I 
expect inertial forces to be strong. Lastly, I focus on variables which 
are likely to mirror the extent of influence activities by plants' 
k- 
employees. The incentives to indulge in such activities depend on the 
marginal benefits and costs to individual employees. Incentives will 
be large if i) the decision to change the organizational structure is 
likely to have considerable distributional implications and to 
negatively affect an employee's rent (for instance, because it implies 
the elimination of some managerial positions), ii) there is room for 
influencing the decision (for instance, because the decision-maker 
has discretionary power) and iii) the attempt to influence the decision 
is not very costly to the employee (for instance, due to his closeness 
to the decision-maker). In line with such reasoning, I expect the 
allocation of responsibility for decisions relating to a plant's 
organizational chart to figure prominently in explaining structural 
inertia. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 
is devoted to the specification of the empirical model. The explanatory 
variables are introduced in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 provides results 
of the estimates of the econometric model. Finally, in Section 6.5 1 
adoption of both technologies is positively associated with use of innovative 
management techniques such as just-in-time and total quality management. 
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present some concluding remarks based upon simulations of the 
estimated model. 
6.2 A Survival Model for the Analysis of Structural 
Inertia 
Table 1 shows transition probabilities for the size of plant's 
organization. In other words, pj is the probability that a plant 
characterized by an i-level hierarchy in 1975 turned its organization 
to a j- layered structure by 1997. In what follows, I shall focus on the 
determinants of structural inertia of organizations (i. e., staying on the 
diagonal). I collapse a choice problem where, at any time, 
management decides the plant either to stay on the diagonal of a 
transition probabilities model or to move off-diagonal to any other 
organizational structure, into a simpler dynamic problem with a 
binary choice of either to stay on the diagonal or to move off-diagonal. 
Tab. 1- Transition probabilities, pj, of management hierarchy 
N. of levels of the 
previous organization 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
N. of levels of the 1997 organization 
23456 
0.57 0.32 0.07 0.04 0.00 
0.01 0.79 0.17 0.03 0.00 
0.01 0.36 0.57 0.06 0.00 
0.00 0.21 0.44 0.28 0.07 
0.00 0.00 0.26 0.48 0.26 
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The econometric model is specified in terms of duration r of not 
changing the management hierarchy: that is, the time elapsed 
between two consecutive organizational changes. Since I have 
detailed information only on the last two organizational structures (in 
terms of size of the management hierarchy, allocation of decision- 
making activities, and line or job shop nature of production 
operations), I focus on the period that starts in the year following the 
organizational change before the last one and ends in 1997 (the 
survey date). More specifically, as for the duration origin, which is not 
the same for each plant, I have proceeded in the following manner. 
For plants that have not changed their structure during the last 20 
years the origin is given by the maximum (say to) between the plant's 
year of foundation and 1975, which is the first date of observation of 
the empirical survey. Observations of plants that have changed once 
have been divided into two intervals: the first period of observation 
goes from to to the date of the first organizational change (ti), while 
the time span of the second interval is delimited by ti+1 and 1997. 
Lastly, observations of plants that have changed two (or more) times 
have been divided into two intervals: the first period starts with the 
year following the organizational change before the last one and ends 
with the date of the last change (t2); the time spell of the second 
interval is delimited by t2+1 and 1997. In the appendix I illustrate in 
greater detail these cases. 
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At r, the dependent variable of the econometric model equals one if 
after r years from the last change a plant switches to another 
organizational structure, either decreasing or increasing the size of 
the management hierarchy (i. e., leaving the diagonal). By following 
the recent literature on technological change (see in particular 
Colombo and Mosconi 1995, Karshenas and Stoneman 1993, and 
Stoneman and Kwon 1994) I employ a duration model. The basic tool 
for modeling duration data is the hazard function, which may be 
viewed as the "instantaneous probability" of leaving the present state 
(i. e., turning to a different management hierarchy), indeed: 
h; (z, x;, 0) 
P[T, < T: 9 z; + DI T>_ z, , x,, 
9] 
= Iim elo ý 
(1) 
so that the hazard function is the probability density of changing the 
organizational structure by plant i at r, conditional on not having 
changed up to r. It depends on duration r and a set of explanatory 
variables x:. Finally, h; () includes the unknown parameter vector 0, 
which is supposed to be the same for all individuals. 
The likelihood function can be written in terms of the hazard 
function, as follows (Cox and Oakes 1984): 
I r; L(B) =FI expt- jh; (u, x,, 9)dutfl h, (r, x;, 0), (2) 
t0 tEU 
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where U is the set of all uncensored individuals (i. e., plants that have 
changed organizational structure before the survey date). 
In order to estimate equation (2) I have to choose a functional form 
for the hazard function. Following previous work, I assume h() to be 
Weibull: 3 
hi[T, x 0 =(p, Q)] = hp(hr)p-1, h= eX;. v (3) 
where p is the parameter that rules duration dependence. When p=1, 
there is no duration dependence; when it is greater than one there is 
positive duration dependence, while a negative duration dependence 
arises when p is smaller than 1. The effects of covariates x (i. e., 
explanatory variables) are accounted for by the parameter vector , ß. 
6.3 The Determinants of Structural Inertia 
In this paragraph I concentrate on the explanatory variables, which 
are presented in Table 2. All time varying variables have a subscript t. 
I have divided explanatory variables into three sets. The first set 
refers to variables regarding the characteristics of the organization: 
allocation of decision-making, hierarchy's size and type of production 
operations. These variables are intended to capture the effect of 
3 Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) estimate both exponential and Weibull models, 
and argue that the latter explains in greater detail the diffusion of technological 
adoptions, because it allows for epidemic effects (i. e., positive time dependence). 
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influence activities and sunk costs on structural inertia. The second 
group includes variables concerning technology adoptions of 
advanced manufacturing technologies (AMTs) and introduction of 
human resource management practices (HRMPs). These variables 
measure the impact on organizational evolution of technological 
change. Finally, the third group concerns other plant-specific 
variables such as plant size, ownership status, and growth, and 
industry-specific variables such as industry R&D, market growth rate 
and concentration. 
6.3.1 Variables Regarding the Organizational Structure 
If we consider theoretical work, probably the most important 
determinant of organizational change is the organization itself. In 
other words, the organization changes according to its current 
structure. Thus, for instance case studies document that very 
centralized firms, where the owner holds most of decision-making 
power, have often suffered from structural inertia. In this section I 
present variables regarding the characteristics of the organization. 
First, I define variables that control for the allocation of decision- 
making activities within the firm's organization. PM SUPt is a time- 
varying dummy variable that equals 1 if the plant manager's 
corporate superior has at time t responsibility for decisions 
concerning the plant's organization. More specifically, I set PM SUP to 
Colombo and Mosconi (1995) employ a Weibull model and find positive time and 
duration dependence. 
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I when authority over at least one of the decisions regarding plant's 
workforce is assigned to a plant manager's superior (i. e., hiring and 
dismissal, definition of individual and collective incentive schemes, 
and decisions on plant's employees career paths). Given that I do not 
have specific information of the corporate level that takes the decision 
on organizational change, I assume that the likelihood of such 
decision being taken by a superior of the plant manager is greater if 
he is in charge of (some of the) decisions concerning the plant's 
personnel. Indeed, this decision presents high externalities with all 
the other strategies; thus it is usually assigned to higher corporate 
levels. 
Further, I distinguish between situations in which the corporate 
superior of the plant manager is the owner of a single-plant firm and 
those in which she is a middle manager within a large multi-plant 
corporation. In single-plant firms the owner operates both inside and 
outside the plant. Agents have thus great incentive to try to affect 
directly and/or indirectly decisions of the owner, who possesses 
power over a very large spectrum of decisions. Thus, in this case 
influence activities are very high, due to both the proximity between 
plant's agents and the owner and the large discretionary power of the 
decision-maker. Moreover, case studies reveal that the owner is often 
unwilling to change the organization. In (small) single-plant firms 
changing the structure means both introducing new corporate levels 
and delegating some power downwards the management hierarchy 
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(see chapter 2). Due to moral hazard problems and psychological 
explanations, owners are often adverse to this change. 
Tab. 2- The explanatory variables of structural inertia 
Variables Description 
SIZE Logarithm of the number of plant's employees in 1989 
dSIZE Positive value of plant's growth rate (employment), period 1989-96 
GROWTH Plant's growth rate, for plants with positive growth rate; 0 otherwise 
DECLINE Positive value of plant's growth rate, for plants with negative growth 
rate; 0 otherwise 
GROUP 1 for plants that belong to a multi-plant company; 0 otherwise 
AGEt Plant's age at time t; 
LINES 1 for plants involved in line production of a limited number of 
standardized designs; 0 for plants characterized by job-shop kinds 
of operations; 
LEVELS Number of hierarchic levels of plant's organization 
EXTERNALS 1 for plants owned by a multi-plant company in which the decision 
on the plant's organizational structure is taken by corporate officers 
outside the plant; 0 otherwise 
OWNERS 1 for plants owned by a single-plant firm in which the decision on 
the plant's organizational structure is taken by the firm's owner; 0 
otherwise 
AMT1,2,3,4t 1 for plants that by year t-1 have adopted 1,2,3,4 AMTsa 
respectively; 0 otherwise 
QCt 1 for plants that by year t- 1 have adopted formal team practices 
(i. e., quality circles); 0 otherwise 
INCt 1 for plants that by year t-1 have adopted individual line incentives; 
0 otherwise 
ROTt 1 for plants that by year t-1 have adopted job rotation; 0 otherwise 
I-GROWTH Positive value of industry growth rate (three digit NACE-CLIO 
classification) 
R&D Proportion of R&D employees to total sector employment (two-digit 
NACE-CLIO classification) 
HERF Herfindahl concentration index (three-digit NACE-CLIO 
classification) 
Legend 
(a) AMTs (advanced manufacturing technologies): machining centers, 
programmable robots, numerically (or computerized numerically) controlled 
stand-alone machine tools, and flexible manufacturing systems (FMS). 
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Conversely, in multinational corporations where decision-making 
on plant's organization is assigned to a salaried executive who works 
outside the production unit, influence activities are strongly limited 
by the distance between the decision-maker and the agents who are 
affected by her decisions. 
In order to take into account these situations, I have defined three 
time-varying dummy variables: OWNERt, PMt, and EXTERNALt. 4 
OWNER equals one if at time t decisions on plant's organization are 
assigned to the plant manager's corporate superior (i. e., PM SUP = 1) 
and the plant is owned by a single-plant firm. In this case it is very 
likely that there are no intermediate levels between the plant 
manager and the owner. Thus, OWNER captures situations where the 
firm's owner detains decision-making power on plant's organization, 
and is set to zero otherwise. PM equals one if at time t the plant 
manager is assigned responsibility for the decision on the change of 
the plant's management hierarchy independently on the single or 
multi-plant ownership status (PM SUP =0). EXTERNAL equals one 
when PM SUP is one (i. e., authority is centralized at the plant 
manager's corporate superior level) and the plant is owned by a 
multi-plant corporation. In this latter case the plant manager's 
corporate superior is a high corporate officer who works outside the 
plant. On the basis of the aforementioned theoretical considerations 
4 Note that these variables are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, thus one has to 
be chosen as the baseline of the estimates. In particular, I choose PM, which thus 
does not appear in the estimates of the econometric model. 
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on influence activities, I expect the following order as to the impact of 
the allocation of decision-making power upon organizational change: 
OWNER< PM< 0< EXTERNAL. 
I define the variable LEVELt as the number of the plant's corporate 
levels at time t. This variable provides information on the complexity 
of the structure of agents' relations. On the one hand, managerial 
literature suggests that during the 1980s and 1990s plants 
characterized by very bureaucratic structures have changed their 
organizations turning to "leaner forms" (see Baharami 1992, Drucker 
1988, Krafcik 1988). On the other, organizational ecology theory 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977 and 1984) predicts just an opposite 
relation: complexity of organizations causes structural inertia. As a 
consequence, the likelihood of inertia may increase or decrease, 
depending on which effect prevails. 
Finally, I also consider the characteristics of the production 
process to considerably affect the likelihood of changing the 
organization. Their impact is examined through the time-varying 
dummy variable denoted LINEi. LINE indicates that at time t plants 
are involved in line production, whilst equals 0 with plants 
characterized by job-shop kinds of operations. We should consider 
that line production is associated to specialization of blue collars in 
specific tasks, whilst job shop operations are linked to a more flexible 
multitask organization. Thus, plants involved in line production are 
less likely to change their organization, due to the higher sunk costs 
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associated with a change of the management hierarchy (e. g., re- 
definition of tasks and procedural routines). 
6.3.2 Technology Adoptions and HRMPs 
I divide explanatory variables on adoption of innovations into two 
sets. The first concerns technology adoptions, whereas the second set 
includes managerial innovations. 
I consider advanced production technologies which are at the core 
of the analysis of recent empirical literature on technological change 
(see Dunne 1994). In particular I focus attention on AMTs which are 
defined as one of the following category of technology: flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS), machining centers, CN/CNC stand 
alone machine tools, and programmable robots. Generally speaking, 
both theoretical (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990) and empirical (see 
Bresnahan et al. 1999) literature suggests advanced technologies to 
be positively related to organizational change. In addition, I expect 
the existence of a "cluster effect": AMTs may affect the organizational 
change when introduced together, rather than in isolation. Thus, I 
define four time-varying dummy variables: AMT1t, AMT2t, AMT3t, and 
AMT4t equal 1 for plants which by year t-1 have adopted 1,2,3 and 4 
AMTs, respectively. It is worth mentioning that Doms et al. (1997), 
using a similar technology count for US manufacturing plants, find 
that the intensity of use of AMTs is positively related with the use of 
multiple technologies. So, in accordance with previous line of 
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reasoning, I expect plants that have adopted a great number of AMTs 
to be more innovative hence more inclined towards organizational 
change. 
The second set consists of time dependent dummy variables 
regarding the introduction of human resource management practices 
(HRMPs). QCt, INCt, and ROTt equal 0 for plants that by year t have 
not adopted quality circles, individual incentive schemes and job 
rotation, respectively. In the year following the adoption they are 
switched to 1. These work policies are at the core of recent empirical 
and theoretical research on the organization of firms (see for instance 
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994, Kandel and Lazear 1992, and 
Ichniowski et al. 1997 for empirical support). This work suggests that 
the introduction of managerial innovations is part of a new 
organizational structure characterized by decentralization of (some) 
decision-making activities, multitasking (rather than specialization of 
tasks), and reduced bureaucratization. As Lindbeck and Snower 
(1996) point out "the organizational structure of firms is becoming 
flatter: the new structure is built around teams that report to the 
central management, with few if any intermediaries". In this respect, 
job rotation, team work (i. e., quality circles), and incentive schemes 
appear to be complementary to a new "holistic" form of organization. 
Hence, I predict a positive impact as to the effect of the introduction 
of HRMPs to the organizational change of plants. 
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6.3.3 Plant and Industry-specific Variables 
Previous empirical work on organizational change have mainly 
concentrated on firm and industry-specific characteristics, such as 
firm size, growth and ownership status, product differentiation, and 
industry concentration and growth. 
SIZE is the logarithm of the number of plant's employees at the end 
of the 1980s (June 1989). On the one hand, Thompson (1983) shows 
that organizational change (i. e., the passage from a functional form to 
an M-form in large multi-plant companies) is positively related to firm 
size. On the other hand, more recent studies (see for instance Palmer 
et al. 1993) find that once we control for (product and geographic) 
diversification the effect of size vanishes. 
DSIZE is the positive value of the plant's growth rate (in terms of 
employment) between 1989 and 1996. I expect a change in the 
number of employees to strongly affect the likelihood of changing the 
organizational structure. In fact, since the size of the organization is a 
positive function of the number of employees, a change in the latter 
should end up in a change in the former. In order to control for 
eventual asymmetric effects two additional variables GROWTH and 
DECLINE are defined. They are equal to the (positive) value of the 
growth rate for plants with positive and negative growth respectively, 
and are set to 0 otherwise. I would expect the effect of the change in 
plant size to be quite symmetric. Descriptive evidence of chapter 2 
would seem to confirm this impression. Indeed, during the last two 
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decades very complex and large plants have been both downsizing 
and reducing their number of levels, whilst small and simple plants 
have increased their number of employees and adopted more complex 
structures. 
GROUP is a dummy variable that is one when the plant is owned 
by a business group and is set to 0 otherwise. In multi-plant firms, 
the change of the organizational structure of plants may imply higher 
sunk costs due to the large extent of externalities associated with this 
decision. Thus, I would expect the organization of plants that are 
owned by a business group to be comparatively more stable over 
time. AGE& is a time-varying variable that conveys information on 
plant's age at time t. Young firms have less consolidated hierarchic 
structures (in terms of procedural routines, definition of tasks), hence 
enjoy gains coming from a more flexible and less bureaucratic 
organization. In accordance with such line of reasoning, I expect AGE 
to negatively affect the likelihood of changing the organization. 
The second set of explanatory variables refers to industry-specific 
characteristics. I-GROWTH is the positive value of the industry growth 
rate (three-digit NACE-CLIO classification) in the period 1981-1991. 
To examine the impact of industry concentration on the likelihood of 
changing plant's organization, I calculated the Herfindahl index at 
the three digit NACE-CLIO classification in 1991 (HERF). Finally, I 
include the variable R&D, which is the ratio of R&D expenses to 
industry turnover (two-digit NACE-CLIO classification). Overall, I 
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would expect plants in high-tech, fast-growing and more competitive 
industries to change more frequently their organizations, due to the 
need of adapting quickly their production structure to an unstable 
and competitive environment. 
6.4 Empirical Evidence 
Table 3 presents the results of two Weibull duration models. Before 
addressing the core issues which this paper is concerned with, i. e., 
the impact of organizational variables and technology adoptions on 
structural inertia, let us consider the role of "more classical" firm and 
industry-specific explanatory variables. 
First, SIZE fails to register any additional significant impact upon 
the likelihood of changing the organizational structure once I 
consider the characteristics of plant's organization (notably, the 
number of levels of the management hierarchy). In contrast, plant's 
employment growth (i. e., DSIZE) turns out to play a crucial role in 
positively influencing the likelihood of changing the organizational 
structure. In chapter 3, I demonstrated that organizational depth is 
positively related to plant size; therefore the negative impact of DSIZE 
on inertia would seem to mimic the static link: plants that are 
growing introduce new corporate layers, whereas those that are 
downsizing decrease the depth of the management hierarchy. 
In model II I investigate whether such effects are symmetric by 
replacing DSIZE with two variables: GROWTH and DECLINE. Results 
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are somewhat surprising: they show the existence of an asymmetric 
relation between changes of size and structure. Whilst growing plants 
do change their architecture, declining plants do not. This evidence 
may point to the role played by influence activities: these activities 
are indeed very high when the firm is downsizing, when changing the 
management hierarchy implies shrinking its size and re-allocating 
tasks. In this process many agents are likely to be (negatively) 
affected by the organizational change. In contrast, when a firm is 
growing the amount of resources is growing as well, thus a re- 
allocation of power will damage only few (if any) agents. The impact of 
influence costs, however, will be analyzed in greater detail later in 
this section. 
Contrary to prior expectations, AGE displays a negative effect on 
structural inertia, even if it fails to register any significant 
explanatory power. The ownership status seems to play a role in the 
evolution of plants' organization, with GROUP being negative and 
significant at 90%. Thus, we have a confirmation that plants that are 
owned by a multi-plant company are, other things being equal 
(notably the allocation of decision-making), less likely to change their 
organization, due to the larger externalities involved in this decision: 
a change of the organization of this category of plants very often 
implies a contextual change of the organization of other firm's units. 
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Tab. 3- The econometric model of organizational change 
Variables 
P 
ao Constant 
ai SIZE 
a2 dSIZE 
a3 GROWTH 
a4 DECLINE 
a5 AGEt 
a6 GROUP 
a7 LINEt 
a8 LEVELt 
a9 OWNERt 
ato EXTERNALt 
ail AMT1t 
a12 AMT2t 
a13 AMT3t 
a14 AMT4t 
ais QCt 
a16 INCt 
a17 ROTt 
am I-GROWTH 
ai9 R&D 
azo HERF 
I 
1.2563 (0.1156) c 
-5.1897 (0.4335) c 
-0.0666 (0.0829) 
0.4249 (0.1657) b 
0.0038 (0.0030) 
-0.6670 (0.4001) a 
-0.3526 (0.1451) b 
0.3424 (0.0777) c 
-0.4544 (0.1974) b 
0.2625 (0.4039) 
0.6178 (0.2084) c 
0.9294 (0.2075) c 
1.1133 (0.2589) c 
1.6964 (0.3065) c 
0.5773 (0.1759) c 
0.1475 (0.1550) 
0.3576 (0.1455) b 
0.3776 (0.2271) a 
2.3280 (2.0550) 
-4.4463 (2.2562) b 
Log-likelihood -703.1834 
LR X2-tests on groups of explanatory variables: 
Organization: a7= a8= a9= aio=0 
- 
bureaucratization: a7= a8= 0 
- decision-making: a9= aio=0 
Technology: an= ail= ai3= a14=0 
HRMPs: ais= aie= a17=0 
Industry: a18= ai 9= a2o= 0 
Number of plants 
Number of records 
33.3408 (4) c 
26.0636 (2) c 
5.8794 (2) a 
49.1928 (4) c 
24.6986 (3) c 
10.1742 (3) b 
438 
8,169 
Legend: Usual t-tests, except for p, where Ho: p=1. 
a) Significance level greater than 90%. 
b) Significance level greater than 95%. 
c) Significance level greater than 99%. 
Standard errors and degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
II 
1.2587 (0.1161) b 
-5.1901 (0.4327) c 
-0.0577 (0.0827) 
0.4375 (0.1658) c 
0.2365 (0.3869) 
0.0042 (0.0031) 
-0.6843 (0.4135) a 
-0.3511 (0.1448) b 
0.3382 (0.0787) c 
-0.4566 (0.1971) b 
0.2915 (0.4037) 
0.6094 (0.2082) c 
0.9204 (0.2079) c 
1.1050 (0.2589) c 
1.6913 (0.3059) c 
0.5656 (0.1779) c 
0.1408 (0.1592) 
0.3546 (0.1454) b 
0.3767 (0.2269) a 
2.3430 (2.0550) 
-4.5060 (2.2550) b 
-703.0019 
32.984 (4) c 
25.4504 (2) c 
6.0274 (2) b 
48.7988 (4) c 
23.6454 (3) c 
10.3292 (3) b 
438 
8,169 
208 
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Turning to industry-specific variables, they overall display a 
significant impact on structural inertia, with the coefficient of I- 
GROWTH, R&D and HERF being jointly significant at conventional 
levels (see the LR tests at the bottom of Table 3). In particular, the 
greater the turbulence of an industry, the more likely the change of 
plants' organization, with I-GROWTH positive and significant at 90%. 
In addition, the negative significant (at the 95% level) effect of HERF 
illustrates that industry concentration favors structural inertia, 
whilst the positive though insignificant coefficient of R&D would seem 
to show that a higher scientific base induces more change. 
Next, let us focus on variables regarding plant's organization. They 
overall display a significant impact on structural inertia (see again 
the LR tests of Table 3). As to the complexity of a plant's organization, 
this turns out to be positively related to organizational change, with 
the coefficient of LEVEL being positive and significant at the 99% 
level. This result contrasts with predictions of organizational ecology 
theory, confirming instead case studies evidence of managerial 
literature. It is worth noticing that the reduction of hierarchical layers 
of very complex organizations is not the result of a process of 
downsizing, which was particularly pronounced in the 1990s. 5 
Indeed, as stressed before, the variable DECLINE has not been found 
to play any role in organizational change. Instead, it may be due to a 
5 For instance, between the end of the 1980s and 1996 the average plant's size had 
declined from 233 employees to 195. 
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new method of organizing production in a mutated, more uncertain 
environment. In this context, operative decisions have to be taken 
just in time, so that a new flatter form of organization is needed, 
confirming in some way predictions of computer science models (see 
in particular van Zandt 1999). 
The result of the variable LINE, which has a negative and 
significant (at 95%) coefficient, shows that sunk costs are key in 
explaining structural inertia. Given that a) plants whose layout of 
production is in line incur in high sunk costs when changing their 
organizational structure and b) the decision on organizational change 
implies uncertain returns, then in accordance with option theory 
(Dixit and Pyndick 1994) for a plant's management may be rational to 
postpone any change until new information is collected. This in turn 
leads to the detected inertial process. 
Let us now turn to variables reflecting the allocation of decision- 
making. Plants owned by a single-plant firm where the owner holds 
large discretionary power are more likely to be characterized by 
structural inertia: the coefficient of OWNER is negative and 
significant at the 95% level. Conversely, plants owned by multi-plant 
corporations in which decision making power on a plant's 
organization is assigned to a corporate officer outside the production 
unit, are marginally more likely to change. EXTERNAL has a positive 
though statistically insignificant coefficient. In an intermediate 
position are those situations in which the plant manager is assigned 
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responsibility on plant's organizational structure (i. e., the baseline of 
the estimates). Such evidence provides support to the key role played 
by influence activities in inhibiting organizational change. Agents are 
very likely to try to influence the decisions of the principal so as to 
defend their personal power, especially when a) the principal is 
physically close to them, as is the case of single-plant firms 
independently of whether decision activity is allocated to the plant 
manager or to its superior and b) if the principal is entitled with 
considerable decision power, a condition which distinguishes 
situations where the owner-manager is in charge from those where 
responsibility on some plant's strategic decisions is partially 
delegated to the plant manager. Actually, such result is also 
consistent with previous evidence on the aversion of owner-manager 
of very autocratic organizations towards organizational change which 
often implies a delegation of decision-making authority to salaried 
managers. 
Next, let us focus attention on technology adoptions of AMTs. They 
overall display a great explanatory power, with the LR test of joint 
significance showing the key role played by technological innovations 
on organizational change. The coefficients of the categorical variables 
AMT1, AMT2, AMT3, and AMT4 are all positive and statistically 
significant at 99%. Even more interestingly, these results show that 
the higher the intensity of use of AMTs, the larger the impact on 
organizational change. This evidence is further confirmed by the Wald 
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tests of Table 4, which demonstrate that the increasing magnitude on 
organizational change of the effect of multiple technology adoptions is 
statistically significant in almost all cases: the larger the number of 
technologies in use, the higher the probability of changing the 
management hierarchy. Such result points to the complementarity 
between the adoption of technologies related to the Flexible 
Automation paradigm and consequent changes in organization. In 
this sense, they are consistent with both theory (Milgrom and Roberts 
1990) and previous empirical evidence (Colombo and Mosconi 1995). 
Tab. 4- The impact of technological complementarity 
Intensity in the use ofAMTs Walt tests on Model H of Table 3 
AMT4 > AMT3 4.28 (1) c 
AMT4 > AMT2 8.72 (1) c 
AMT4 > AMT1 14.70 (1) c 
AMT3 > AMT2 0.73(l) 
AMT3 > AMT1 4.42 (1) b 
AMT2 > AMT1 2.66(l) 
Legend 
b) Significance level greater than 95%. 
c) Significance level greater than 99%. 
Degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
Before turning to the results of managerial innovations, a last 
remark on technology adoptions is in order. As said, the detected 
impact of AMTs on structural inertia may point to a causal 
relationship between complementarity in advanced production 
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technologies and organizational change. Yet this may also reflect 
unobserved plants heterogeneity: plants that adopt multiple 
technologies are more likely to change the organization due to 
differences in plants' employees skills (see Di Nardo and Pischke 
1997 for a similar issue but in another empirical context). In 
particular, the larger the intensity in the use of AMTs, the higher the 
skill of employees working inside the plant (Bartel and Lichtenberg 
1987). Plants with operators with higher skill are in turn more likely 
to change their organization, due to the lower costs of re-organizing 
the production process, i. e., tasks, information flows, and 
administrative procedures. 
Lastly, the results on human resource management practices 
(HRMPs) confirm prediction of aforementioned theoretical work: the 
management hierarchy changes with the introduction of managerial 
innovations. The coefficients of INC, QC and ROT are positive, with 
the last two being significant at conventional levels. In the 1980s and 
1990s, the use of such innovations has forced Italian plants to 
change their organization. It is worth mentioning however that in 
chapter 5I found that, unlike technology adoptions, the use of 
HRMPs was not associated to any particular form of organization. So, 
whilst managerial innovations influence the likelihood of changing 
the organization, they do not influence the direction of this dynamic 
path. 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks through Simulations 
The coefficients of previous econometric models are not derivatives in 
the estimations, thus assessing the magnitude of the impact of the 
different explanatory variables is difficult. For this purpose, I have 
proceeded to simulate the model. The basic idea is to use the 
estimated parameters for calculating the distribution function F(r, x, 9). 
For any plant, F gives the probability to change the organization after 
r years from the last organizational change. As a benchmark, I have 
firstly calculated the value of F when the explanatory variables in the 
vector x take on values that describe the "representative plant". The 
probability of the representative plant is then compared to those 
calculated for different values of x, in order to analyze the estimated 
effects of the variable(s) which have been modified. 
The characteristics of the representative plant are described in 
Table S. All non-dummy variables have been set at (or around) the 
mean, while dummies have set to zero for the whole period with the 
exception of LINE, which equals 1. So, the benchmark case is 
represented by a plant founded in 1957, with a constant number of 
employees equal to 233, and characterized by a four-level hierarchy 
in which decisions on plant's organizational structure are assigned to 
the plant manager. 
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Tab. 5- Description of the 'representative plant' 
Variable Value 
Plant's employees 233 
DSIZE 0 
LINEt 1 for all t 
LEVELt 4 for all t 
Year of establishment 1957 
OWNERt and EXTERNALt 0 for all t 
AMTI t0 for all t 
AMT2t 0 for all t 
AMT3t 0 for all t 
AMT4t 0 for all t 
QCt 0forallt 
INCt 0 for all t 
ROTt 0forallt 
I-GROWTH 0.0614 
R&D 0.0198 
HERF 0.0177 
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Tables 6,7 and 8 illustrate the predicted probability of changing 
the organization by 1997 when the explanatory variables are changed 
one at a time, to give an idea of the impact of each variable on 
structural inertia. Whenever a variable is changed, it is set either to a 
value representative of the lowest values observed in our sample, or 
to a value representative of the highest ones. This with the exceptions 
of SIZE and DSIZE, for which intermediate (more interesting) values 
have been chosen. As for the time varying dummies that capture 
characteristics of the organization, when they are changed they are 
set to 1 from the period considered (i. e., from 1975). For the time 
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varying dummies of technology and HRMPs adoptions, when they are 
changed they are set to 1 from 1979 (I call this as the case of a 
pioneer), 1984 (early adopter), 1989 (average adopter), or 1995 (late 
adopter). 
Table 6 presents simulations of the effects on structural inertia of 
change in organization and other plant-specific variables with respect 
to the representative plant. In order to evaluate the effect of the 
allocation of decision-making, I have considered two benchmark 
cases depending on the plant's ownership status: single or multi- 
plant ownership. The two benchmarks differ quite remarkably in the 
likelihood of changing the organization by 1997: for single-plant firms 
this probability is as high as 18.1%, whilst it drops to 8.1% for plants 
owned by a business group, confirming that when the decision on the 
plant's management hierarchy might extend to other firm's units 
sunk costs are higher. The sunk costs explanation of structural 
inertia is also supported by the effect of the type of production 
operations: single-plant firms that are involved in line production 
operations are far less likely to change their structure than plants 
characterized by job shop kinds of operations (18.1% versus 26.6%). 
As to organizational complexity, the probability of changing the 
organization of plants increases with the size of the management 
hierarchy: 8.1% in 2-layered organizations (3.5% when the plant is 
owned by a business group), 18.1% (8.1%) when the number of levels 
is 4, up to 37.3% (17.9%) with 6 managerial layers. 
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Tab. 6- Simulation of the effect on organizational change of 
change in one variable at a time with respect to the 
representative plant: organization and plant-specific variables 
Probability of changing the management hierarchy by 1997 
single-plant multi-plant 
Representative plant 18.06% 8.07% 
Level =28.15% 3.53% 
Level =6 37.30% 17.90% 
Job shop (Line =0) 26.65% 12.28% 
Owner =1 10.61% - 
External =1- 11.44% 
Size = 100 19.09% 8.56% 
Size = 1,000 16.41% 7.29% 
Decline = 50% 20.64% 9.31% 
Growth = 50% 23.08% 10.50% 
Large, complex and downsizing 38.57% 18.61% 
- and driven by an external - 25,71% 
manager 
Small, simple and growing 11,23% 4,91% 
- and driven by the owner 6,48% - 
Influence activities strongly inhibit the stimulus towards change. 
For single-plants firms where decision-making is (partially) delegated 
to the plant manager, the likelihood of changing the organization is 
as high as 18.1%. This probability drops to 10.6%, in an autocratic 
(owner driven) single-plant firm where power is highly concentrated 
and agents have more incentive to influence the principal's behavior. 
In plants owned by a business group, where the decision-maker is 
physically far from the production unit, influence activities of plant's 
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employees are reduced, thus organizational change is more likely 
(11.4% versus 8.1% of the benchmark case). 
At the bottom of Table 6, I present results for two important 
categories of plants: large (number of employees=1,000), complex 
(number of levels=6) and declining (growth rate=-50%) units and 
small (100), simple (2) and growing (+50%) plants. The former tend to 
change their organization quite often, specially when they are 
managed by an external executive, whilst the latter follow an inertial 
process, particularly pronounced in very autocratic single-plant firms 
where ownership and control are not separated. 
Tab. 7- Simulation of the effect on organizational change of 
change in one variable at a time with respect to the 
representative plant: industry effects 
Probability of changing the management hierarchy by 1997 
Representative plant (single plant) 18.06% 
Low scientific base (R&D=0.002) 17.24% 
High scientific base (R&D=0.139) 24.68% 
Low concentration (Herf=0.000) 19.75% 
High concentration (Herf=0.242) 5.42% 
Low turbulence (I-growth=0.003) 17.62% 
High turbulence (I-growth=O. 992) 26.63% 
In Table 7I have proceeded to simulate the effects on 
organizational change of different industry environments. The 
scientific base of an industry, in terms of proportion of resources 
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devoted to R&D, raises the likelihood of changing frequently the 
organization of plants. In addition, industries with low market 
concentration and high turbulence are not only characterized by a 
changing environment, but are also populated by changing 
organizations. 
Tab. 8- Simulation of the effect on organizational change of 
change in one variable at a time with respect to the 
representative plant: technology adoptions and HRMPs 
Probability of changing the management hierarchy by 1997 
Pioneer Early Average Late No adoption 
adopter adopter adopter 
AMT1 32.52% 29.19% 25.09% 19.16% 18.06% 
AMT2 43.27% 37.85% 30.86% 20.14% 18.06% 
AMT3 50.70% 44.07% 35.20% 20.91% 18.06% 
AMT4 72.59% 64.02% 50.59% 24.08% 18.06% 
INC 20.70% 20.05% 19.29% 18.25% 18.06% 
JROT 25.47% 23.69% 21.57% 18.60% 18.06% 
QC 31.20% 28.15% 24.42% 19.06% 18.06% 
Legend 
Pioneer. adoption in 1979; 
Early adopter adoption in 1984; 
Average adopter adoption in 1989; 
Late adopter. adoption in 1995. 
Lastly, Table 8 shows the results of the simulated effects on 
structural inertia of technology adoptions and HRMPs. First, the 
likelihood of inertia increases with the adoption time: the earlier the 
adoption, the more likely organizational change. This result derives 
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from the significantly positive duration dependence of the estimates 
(see the result of the parameter p reported in Table 3). Second, the 
impact of technology adoptions on organizational change seems to be 
greater than that of HRMPs: a plant that by 1979 had adopted one 
AMT has a probability of changing its structure by 1997 equal to 
32.5%, which is greater than the impact of the most influent category 
of HRMPs (Quality Circles with 31.2%). Third, it is now more manifest 
the increasing effect of technological complementarity. The higher the 
number of flexible technologies adopted, the larger the impact on 
organizational change, with a `pioneer plant' that by 1979 had 
adopted four AMTs being almost sure to change its management 
hierarchy by 1997 (73% versus 18% of the no adoption case). 
Chapter 6 221 
Appendix 
I have classified plants depending on the evolution of their 
organizational structure. In particular there are three possible cases, 
which are graphically presented in what follows: a) plants that have 
not changed their organization in the last 20 years (i. e., from 1975 to 
1997), b) plants that have changed once, and c) plants that have 
changed two (or more) times. 
a) No organizational change: 
In this case I impose a starting date which is the maximum (to) 
between 1975 (the first year of observation of the empirical survey) 
and the date of plant's foundation. Also, observations are right- 
censored, since I impose a closing date given by 1997 (the survey 
date). 
0 T=1997-to duration 
ii No 
to =max(1975, year of establishment) 1997 time 
b) 1 organizational change: 
In this case I divide the period under observation into two intervals. 
The first starts from to and ends at the date of the last organizational 
change (tl). The second is delimited by t1+1 and 1997. 
0 T1=ti-to tit=1997-t1-1 duration 
ii1, 
to t1= date of the org. change 1997 time 
=max(1975, year of establishment) 
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c) 2 (or more) organizational changes: 
In this case I divide the period under observation into two intervals. 
The first starts from the year after the date of the organizational 
change before the last one and ends at the date of the last change (t2). 
The second interval is delimited by t2+1 and 1997. 
0 T i=t2-ti-1 tie=1997-t2-1 duration 
II1 10 
ti t2 1997 time 
=date of the org. change before the last one 
Summing Up 
The Central Theme: Coordination through Hierarchies 
The unifying viewpoint of this study relates to the notion of the firm. 
So far, the firm has been depicted as a nexus of contracts (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976), in which information is asymmetric and agents 
tend to exploit informational gains opportunistically. In this context, 
the main issue is to design an efficient incentive system so as to align 
agents' objectives to those of the firm. The firm and the market are 
(alternative) contractual arrangements, which do not differ much. 
Indeed, the firm "has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary 
action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market 
contracting between any two people" (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
Alternatively, the firm derives from transaction costs analysis 
(Coase 1937). Firms are efficient institutions when transaction costs 
of market relations are high. More generally, you can think of a 
continuum of institutional arrangements each of them minimizes 
transaction costs under certain conditions. Since transaction costs 
are inter-linked with asymmetric information issues, contractual 
relations re-emerge as key in the notion of the firm. 
I do not deny that these are important aspects of the firm. 
However, I depart from these and reject the view that depicts the firm 
uniquely (or even mainly) in terms of contractual relations. Indeed, 
market relations and intra-firm agents' relations are very different 
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institutional arrangements. We cannot look at these as different sides 
of the same coin or as a continuum of ordered contractual structures. 
In particular, it is my opinion that we should analyze the organization 
in greater detail. 
More specifically, hierarchic organizations are a strong means of 
ranking and coordinating agents within companies. By following 
Radner (1992), a hierarchy can be defined as a ranked tree, where a 
tree is a collection of members of the firm (either single agents or 
teams) together with a binary relation, called "superior to", that 
satisfies the following properties: 1) transitivity: if the agent A is 
superior to B, and B is superior to C, then A is superior to C; 2) 
antisymmetry: if the agent A is superior to B, then B is not superior 
to A (A is subordinate to B); 3) there is exactly one agent that is 
superior to all other agents, called the top manager, 4) except the top 
manager, agents have exactly one immediate superior (if the agent A 
is an immediate superior of B, then there is no agent between them 
in the relation). In order to rank a tree, that is to obtain a hierarchy, 
we add two further properties: 5) if the agent A is superior to B, then 
A has a higher rank; 6) if the agents A and B have the same rank, 
then they are not comparable in terms of the relation "superior to". It 
follows that within hierarchies agents are (partially) ordered. Roughly 
speaking, the hierarchic organization allows companies to set up a 
system of relations where the equilibrium is not reached through the 
market mechanism but by the hierarchic allocation of authority. In 
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other words, firms "attempt to supersede the price mechanism by 
direct hierarchical coordination" (Miller 1992, pg. 4). 
In this context aspects such as the span of control, the size of the 
management hierarchy, the allocation and concentration of decision- 
making, the adoption of human resource management practices and 
managerial innovations are key. These are means of stimulating 
agents, monitoring activities, coordinating resources, defining 
information flows, exploiting local knowledge. Within this more 
general framework monetary incentive schemes play an important 
role. However, they are neither unique nor the most exploited means 
of aligning agents' objectives to those of the firm. 
Indeed, part of the most recent theoretical work on the firm has 
been devoted to the study of these characteristics of the organization. 
Thus, decentralization or empowerment is now recognized as a means 
of stimulating motivation, exploiting local knowledge, testing agents' 
qualification (Aghion and Tirole 1995,1997, Aoki 1986, Geanakoplos 
and Milgrom 1991 and Sah and Stiglitz 1986 and 1988). Human 
resource management practices and managerial innovations aim at 
coordinating agents', defining a network of information (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1994, Kandel and Lazear 1992, Ichniowski et at. 1997). 
The size of the management hierarchy and the span of control are 
inter-linked to the monitoring activity of managers and 
communication costs (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, Calvo and 
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Wellisz 1978 and 1979, Keren and Levhari 1979 and 1983, Qian 
1994, Radner 1993, and van Zandt 1999). 
The Empirical Survey 
I started this thesis with some anecdotal evidence on the organization 
and its evolution derived from case studies of both business history 
and managerial literature. It was noted in Chapter 1 that these 
studies are based on qualitative definitions of organization variables. 
Also, they often concentrate on few case studies of very large 
corporations. The aim of this thesis was instead to provide evidence 
on key aspects of the management hierarchy by defining quantitative 
measures of the organization on a sample of plants of different sizes. 
The result is the empirical survey and the related FLAUTO97 
database. 
In the empirical survey, I focused attention on the organization of 
plants. This was due to two reasons. First, in order to study 
aforementioned aspects of hierarchies I had to delimit the unit of 
observation. Consider for instance the study of the decision-making 
allocation, the span of control and the size of the organization in large 
multi-plant corporations. Given the complexity of information to 
gather and the unwillingness of large corporations to provide such 
data, it is very likely to end up, as for business history and 
managerial studies, with qualitative taxonomies of organizations. 
However, my aim was to develop objective quantitative indices of 
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organizational variables. Second, the study of technology adoptions is 
mainly based on plant-level evidence. As long as I wanted to analyze 
the relation between technology and organization, the choice of the 
plant came out as the most appropriate. 
Therefore I designed and conducted a questionnaire analysis on 
Italian manufacturing plants aimed at collecting quantitative 
information on the above mentioned aspects of business 
organizations. The main pay-off from building the empirical survey 
upon this approach to organization relates to the alleged 
potentialities of testing quantitatively economic theory. So far, 
economists have left aspects such as leadership and power within 
organizations to sociologists or business schools. A large-scale data 
set has allowed me to test quantitatively economic models. It is my 
opinion that the findings shed new light on the organization. 
Substantive Findings 
At the end of a work one is pressed to sum up substantive findings. 
This is the place in my thesis. I do not want to summarize results of 
all Chapters here. I just want to highlight a few findings that seem to 
me particularly important in the present theoretical debate. 
First, the size of the management hierarchy increases with the 
complexity of a firm's (production and administrative) operations due 
to economies of scale in gathering and processing items of 
information. However, given the distance between the pinnacle and 
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the bottom of the hierarchy, large organizations may incur in the loss 
of control phenomenon. So, the management of firms characterized 
by very large organizations tends to increase the number of 
subordinates under one manager (i. e., the span of control) so as to 
shrink the size of the hierarchy and to limit communication and 
information failures (see Chapter 2). In other words, 
Finding 1. The loss of control phenomenon shapes the organization of 
firms: both the size of the management hierarchy and the span of 
control increase with the complexity of a firm's operations. 
Another means of reducing the distance between decision-making 
and implementation is decentralization. In large organizations, 
strategic and operating decisions are decentralized more often than in 
small sized firms were the owner usually holds most of power. 
Overall, 
Finding 2. Also decentralization of strategic and operating decision- 
making is positively correlated with the complexity of a firm's 
operations. 
Decentralization of decision confers power on an individual agent, 
who may be able to use it to purse its own interest at the owner's 
expense. Given the existence of conflicting goals in organization, 
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decentralization may be a considerable source of loss of control. In 
this situation, monetary incentives are introduced as a means of 
aligning agent's objectives to those of the firm. 
However, delegation of (real and formal) authority can be itself a 
mechanism to motivate agents and increase their participation in the 
contractual relationship. In Chapter 4I showed that authority is 
allocated depending on the importance of the decision to the agent 
and to the principal. The exploitation of local knowledge and 
capabilities, the extent of intra-firm externalities and the urgency of 
decision also turned out to play a remarkable role in influencing the 
allocation of real and formal authority. To sum up, 
Finding 3. Management introduces individual incentive schemes as a 
means of aligning agent's objectives to those of the firm when authority 
is (partially) delegated to the agent. In addition, authority is allocated 
depending on the importance of the decision to the agent and to the 
principal, the desire to exploit local knowledge and capabilities, the 
extent of intro firm externalities and the urgency of decision. 
Another aspect of interest is the relation between organization and 
technology. Just as the second industrial revolution changed the 
configuration of business organizations, so the information 
technology (IT) and flexible automation (FA) paradigms are shaping 
the organization again. In particular, in Chapter 31 maintained that 
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advances in communication and production technology strongly 
influence the organizational architecture of firms and plants. I have 
also argued that this relation deserves a careful analysis. Indeed, the 
sign and the magnitude of the impact of technology on the 
organization depend on the characteristics of technological 
innovations. In particular, I found that adoptions of different 
technologies that pertain to the production and communication 
spheres affect the organization in rather distinct and (sometimes) 
opposite ways. 
First, whereas advances in communication technology have an 
impact both on the plant and overall on the firm's organization, 
production technology influences only the architecture of the 
production unit. 
Second, both the vintage and the extent of use of production 
technologies play a key role in assessing the way in which technology 
shapes the organization of plants. Plants that use technologies linked 
to the Tayloristic approach to production (i. e, inflexible 
manufacturing systems) have a hierarchy composed of many layers, 
whilst plants that have introduced a cluster of technologies linked to 
the Flexible Automation (i. e, flexible manufacturing systems, robots, 
CNC machine tools, machining centers) are characterized by leaner 
kinds of organization. As to network technology, it is the locus of 
advances in communication - i. e., intra versus inter-firm network - 
that matters in the relation between technology and organization: 
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advances in intra-firm communication promote specialization and 
hierarchy, technology-induced reductions in communication costs 
between firms encourage outsourcing, hence a smaller type of 
organization. Thus, overall 
Finding 4. Advances in communication and production technology 
shape the organizational structure. The way in which technology 
affects organization crucially depends on its type, vintage and extent of 
use. 
In contrast, the use of new management practices does not affect 
the organizational architecture of firms (and plants). In particular, in 
Chapter 5I found that neither human resource management 
practices nor other managerial innovations are associated with the 
lean type of organization. Nevertheless, the use of such instruments 
covary in cross-sectional data; that is, they generally diffuse in 
cluster rather than in isolation. Given the lack of correlation with 
other important aspects of the organization (e. g., decentralization, 
reduced bureaucratization), it is hard to maintain that this is the 
result of the adoption by profit-maximizing firms of a coherent 
business strategy that exploits complementarities. I rather adhere to 
the view expressed by some theory that can be summarized as 
follows: 
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Finding S. Adoption of new management practices is driven by fads. 
Another fundamental theme, which has been investigated' in 
Chapter 6 (and Chapter 2), concerns the evolution of organizations. 
In this respect, I have provided robust evidence on the existence of an 
inertial process. Both the allocation of decision-making activities and 
the structure of the management hierarchy are very stable over time. 
Indeed, 
Finding 6. The evolution of business organizations is characterized by 
structural inertia. 
This is not the effect of organizational complexity as some 
sociological theory suggests (i. e., the organizational ecology 
approach). Inertia seems to be determined by influence activities (and 
sunk costs). Since authority is a fixed resource, re-organization 
implies a change in the allocation of power that favors some agents 
and damages some others. Thus, there always exist agents who 
oppose any change and embark in costly influence activities. 
Finding 7. Influence activities inhibit organizational change. 
Just as technology influences the static choice of an organizational 
structure, so also it affects the evolution of organizations. In 
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particular, the (extent of) use of flexible technologies linked to FA is 
associated to flatter and smaller organizations. Since the introduction 
of multiple technologies signals a more skilled workforce, plants that 
adopt technological innovations are also more inclined towards 
change due to the lower costs of changing frequently tasks and 
ranks. More generally, Chapter 6 shows that 
Finding 8: Technological change induces organizational change. 
Further, it is my opinion that organization and technology co- 
evolve. However this is not a finding of the present work, but it is a 
suggestion for further economic research. 
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